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Chapter 1
Introduction
As technology advances, microchips become more and more complex. To grasp
the complexity of a future chip, consider the streets of a large city from an aerial
view. Buildings – like black boxes – continuously inject and consume cars from the
infrastructure, helicopters ﬂy around and underneath it all a subway transports
masses of people between ﬁxed points. The integral behavior is dazzlingly complex
and chaotic. Future microchips may well achieve a similar degree of complexity.
On a single chip, hundreds of cores (the buildings) are performing parallel com-
putations. A future on-chip infrastructure can integrate channels (the streets),
wireless transmitters (the helicopters), or optical interconnects (the subways) on
a few square centimeters. Even three-dimensional chips are feasible, essentially
stacking several mutually connected cities upon each other.
The cause of all this on-chip complexity, is the ability of modern manufacturers
to integrate huge amounts of transistors on a small surface. Currently, chips
are built from transistors being only 22 nanometers long. Smaller transistors
are expected (latest research has even developed a transistor consisting of only
a single atom [57]) allowing more on-chip possibilities. It is up to both industry
and academia to exploit this nano technology and to cope with the complexity
inherent to running more than a billion transistors in one integrated circuit.
A general approach is to reduce the overall complexity by raising the level
of abstraction of the design phase. Instead of building a chip from scratch, de-
signers use prefabricated building blocks called intellectual properties or cores. A
System-on-Chip (SoC) integrates diﬀerent cores on one die. Examples of cores
are processors, memory controllers, and video processing units. Cores are cre-
ated, veriﬁed and tested individually, allowing a divide-and-conquer approach in
designing complex microchips.
Essential to the performance of the chip is an eﬃcient communication inter-
connect between these cores. Traditionally, a bus is used to facilitate all on-chip
communications. The major drawback of a bus is scalability. It is possible to
connect dozens of cores on one bus, but not hundreds. To deal with this issue,
Networks-on-Chip (NoC) have been proposed [8]. In an on-chip network, several
cores communicate with each other by transmitting messages which move through
the interconnect until they arrive at their destination. An NoC is a “city on chip”
with packets of data as its inhabitants.
3
1 Introduction
The NoC paradigm introduces new challenges to the world of SoC designers. In
a chip with a bus, it is relatively easy to ensure that a message sent from one core
to another will always eventually arrive. In an on-chip network this becomes more
troublesome. In the interconnect of an NoC scenarios may occur in which messages
never arrive at their destination. A deadlock is such a situation. Figure 1.1 shows
an example. The cubes represent cores that make use of an on-chip interconnect
to transmit and receive messages. The on-chip infrastructure is depicted as a
set of streets, and the messages moving through this interconnect are depicted as
cars. Each message has a destination, and it knows which direction to take to get
towards its destination. However, each message is waiting for another message.
All messages are waiting permanently.
A deadlock is not the only scenario in which messages never arrive at their
destination. Various network-related issues can occur such as misrouting, livelocks,
and starvation. None of these issues may occur, if a network is to be called correct.
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Figure 1.1: Deadlock Scenario
Complex as microchips may be, we base our everyday lives on the assumption
that these chips correctly do what we expect them to do. Microchips are omni-
present, ranging from our laptops, to home appliances, to safety-critical systems.
A chip that performs correctly often remains unnoticed. It is when bugs occur that
we realize how consequential it is to assume correctness of all the hugely complex
chips surrounding us. For example, in 2011 Intel identiﬁed a problem with its
Cougar Point chipset. They had to halt shipments and repair existing systems,
with a total cost of about 700 million dollars.
Establishing chip correctness – beyond any doubt – is a hard problem. With
cores being validated separately, this thesis focuses on veriﬁcation of the intercon-
nect between the cores. A major diﬃculty is that correctness of the interconnect
is an emergent property depending on many diﬀerent facets of the NoC, such
as which cores run on top of it, which routes can be taken by messages in the
interconnect, and under which conditions messages are stalled.
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Formal veriﬁcation is a technique for assessing that a system is correct, i.e.,
that it meets a speciﬁcation formalized in some mathematical language. Generally,
a formal model of the system is created using, for example, state machines or Petri
nets. A speciﬁcation is formulated in a logic such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL).
It is then proven that the model always satisﬁes the speciﬁcation.
Whether it concerns the formulation of deﬁnitions, the implementation of an
algorithm, or the proof of a theorem, humans’ labor is always error-prone. Wolper
asserts that “manual veriﬁcation [of a program] is at least as likely to be wrong as
the program itself” [146]. A proof can only reliably be called sound if it is built
from very small logical reasoning steps. However, even in the proofs of the smal-
lest theorems humans have the tendency to think in larger steps, eschewing the
rigority enforced by logic. The result is that human proofs are often unreliable.
In contrast, the rigorous and ﬁne-grained nature of logic perfectly suits a com-
puter. The soundness of logical proofs can be veriﬁed more reliably by computers
than by humans. It is therefore common practice to perform formal veriﬁcation
mechanically, that is, in such a way that its soundness can be ascertained by a
computer.
Applying formal methods to on-chip interconnects provides trustworthy claims
on their correctness. However, mechanical veriﬁcation generally has to deal with
a trade-oﬀ between ease of use and scalability. Automated and general techniques
such as model checking are push-button solutions, but do not scale to the complex-
ity of realistic NoCs. On the other hand, interactive and parametric techniques
such as theorem proving are laborious and hard to use, which tends to prevent
their widespread adoption. Currently, there is no way of formally verifying inter-
connects on the scale demanded by the NoC paradigm.
The contribution of this thesis consists of easy and scalable mechanical veriﬁc-
ation methods for communication networks. We formalize a notion of correctness,
stating that a network is always eventually able to inject messages and that any
injected message will always eventually arrive at its destination. We show that
in order to establish this emergent correctness property for some NoC, it suﬃces
to prove several smaller properties on isolated constituents. With a realistic ex-
ample we conclude that many of these properties can easily be veriﬁed. Deadlock
freedom, however, remains diﬃcult to prove due to the interactions between the
diﬀerent constituents of the network. Therefore we provide formally proven correct
tools and algorithms to hunt for deadlocks in communication networks.
This thesis advances the state-of-the-art both theoretically and practically.
We provide new theories identifying deadlocks in communication networks. We
prove that deciding deadlock freedom of wormhole networks is co-NP-complete.
On the practical side, we design deadlock detection algorithms. A new tool is
presented, which runs optimized C implementations of these algorithms in parallel.
We present examples that could previously not be proven deadlock-free, due to
either scalability issues or the complexity of dealing with many diﬀerent facets of
NoCs all at once. Our algorithms are able to either prove absence of deadlocks or
report a counterexample. The correctness of our theories and algorithms has been
established mechanically using the ACL2 theorem prover.
5
1 Introduction
Before discussing the outline of this thesis, we present a short introduction into
formal veriﬁcation and communication networks. We then motivate the structure
of this thesis using two examples. More background information and related work
can be found in the next chapter.
1.1 Formal Verification
The current state-of-the-art in verifying on-chip networks is simulation [17, 15, 91].
Simulation can be used to predict the behavior of complex and interactive sys-
tems. An inherent disadvantage of simulation is the diﬃculty to obtain full cov-
erage. Corner cases are hard to ﬁnd and debug. Finding simulation patterns
that cover them all is even more intricate. Simulation does not scale to future
communication-centric SoCs [121]. The focus of this thesis is therefore on analyt-
ical formal veriﬁcation approaches to complement simulation.
Analytical approaches do not consider dynamic and runtime behavior of a
system, but statically analyze a system. Various diﬀerent ﬂavors of analytical
mechanical veriﬁcation exist. Model checking is an automated technique to check
whether some model of a system satisﬁes a certain speciﬁcation [81, 5]. The model
is described in some sort of state machine and the speciﬁcation is described in a
temporal logic. A model checking algorithm uses the transition function associated
to the state machine to explore the state space and to ﬁnd states that do not satisfy
the speciﬁcation. If it ﬁnds such a state, both the state and the trace leading to
this state are reported. If such a state is not found, the system is proven correct.
Model checking is widely adopted by academia and industry alike, mostly because
it is completely automatic and it can provide counterexamples. The major issue is
a combinatorial blow-up of the number of states that needs to be explored, referred
to as state space explosion. This severely limits the scalability of model checking.
Theorem proving is a technique where the proof of some mathematical theorem
is formalized in such a way that a computer program can ensure its correctness.
Theorem proving is an interactive process, during which the user supplies hints
and lemma’s to the theorem prover until the proof can be derived by the system.
A theorem prover can guide the user while making his proof, by breaking down
large proofs into smaller ones, by simplifying and rewriting the current goal, or
by automatically searching for lemma’s that can be used to prove the current
theorem. The major advantage of theorem proving is the ability to deal with
parametric systems. For example, the size of a network can remain unspeciﬁed,
meaning that the theorem is proven to hold for networks with any size. Scalability
is then measured by the amount of interaction with the user. Theorem proving
is generally considered an academic eﬀort, even though it has been adopted by
various industry such as Intel and AMD. The process of theorem proving requires
a relatively steep learning curve, and even for an experienced user it still often
requires a great amount of interaction to prove non-trivial theorems.
SAT solvers are automated algorithms that decide whether some formula is
satisﬁable [100, 62]. Even though the satisﬁability problem is well-known to be NP-
complete, SAT solvers can prove truthness of propositional formulae with millions
of variables. Satisﬁability Modulo Theories (SMT) adds a background theory to a
SAT solver, eﬀectively giving an interpretation to some symbols [6]. For example,
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the integer arithmetic theory assigns the expected interpretation to symbols such
as <, +, and 0. Other examples of theories deal with various data structures such
as lists, arrays, or bit vectors. The use of SAT solvers is completely automatic,
but it requires the problem or theory that is to be proven to be formulated as a
SAT instance. Many model checkers and theorem provers make use of SAT and
SMT solvers under the hood.
This thesis applies both theorem proving and SMT solvers to perform para-
metric and scalable veriﬁcation of NoCs. The ultimate purpose of this eﬀort is
to remove the traditional objection against theorem proving – namely that it is
a diﬃcult and time consuming process – while preserving the major advantage of
scalable and analytical veriﬁcation.
1.2 Communication Networks
In this thesis, the term communication network denotes a synchronous message
passing network with a static topology. The behavior of all the switches in the
network is predetermined and is assumed to be reliable. There is no packet loss,
and communication wires do not cause any bit loss.
It is common practice to reason about the total functionality of a network
in terms of diﬀerent layers of abstraction deﬁned by the OSI model [139]. This
approach has also been adopted for on-chip networks [130, 88, 48]. Figure 1.2
shows the three diﬀerent layers used in this thesis.
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Figure 1.2: Three layers occurring in this thesis.
Application Layer
The highest layer considered in this thesis is the application layer. At this layer,
applications (or cores) such as processors or memory controllers run in parallel.
These cores communicate with other cores by transmitting messages back and forth
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over the network. The behavior of the cores dictates where, when, and which types
of messages are injected into the network. It also dictates where, when, and which
types of messages are consumed from the network. The behavior of the cores will
also be called the application-layer protocol.
For example, a cache coherency protocol between the cores might induce that
some of the cores (e.g., the processors) send out requests, while others transmit
responses (e.g., the memory controllers). In this example, the protocol determines
that two types of messages exists. It provides the destinations of these messages.
It also determines that, e.g., a response is injected only when a request has arrived.
In this case, the application-layer protocol causes a message dependency between
requests and responses [68].
Network Layer
The second layer considered in this thesis is the network layer. In the OSI model,
this layer coincides with both the network and the transport layer. Each core
is connected to a processing node (see Figure 1.3). This node is able to inject
messages received from the core into the network, and to remove messages sent to
the core from the network. Any message arriving at the processing node is sent
through a switch.
Switches are connected to each other via channels. Each channel has a certain
capacity to store messages. Channels are the only components in the network that
buﬀer messages. Generally, channels are directed, i.e., they are used to transmit
messages from switch to switch unidirectionally.
A switch applies arbitration to determine which of their in-going channels is
served. A routing function decides where the message is sent to. It can choose
between one of the channels going out of the processing node, or the local outgoing
channel leading to the core. The set of possible channels to which a message can
be routed in one step is called the set of next hops of the message. Each time
a message moves from channel to channel, the processing node at the end of its
current channel decides a set of next hops and selects one that is able to receive
the message. Routing can be deterministic, in which case each message has at
most one next hop. This implies that routes are static and can be precomputed.
In contrast, adaptive routing may supply multiple next hops per message. In
case of adaptive routing, a selection function determines which of the next hops
is taken [44]. Note that in case of adaptive routing at each time the set of next
hops is static, i.e., the routing function itself does not change. However, since it
supplies multiple next hops of which only one is to be selected, the route that a
message can take from source to destination can vary.
We assume there is some atomic unit of transfer called a ﬂow control digit
(flit) [36]. The size and the type of this unit depend on the type of network.
Messages are transformed into ﬂits before they traverse the network. A message
may consist of one or more ﬂits, but each ﬂit belongs only to one message.
Link Layer
The lowest layer considered in this thesis is called the link layer. This layer contains
the transfer protocol between two nodes. This protocol determines under which
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Figure 1.3: Processing nodes in a network.
conditions a message may move from channel to channel.
For example, a network may have wires between each pair of connected channels
to facilitate a handshaking protocol. When the target channel is ready to receive,
it will send out a signal on such a wire. The transmitting channel does the same
when it is ready to send. The transfer protocol states that if both signals are high,
a messages moves.
More complicated protocols can be applied. A network with credit-based ﬂow
control has extra wires to count the messages in the network. It prevents messages
from moving to their next channel if a certain bound has been reached, even if
the next channel has free buﬀers. Also, the transfer protocol may take care of
synchronization between messages in the network. In this case, a message is moved
only if some other message(s) in the network have reached a certain channel.
1.3 Network Layer Isolation versus Integration
The main structure of this thesis is based on two points of view on the network
layer. In the ﬁrst view, we formulate assumptions which abstract away from both
the application layer and the link layer. This yields the isolated network model. In
contrast, the integrated network model considers the three layers all at once. We
ﬁrst informally introduce both points of view.
In the isolated network model, the assumptions on the application layer state
that cores are homogeneous and fair. As for the link layer, we assume that the
transfer protocol moves a ﬂit towards a next hop if this next hop is available, i.e.,
if the next hop is able to store the ﬂit. This abstracts away among others counters
or synchronizations. As a result, the isolated network model focuses on routing
and topology. The isolated network model is based on the following assumptions:
• There is only one type of messages.
• Each core may send messages to all other cores.
• At each core, injection is fair, i.e., given some destination d each core will
always eventually want to send a message to d.
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• At each core, consumption is fair, i.e., if a message arrives at a switch con-
nected to the destination core of the message, it will eventually be consumed.
This is commonly referred to as the consumption assumption.
• The size of messages is always ﬁnite.
• A ﬂit moves, if there exists a next hop that has available capacity to store
the ﬂit.
While the isolated network model abstracts away from details, the integrated
network model incorporates all details concerning all three layers. The integrated
network model encompasses among others the behavior of the cores, diﬀerent
message types, the interfaces between the cores and the processing nodes, the
network topology, the routing logic, the injection method, and the transfer protocol
between channels.
With two examples, we illustrate the diﬀerent facets of both points of view.
1.3.1 Example 1
Consider the following simple application-layer protocol: a set of masters (e.g.,
processors) and slaves (e.g., memory controllers) communicate through request
and response messages. A master sends a request to a slave and waits for the slave
to return a response. Figure 1.4a shows the corresponding ﬁnite state machine.
We use the handshaking operator ‖α from Baier and Katoen [5]. At the network
layer, masters and slaves are organized in a two dimensional mesh (Figure 1.4b).
Messages are routed using XY routing [103]. This routes messages ﬁrst in the
horizontal direction to the right column and then vertically towards the right row.
As for the link layer, messages move whenever there is an available next hop.
rspactive wait
req
rsp rsp
active
Master Slave
(a) FSM for protocol with one master and
one slave
(b) Two dimensional mesh topology
Figure 1.4
Taken in isolation, all components are deadlock-free. The protocol at the ap-
plication layer is obviously deadlock-free. Masters wait for slaves, but slaves never
wait and therefore there is no terminal state. The network is deadlock-free, as a
2D mesh with XY routing induces no circular dependencies [36]. There also are
no circular message dependency, as a response can be generated by a node receiv-
ing a request, but not the other way around [68]. We show how deadlocks still
may emerge from these deadlock-free components, depending on among others the
layout of the masters and slaves.
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Consider the layout in Figure 1.5 where every odd (even) column is ﬁlled with
masters (slaves). Each request packet has a source s (the master where the re-
sponse needs to be directed to) and a destination d (the slave where the request
needs to be directed to). Each response package has a destination d only. A dead-
lock can occur when responses get blocked by requests and cannot arrive at their
destination.
Figure 1.5 shows the smallest deadlock possible in this layout. Requests in-
jected at Master 0 and destined for Slave 3 are heading east. At Slave 3, these
requests are turned into responses destined for the original source, Master 0. These
responses are blocked by western bound requests injected by Master 2. These re-
quests are turned into responses heading east at Slave 1. A circular wait has been
created, and no message has an escape possibility out of this cycle. The com-
bination of the routing logic with message dependencies has caused a deadlock.
Figure 1.5: Message-dependent deadlock in a 4x1 mesh. Nodes are identified by their
x-coordinate.
Now consider the layout where all masters (slaves) are put on the left (right)
side of the mesh. In such a layout, requests can be blocked by responses and
other requests. This introduces new dependencies with respect to the routing
dependencies. However, these new message dependencies cannot introduce a cycle.
This is implied by the fact that a western bound message never needs to wait for
a vertical channel or an eastern channel. Any western bound message is always
a response, as masters are on the left side of the mesh. The XY routing logic
ensures that a western bound message is not routed north or south. The only way
a western bound response can be blocked is by another western bound response.
Eventually, some western bound response will arrive at its destination. As it is
a response, it will be consumed and no further message dependencies will occur.
Since a western bound message can wait only for western channels, no cycles occur.
In this layout the network is deadlock-free.
1.3.2 Example 2
In this example, we abstract from the applications running on top of the network.
The cores are simply assumed to be homogeneous. At the network layer, we
consider the Spidergon NoC with shortest path routing [32] (see Figure 1.6a).
Without further modiﬁcation, the chip suﬀers from routing deadlocks. A deadlock
can occur if each clockwise channel going out of processing node n is ﬁlled with
messages destined for node n+ 2 mod N with N the total number of processing
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nodes (see Figure 1.6b).
(a) Spidergon ring topology (b) A deadlock. Each channel has capacity
to store two messages.
Figure 1.6: Spidergon of STMElectronics
However, whether this deadlock actually occurs can depend on the link layer.
For example, a credit-based ﬂow control can make the network deadlock-free. This
transfer protocol moves messages towards a channel only if the total number of
messages in the network is below a certain bound B. The described deadlock can
occur only when there are at least kN messages in the network, with k the capacity
of the channels. Consequently, the transfer protocol ensures deadlock freedom for
any B less than kN .
1.3.3 Isolated versus Integrated
Example 1 shows that a network can be deadlock-free when considered in isolation,
whereas considering the system integrally yields deadlocks. Conversely, Example 2
shows that a network that is considered to have deadlocks when viewed in isolation,
can actually be deadlock-free when the system in analyzed in its entirety.
Considering the network layer in isolation has been common practice for many
years. More so, it is the entire purpose of the OSI model to facilitate a divide-
and-conquer approach. First of all, dealing with the huge complexity of the whole
system is practically infeasible. Secondly, separating the network from the ap-
plications running on top of it allows a modular approach. This separation is
often even necessary, when during the design of a communication network it is not
known which speciﬁc applications run on top of it. In such cases, correctness of
the network can only be assessed under generic assumptions on the behavior of
the possible applications. This approach has the additional advantage that design
and veriﬁcation eﬀorts are reusable: they are correct for any application that sat-
isﬁes the assumptions. Thirdly, even though it is the case that when analyzing
a network in isolation yields a deadlock this deadlock might not actually occur,
the knowledge that the network has deadlocks when considered in isolation is still
valuable. This knowledge tells a designer that additional precautions are required
to ensure deadlock freedom, i.e., that it is necessary to add deadlock-preventing
elements to either the application or the link layer.
The greatest disadvantage of the isolated network model is that it is a very
abstract model of communication networks. At the application layer it does not
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allow diﬀerent types of cores, or diﬀerent types of messages. At the link layer it
does not allow counters, scoreboards, or synchronizations. Therefore, the result
of the analysis does not provide trustworthy results: deadlocks are not necessarily
actual deadlocks, and deadlock freedom does not ensure actual deadlock freedom.
The integrated approach has the obvious advantage that the result is more reli-
able: if the system is proven deadlock-free while considering all three layers mono-
lithically, deadlock freedom of the entire system can be stated with a high degree
of conﬁdence. Also, the integrated network model is not restricted in any way:
it allows for all kinds of applications such as cache coherency and master/slave
protocols and for all kinds of ﬂow control such as synchronizations, duplications,
and packet transformations.
The major disadvantage of the integrated network layer model is the enormous
increase in complexity. Also, results of a veriﬁcation eﬀort are not reusable since
the eﬀort has been done taking all facets of the system into account.
1.4 Contribution of this Thesis
This thesis consists of four parts. Part I, the preamble relates the contributions
of this thesis to the current state-of-the-art and provides background information
required for the remaining three parts. The contents of the remaining parts are
based on fourteen publications, including ﬁve journal articles, six peer-reviewed
conference papers, and three peer-reviewed workshop papers.
In Part II we apply the ACL2 theorem prover to prove correctness of on-chip
interconnects. This part contains two major contributions.
1. We formalize a novel notion of correctness for NoCs.
2. We extend GeNoC, a formal theory of communication networks in the ACL2
theorem prover, with this new notion of correctness. We formulate a set of
assumptions and prove a generic theorem which states that any intercon-
nection network that satisﬁes the assumptions is correct. GeNoC will be
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
Part II is based on the following publications:
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Easy Formal Specification and Valida-
tion of Unbounded Networks-on-Chips Architectures. ACM Transactions on
Design Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES), volume 17 (issue 1),
pages 1:1–1:28, January 2012.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Formal Specification of Networks-on-
Chips: Deadlock and Evacuation. Proceedings of Design, Automation and
Test in Europe (DATE’10), pages 1701–1706, March 2010.
One of the conclusions presented in Part II is that the absence of deadlocks is
the most diﬃcult assumption required to prove correctness. The remainder of this
thesis is concerned with establishing deadlock freedom of communication networks.
Part III considers deadlock veriﬁcation in the isolated network model. It
presents the following contributions:
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3. We formalize necessary and suﬃcient conditions for deadlock freedom of com-
munication networks. A careful analysis of existing conditions is presented
to show the relevance of our new conditions.
4. We present the tool DCI2 (for: Deadlock Checker In Designs of Communic-
ation Interconnects), which automatically decides whether these conditions
hold for a given network. Additionally, it detects livelocks and various rout-
ing related issues under the isolated network model.
5. We prove deadlock detection NP-complete for wormhole networks.
6. Extensive experimental results are provided for non-trivial examples like
adaptive fault-tolerant routing and for a chip with wireless transmissions.
The experimental results have been obtained in cooperation with Abdulaziz Al-
hussien and Nader Bagherzadeh from the University of California, Irvine (UCI).
Part III is based on the following publications:
• Abdulaziz Alhussien, Freek Verbeek, Bernard van Gastel, Nader Bagherza-
deh and Julien Schmaltz. A Formally Verified Deadlock-Free Routing Func-
tion in a Fault-Tolerant NoC Architecture. Proceedings of the 25th Sym-
posium on Integrated Circuits and Systems Design (SBCCI’12), august 2012.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Automatic verification for deadlock in
networks-on-chips with adaptive routing and wormhole switching. Proceed-
ings of Networks-on-Chips Symposium (NOCS’11), pages 25–32, May 2011.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. A Fast and Verified Algorithm for Prov-
ing Store-and-Forward Networks Deadlock-Free. Proceedings of The 19th
Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Network-
Based Computing (PDP’11), pages 3–10, February 2011.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. On Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
for Deadlock-Free Routing in Wormhole Networks. IEEE Transactions on
Parallel and Distributed Systems (TPDS), volume 22 (issue 12), pages 2022–
2032, December 2011.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. A Comment on “A Necessary and Suffi-
cient Condition for Deadlock-Free Adaptive Routing in Wormhole Networks”.
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems (TPDS), volume 22
(issue 10), pages 1775–1776, October 2011.
Part IV presents a deadlock detection algorithm in the integrated network
model. It contains the following contributions:
7. We provide a syntax to enable the description of micro architectural models
of communication fabrics.
8. We provide an algorithm detecting deadlocks in communication fabrics de-
scribed in this syntax.
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Our algorithm is able to deal with many diﬀerent facets of monolithical network
veriﬁcation such as message dependencies and diﬀerent types of link layers. In
essence, the algorithm reduces the decision of deadlock freedom to solving many
SMT instances. The examples presented in this chapter can be proven deadlock-
free with this algorithm. Part IV is based on the following publications:
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Automatic Generation of Deadlock De-
tection Algorithms for a Family of Microarchitecture Description Languages
of Communication Fabrics. Proceedings of the IEEE International High
Level Design Validation and Test Workshop (HLDVT’12). To appear.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Towards the Formal Verification of
Cache Coherency at the Architectural Level. ACM Transactions on Design
Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES), volume 17 (issue 3), pages
20:1–20:16, June 2012.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Hunting deadlocks efficiently in microar-
chitectural models of communication fabrics. Proceedings of Formal Methods
in Computer Aided Design (FMCAD’11), pages 223–231, November 2011.
1.5 The Role of ACL2 in this Thesis
The ACL2 theorem prover (see Section 2.3.1 for a short introduction and references
for further reading) has played a vital role in the realization of this thesis. It has
been used extensively to establish the validity of the deﬁnitions and proofs of many
theorems. The focus of this thesis is on the theorems and the algorithms, but not
on their veriﬁcation in ACL2. Any reader interested in details on the ACL2 proofs
can ﬁnd these in the following publications:
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Proof Pearl: A formal proof of Dally
& Seitz’ necessary and sufficient condition for deadlock-free routing in in-
terconnection networks. Journal of Automated Reasoning (JAR), volume 48
(issue 4), pages 419–439, April 2012.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Formal verification of a deadlock de-
tection algorithm. Proceedings of the International Workshop on the ACL2
Theorem Prover and its Applications (ACL2’11), pages 103–112, November
2011.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Proof Pearl: A formal proof of Duato’s
condition for deadlock-free adaptive networks. Proceedings of Interactive
Theorem Proving (ITP’10), pages 67–82, July 2010.
• Freek Verbeek and Julien Schmaltz. Formal Validation of Deadlock Preven-
tion in Networks-On-Chips. Proceedings of the International Workshop on
the ACL2 Theorem Prover and its Applications (ACL2’09), pages 128–138,
May 2009.
Figure 1.7 provides an overview of the ACL2 proof eﬀort. The arrows do not
represent implications, but stand for the structure in which the theorems have
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been proven. The upper theorems and the deﬁnitions used to prove them have
been used in proofs of lower theorems. Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and Corollary 3.1 are
part of our extension of the GeNoC framework. The proofs in Sections 4.2 and 4.3
are examples of proofs established applying GeNoC. Theorems 6.1, 6.2, and 7.2
and Lemma’s 6.4, 6.6 and 6.9 formulate correctness of our necessary and suﬃ-
cient conditions. The proofs of these theorems rely upon the GeNoC framework.
Finally, Theorems 7.1 and 7.3 formulate correctness of our algorithms, i.e., that
they correctly check whether the necessary and suﬃcient conditions hold for some
particular network.
Theorems
Corollary 3.1
4.2, 4.3
7.1, 7.3
3.1, 3.2
Theorems Sections
Theorems
6.1, 6.2, 7.2
Lemma’s
6.4, 6.6, 6.9
Figure 1.7: Mechanically proven theorems
All the theorems in Part IV have not yet been veriﬁed mechanically. Addition-
ally, our proof that deciding deadlock freedom of wormhole networks is co-NP-
complete, Theorem 3.3 and Lemma 6.5 have not been formalized in ACL2.
The total proof eﬀort related to this thesis consists of 39.321 lines of ACL2
code. This includes 3446 theorems (ACL2 defthm statements) and 858 deﬁnitions
(ACL2 defun statements). ACL2 performs – while proving all the theorems –
about 2.352.273.987 prover steps. All books are available upon request.
The added value of verifying all these theorems in ACL2 is twofold. First, it
helped with getting all deﬁnitions completely correct. As example, the deﬁnition
of a valid conﬁguration in a wormhole network contains many subtleties. Sec-
tion 6.7.2 (see Page 94) will show that the deﬁnitions as they were used in existing
literature were incorrect. It was due to our formalization in ACL2 that we were
able to formulate accurate and precise deﬁnitions. Secondly, the ACL2 theorem
prover has greatly helped while designing the algorithms presented in this thesis.
Our initial proof eﬀort started with ﬂawed algorithms. The ﬁnal versions presen-
ted in Chapter 7 are the result of a mutual recursion between reformulating the
algorithms and proving theorems about them. The algorithms contain a post-
processing step, which is only required when for some very speciﬁc network, some
speciﬁc trace of the algorithms yields an erroneous result. We would not have
found the necessity of this post-processing step without proving correctness of the
algorithms in ACL2.
16
Chapter 2
Advances to the State-of-the-art
This chapter discusses background information to facilitate the reading of the re-
maining parts of this thesis. We present the current state-of-the-art in formal
veriﬁcation of interconnection networks, with a focus on the architectures used
on-chip. Whenever possible, we clearly show how this thesis advances the cur-
rent state-of-the-art. After providing background information on interconnection
networks, we give an overview on research related to deadlocks in communication
networks. Finally, we provide an overview of the mechanical veriﬁcation eﬀorts
related to communication networks.
2.1 Communication Networks
During the ’00s, a multi-core shift occurred [94, 58]. In 2000, it was already possible
to design SoCs with dozens of mutually communicating IP blocks. Following
Moore’s Law, more and more transistors could be put on a chip each year [98].
In 2009, the Intel single-chip cloud was able to run 48 general purpose – fully
programmable – processing cores on one single die [74].
This revolution evoked a discussion on the interconnect between the cores.
In 2000, Guerrier and Greiner discuss that the increase in complexity caused by
multiple systems on a chip requires a shift from the traditional bus towards an
on-chip network [67]. In the same year, Hemani et al. present an NoC, where
resources communicate using addressed packets routed to their destination via a
communication fabric [72]. Dally and Towles present an example of an on-chip
network and discuss several challenges in their design [37]. In 2002, Benini and
Micheli state that with more and more cores on a chip, the bus becomes the
bottleneck in the overall performance of the system and coin NoC a new paradigm
in chip design [8].
Interconnection networks, however, are not new. The importance of network-
ing to communicate between processes was already recognized in the 70’s. The
ARPA network (the precursor of the Internet) triggered a great amount of research
related to the performance, reliability and correctness of interconnects between
computers [25]1. During the 80’s and 90’s, the interconnection networks inside
1This paper describes a deadlock on the “Internet” between UCLA and Stanford University.
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multicomputers were widely studied [36, 44]. NoCs brought interconnection net-
works to the level of integrated circuits. What ﬁrst took hundreds of square meters
(e.g., the ASCI Red Super Computer reaching 1 teraﬂops in 1996), is now embed-
ded on a single die (i.e., Intel’s Teraﬂops Research Chip with 80 cores).
Wolf recognizes two crucial diﬀerences between the early computer networks
and the modern on-chip ones [145]. First, embedded systems require predictable
performance. Due to the close cooperation between cores, bounds on the latency
and throughput become crucial for the performance and correctness of the system.
Secondly, constraints posed by power and energy become an issue on every level of
abstraction. For example, whereas the interconnect between computers can simply
drop and resend messages in order to resolve a deadlock, this becomes very costly
in an on-chip network. In addition, Vermeulen et al. note that the topology of
an on-chip network is static, whereas oﬀ-chip networks often dynamically add and
remove links [143].
Switching in NoCs
Generally, three types of switching are being used: circuit, packet2 and wormhole
switching. Packet and wormhole switching are the most commonly used [112, 107,
140]. Therefore, this thesis is not concerned with circuit switching.
Packet Switching
In a network with packet switching, messages are packetized before being injected.
A packet consists of a payload and a header. The payload is the data of the message
that is to be transmitted. The header contains the destination of the packet. A
packet is the atomic unit of transfer.
As a packet contains all the information needed to route the packet through
a network, it can move autonomously from channel to channel. At each router in
the network, one or more next hops are determined. If one of these next hops is
able to accept the packet, the packet is forwarded to that next hop. There is no
reservation or prebooking of channels.
A crucial feature of packet networks is that the size of the packets is ﬁxed and
that the network is set up accordingly. A channel with capacity n can store exactly
n packets. A packet is stored completely in a buﬀer of a channel. If it is routed
towards a next channel, it is removed from its old position and moved integrally
to a buﬀer of the next channel.
Since packets are stored and require new channels to be able to store them
before they can move, contention may occur. A channel is available if it has at
least one empty buﬀer. A packet is blocked if all its next hops are unavailable.
Channels can be implemented in two ways: queues and central buffers. With
queues, the order in which packets arrive at the channel is relevant. Only the
packet that arrived ﬁrst, i.e., the packet at the head of the queue, is considered
for forwarding to a next hop. With central buﬀers, any packet in the channel can
be chosen to be forwarded to a next hop.
2In this thesis, packet switching denotes store-and-forward switching.
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Figure 2.1: Network with packet switching. The circle (cross) packets are destined for
n0 (n1).
To stress this diﬀerence, consider Figure 2.1. The network contains three chan-
nels all with capacity 2. Channel A stores two packets, one destined for processing
node n0 and one destined for processing node n1. Channel C is full. Under queue
semantics, none of the packets in channel A can move if the packet destined for
n1 arrived ﬁrst. Only the packet at the head of the queue is considered, and this
packet cannot move because channel C has no empty buﬀer. Under central-buﬀer
semantics, the packet in channel A destined for n0 can move.
Packet networks generally tend to have low contention, as packets do not oc-
cupy many resources. Adaptive routing can decrease contention even further, as
packets move autonomously through the network. However, the storing of the
packets in buﬀers makes latency unpredictable as it depends on the load of the
network. Also, the size of the packets bounds the size of the messages that can
be transmitted. If one message is divided into multiple packets, then some order-
ing mechanism has to ensure that packets are delivered in-order. For an in-depth
discussion on packet switching, we refer to standard textbooks [38, 48].
Wormhole Switching
In a network with wormhole switching, messages are split into worms before being
injected. A worm consists of an arbitrary but ﬁnite number of ﬂits. Two types
of ﬂits exist. A header flit is a ﬂit containing the destination of the message. A
tail flit, is a ﬂit containing a part of the message that is to be sent. Each message
has one header ﬂit, but typically many tail ﬂits. It is common practice to further
distinguish between data ﬂits, end-of-worm ﬂits or ﬂits storing the length of the
worm. In this thesis, however, this distinction is not necessary and all these ﬂits
are denoted simply as tail ﬂits.
When injecting a message, the header ﬂit is injected ﬁrst and leads the way.
The header ﬂit is routed autonomously from channel to channel. Similar to a
packet, at each router a set of next hops is determined and the header ﬂit is sent
to a next hop that is ready to receive it. As the tail ﬂits do not contain any
information on their destination, they follow the header ﬂit in a pipelined fashion.
At each successive channel, ﬂits are stored before they are forwarded to their
next hops. Each channel with capacity n is able to store exactly n ﬂits. Contention
occurs when the header ﬂit has to wait for its next hops to become available.
A channel is available to accept tail ﬂits if it has free buﬀers to store these
ﬂits. A channel is available to accept a header ﬂit only if all its buﬀers are empty.
This is of importance for the pipelining process. If channels store ﬂits belonging
to diﬀerent messages, there is no way to distinguish which ﬂits belong to which
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message. A channel with tail ﬂits cannot even accept the header ﬂit of its own
message.
Consequently, a header ﬂit is blocked if all its next hops are non-empty. A tail
ﬂit is blocked if the next channel in the worm is full.
The most important advantage of wormhole networks is that they allow for
relatively small buﬀers, as messages can be split up into many ﬂits. However, as
messages may hold many resources simultaneously, contention can be higher. For
more details, we refer to standard text books [38, 48].
2.2 Deadlocks in Communication Networks
A deadlock is a situation where a set of processes is permanently blocked and no
progress is ever possible. This can occur due to a competition for ﬁnite resources or
reciprocal communications. Classically a deadlock is associated with a circular wait
between processes: each process holds a resource needed by the next process [134].
In the context of interconnection networks, processes are messages and resources
are channels. A deadlock can occur as messages compete for available channels.
There are three ways to deal with deadlocks: avoidance, prevention, and de-
tection. In networks where deadlocks are avoided, deadlock freedom is ensured
dynamically. The on-chip switching has some look-ahead mechanism and bases its
decisions on extra information. In contrast, deadlock prevention statically ensures
deadlock freedom. The routes messages can take are restricted, e.g., in such a way
that messages are not sent into a circular wait. In networks with deadlock de-
tection, routing can be less restricted. An online deadlock detection and recovery
mechanism deals with deadlocks that occur as a result of these relaxed routing
schemes.
In typical on-chip networks, routing decisions must be taken in a few nano-
seconds. On-chip deadlock avoidance is too costly and is generally not considered
a solution for NoCs. Some on-chip deadlock detection mechanisms have been pro-
posed by Pinkston [116] and Martinez-Rubio et al. [93]. The most practical way of
dealing with deadlocks is to prevent them by designing deadlock-free routing func-
tions. This has been a fruitful research area for many years [11, 35, 18, 61, 28, 132].
2.2.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
This research has lead to a search for generic conditions ensuring that a routing
function is deadlock-free [36, 43, 44, 128, 54, 138]. Typically, the dependencies
between channels are captured by a dependency graph. Early work by Dally and
Seitz has shown that an acyclic dependency graph is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for deadlock-free routing [36]. This original condition only applies to
deterministic routing functions.
An interconnection network can have an adaptive routing function. If a mes-
sage is blocked on its way, an adaptive routing function proposes an alternative
next hop allowing further progress. To the best of our knowledge, Chen was the
ﬁrst to notice that a cyclic dependency is not suﬃcient for deadlock in 1974 [25].
Cypher and Gravano prove a routing function deadlock-free that allows circular
dependencies in a packet network [34]. Duato was the ﬁrst to propose necessary
20
2.2 Deadlocks in Communication Networks
n0 n1
cA0
cH0
n3 n2
cH2
cA2
cA3 cA1 cH1
(a) Interconnection network
cA0
cH0
cH2
cA2
cA3 cA1 cH1
(b) Channel dependency graph
Figure 2.2: Example of cyclic dependencies without deadlock[48]
and suﬃcient conditions for deadlock-free routing in adaptive networks [44, 45].
He noticed that alternative paths could be used to escape deadlock situations and
that a cyclic dependency is not a suﬃcient condition to create a deadlock [43]. He
used Example 2.1 to demonstrate this [48].
Example 2.1 Consider the interconnection network in Figure 2.2a. Routing
is deﬁned as follows: when routing a message from source ni to destination nj ,
the routing function always returns channel cAi. It returns channel cHi only if
j > i. The cHi channels do not form a dependency cycle, implying that they will
always eventually become available. The cAi channels do form a dependency cycle.
However, even if all channels of this cycle are unavailable, messages in node n0
can always escape the cycle by using channel cH0. After this, the messages in the
cycle can progress.
Based on his intuition, he deﬁned and proved a condition capturing the fact
that an adaptive network can still be deadlock-free even in the presence of cyclic
dependencies between channels [44]. This was a breakthrough in the ﬁeld as it
enables a dramatic reduction in the number of resources to implement fully ad-
aptive routing networks. It is also counterintuitive as it seems that a circular wait
is not suﬃcient for deadlock. Duato’s work was not easily accepted by his peers.
On Duato’s webpage one can read [46]:
Only a complex mathematical proof can show that deadlock freedom
can be guaranteed if certain conditions are met. This research was so
disruptive when it was developed that it was rejected by several peers
and considered to be incorrect, even by the most prominent researchers
at that time. However, it was ﬁnally accepted and several well-known
researchers developed their own version of this theory.
Several more papers have been devoted to generic necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for deadlock-free routing. Duato’s condition holds for routing functions which
are based on the current location of the message and its destination. Schwiebert
and Jayasimha present a condition that holds for routing functions which also base
their decisions on the direction from which the message came [128]. Fleury and
Fraigniaud extended Duato’s result to a broad class of routing functions [54]. Tak-
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tak et al. were the ﬁrst to present a condition that can be checked automatically
in polynomial time [138]. Their condition is logically equivalent to Duato’s one.
These conditions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
All these papers are devoted to wormhole switching. Wormhole networks are
generally more prone to deadlock than packet networks. Messages can hold mul-
tiple channels at once. Channels are unavailable more often, as they can only store
ﬂits belonging to one message. Both types of network require diﬀerent deﬁnitions
and conditions for deadlock freedom. Duato also deﬁned his condition for packet
networks [45]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for adaptive deadlock-free routing in packet networks.
The contribution of this thesis: Chapter 6 will present new necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for packet and wormhole networks. The proofs of correct-
ness of existing conditions are often complex, highly abstract and counterintuit-
ive. Therefore, we have applied the ACL2 theorem prover to mechanically prove
correctness of our conditions. We will show that Duato’s seminal condition for
wormhole networks is not necessary and suﬃcient. Our condition is the ﬁrst static
necessary and suﬃcient condition for deadlock freedom in wormhole networks.
2.2.2 Determining Deadlock Freedom
Once necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the absence of deadlocks have been
established, a natural next question is how to determine whether some network
actually satisﬁes such a condition. In other words, how can we use these conditions
to establish deadlock freedom of a given design? The condition of Dally and Seitz
can easily be by checked by computing the dependency graph and performing a
linear search for cycles [33]. For adaptive routing however, this is more complicated
as cycles are not necessarily deadlocks.
The most straightforward approach of determining that some network satisﬁes
a condition is to just prove this by hand. Such a proof can be done mechanically
or with pencil and paper. Advantage is that such proofs can be done leaving the
size of the network parametric. However, such proofs become tedious very quickly.
They are very time-consuming and require a lot of user interaction.
Another approach of determining that the network is deadlock-free is to limit
the design process using some design methodology. Duato, Silla, et al. present
a design methodology based on Duato’s condition [44, 132]. Consider a network
and a routing function that are already known to be deadlock-free. New channels
and routing capabilities can be added to this network as long as once a message
arrives in an original channel, it cannot be routed towards new channels. Duato’s
condition holds for any network obtained in this way.
Various design methodologies are based on a turn model [61, 29]. This model
restricts the routing function in such a way that no cyclic dependencies occur. It
was initially deﬁned for 2D-mesh topologies. Starobinksi et al. use the network
calculus to generalize this methodology to general topologies [135]. Palesi et al.
incorporate message dependencies, induced by a model of the applications run-
ning on the cores, into the dependency graph and provide a design methodology
breaking all cycles [110].
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These methodologies target static and fault-free networks. Duato, Lysne, et
al. present a theory and a corresponding methodology to dynamically reconﬁgure
a routing function in such a way that deadlock freedom is ensured [47, 90]. Their
methodology applies to broad class of interconnection networks, both on-chip and
oﬀ-chip.
An inherent disadvantage of such design methodologies is that they limit the
designer. All these methods cannot be applied to arbitrary topologies and rout-
ing functions. Also, these methodologies are restrictive, in the sense that many
deadlock-free designs are excluded. Most of these methodologies break all de-
pendency cycles. As for adaptive routing a dependency cycle is not necessarily
a deadlock, this is very limiting. Finally, these methodologies are manual and
therefore error-prone.
A third approach of determining deadlock freedom is to add new channels –
either virtual or physical – to a given design [36]. Seiculescu et al. automatically
detect cyclic dependencies and determine where new channels can be added to
break these [129]. Their approach is based on the suﬃcient condition that an
acyclic dependency graph ensures deadlock freedom.
In 2008, Taktak et al. presented a diﬀerent approach. They presented a ded-
icated algorithm to either detect deadlocks or prove deadlock freedom [137, 138].
The work of Taktak et al. will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.8 (see
Page 129).
The contribution of this thesis: Our approach is similar to that of Taktak
et al. Chapter 7 will present two fully automatic decision procedures for deadlock
freedom in both packet and wormhole networks. Our wormhole algorithm checks
a modiﬁed version of our necessary and suﬃcient condition. This version is only
suﬃcient and therefore our algorithm may identify false deadlocks. We will show
that deciding deadlock freedom of wormhole networks is co-NP-complete. This
implies that the polynomial algorithm of Taktak et al. does not check a necessary
and suﬃcient condition as well. Indeed, as the correctness of the algorithm of
Taktak et al. is – indirectly – based on Duato’s condition, it is subject to false
negatives. In contrast, the correctness of our algorithms has been established
mechanically, using the ACL2 theorem prover. Our wormhole algorithm is one
degree faster than that of Taktak et al. We will show that this improvement has
a signiﬁcant practical impact. As our tool is able to analyze millions of diﬀerent
network topologies eﬃciently, we are able to apply it to the veriﬁcation of a fault-
tolerant routing function in a mesh of 400 cores. This degree of scalability is not
reachable with state-of-the-art tools.
2.3 Mechanical Verification of Interconnects
Several speciﬁc NoC architectures have been studied using model checking [122,
124, 27], theorem proving [60] or combinations thereof [1]. Regarding formal proofs
of deadlock prevention, Gebremichael et al. formally prove a suﬃcient condition
for the Æthereal protocol of Philips in a packet-switched network [60]. The main
property that has been veriﬁed is the absence of deadlock for an arbitrary number
of masters and slaves. These works target very speciﬁc designs described at a low
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level of abstraction. Goossens recognizes the need for more parametric veriﬁcation:
“Ideally, deadlock freedom would be proven for any instance of the NoC.” [63]
A diﬀerent methodology is presented by Chatterjee et al. of the Intel Corpora-
tion. Recently, Chatterjee et al. proposed xMAS as a formal description language
for microarchitectures [24, 23]. This language is based on a restricted set of prim-
itives with well-deﬁned semantics. The methodology consists of automatically
generating inductive invariants and using this these to model check a design [22].
This way they can establish, among others, deadlock freedom. Chapter 9 will
discuss the xMAS language in-depth.
This thesis applies theorem proving to do parametric proofs over NoCs. Since
the mid 70’s, interactive theorem provers have been designed to mechanically
check formal and detailed proofs. Their development and application in various
domains are active research ﬁelds. These proof assistants are used in projects
about formalizing mathematics (e.g., the FlySpeck project [104, 106]) or in the
veriﬁcation of hardware and software designs (e.g., microprocessors [14, 55, 75],
ﬂoating point units [123, 76, 10, 69], operating systems [87], entire computing
systems [13]). The most popular tools are ACL2 [85], Coq [12], HOL [64], HOL-
Light [70], Isabelle [105], and PVS [109].
To the best of our knowledge, the only work that targets parametric proofs over
interconnection networks is by Schmaltz et al. [127, 21]. Schmaltz created a generic
framework called GeNoC for reasoning about NoCs in the ACL2 theorem prover.
We shortly introduce the ACL2 theorem prover and the GeNoC framework.
2.3.1 ACL2
ACL2 (for A Computational Logic for Applicative Common Lisp) denotes a lan-
guage, a logic, and an interactive theorem proving system. It is the last of the
Boyer-Moore family of provers and has been developed at the University of Texas
at Austin. Currently, it is maintained by Kaufmann and Moore [85]. ACL2 has
been used in academia to verify, for example, the mu calculus [86], theorems on
real and complex numbers [59], and graph theory [86]. It has also been adopted by
industry for the veriﬁcation of, e.g., the ﬂoating point division microcode on the
AMD-K5 processor [80], the X86-compatible microprocessor at Centaur [77], and
verifying compilers at Rockwell Collins [115]. ACL2 has won the ACM System
Software Awards in 2005.
The language of ACL2 consists of a superset of a subset of common LISP.
Its logic consists of a classical ﬁrst-order logic with induction. Axioms are added
which assign interpretation to common symbols from the language such as car
(i.e., the ﬁrst element of a list) and natp (i.e., a recognizer for natural numbers).
The result is called the ground zero theory. This theory allows ACL2 to reason
over common LISP symbols.
Extension principles allow ACL2 to extend the ground zero theory with ad-
ditional axioms, and are key to the use of ACL2 to reason about any non-trivial
theorem [84]. There are three diﬀerent extension principles. The definitional prin-
ciple can extend the theory with axioms that assign a deﬁnition to a new function.
As long as this function is terminating and does not contain fresh variables, sound-
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ness of the theory is preserved. The defchoose principle allows the introduction of
Skolemized formulas, which brings the abilities of quantiﬁers to the ACL2 logic.
Thirdly, the encapsulation principle extends the theory with functions without a
deﬁnition. Since this thesis does not present details on ACL2 proofs, we will not
further introduce the ﬁrst two principles. The encapsulation principle, however, is
key to the GeNoC methodology. We explain it in more detail.
Encapsulation allows the introduction of a fresh function symbol f that sat-
isﬁes a certain set of theorems t0, t1, . . . tn. As example, one might add the func-
tion symbol sort to the current theory, with as axioms ordered(sort(x)) and
perm(sort(x), x). Here we assume that ordered and perm have already been
deﬁned with their obvious interpretations. Function symbol sort is called a con-
strained function and the theorems t0, t1, . . . tn are called proof obligations.
Extending a theory with a constrained function can possibly make the theory
inconsistent. Therefore, the following conditions have to be satisﬁed before a
constrained function f with axioms t0, t1, . . . tn can be admitted to the theory:
• Symbol name f must be fresh.
• It is logically consistent to add a witness function fw to the current theory,
and the theorems t0[f = fw], t1[f = fw], . . . , tn[f = fw].
In other words, we must provide a witness function fw for which all the proof
obligations are proven. This witness is local, meaning that it will not actually be
admitted to the current theory. Its only purpose is to ensure the soundness of the
extension. Constrained function f has no deﬁnition when it is admitted.
The crux of encapsulation is that any theorem that holds for a constrained
function, also holds for any function that satisﬁes all the proof obligations. This is
stated by the rule of inference called functional instantiation. Encapsulation and
instantiation enable the following methodology:
1. First, a generic theorem is proven, e.g., the idempotence of sort:
sort(sort(x)) = sort(x)
2. An instantiation is made of the generic function. As example, one might
program merge sort, yielding a function mergesort.
3. For the instantiation, all proof obligations must be discharged. That is, we
must establish:
ordered(mergesort(x)) and perm(mergesort(x), x)
4. By functional instantiation, we can now safely conclude that our generic
theorem also holds for our instantiation. That is, without any further proving
we have established:
mergesort(mergesort(x)) = mergesort(x)
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2.3.2 GeNoC
The GeNoC framework (for Generic Network-on-Chip) provides a methodology to
do parametric proofs over NoCs. The proof methodology applies the concepts of
encapsulation and instantiation to reason about the generic object “Communica-
tion Network”. This generic network will be referred to with the bold capital N.
Schmaltz et al. formulate proof obligations and use them to prove generic theor-
ems. This yields a set of proof obligations and a theorem of the following form:
PO1(N),PO2(N), . . . |= correctness(N) (1)
This theorem allows a user to do proofs by instantiation. If we want to prove
correctness of an actual communication network n, the proof obligations must be
discharged.
PO1(n), PO2(n), . . . (2)
From this, it automatically follows that our network n is correct:
(1), (2) =⇒ correctness(n)
The value of the methodology enabled by GeNoC lies in the fact that even
though proving a generic theorem can be diﬃcult and require a lot of user inter-
action, this work is done once-and-for-all. As it is a generic theorem, it holds for
all instances and it needs not be proven again. The easier it is to discharge the
proof obligations, the greater the value of the methodology. For example, proving
that a complicated sorting function s is idempotent might be diﬃcult. The generic
theorem presented in the previous subsection reduces this proof to a proof that s
orders and permutes. Similarly, GeNoC reduces diﬃcult proofs of correctness to
the discharging of simple proof obligations.
The central part of the methodology is a generic theorem such as Equation 1.
Such a theorem requires the study of four diﬀerent problems.
1. The theorem mentions a generic communication network N. We need to
know what a generic network is. This entails the question which constituents
are common to all communication networks.
2. We need to deﬁne correctness.
3. It must be determined what proof obligations we may assume. If the as-
sumptions we make are too strong, this will limit the applicability of the
methodology. If they are too weak, we cannot prove anything signiﬁcant.
4. The generic theorem must be proven, i.e., we need to show that the proof
obligations imply correctness.
GeNoC deals with all of these problems. It contains the deﬁnition of generic
communication network N, consisting of an injection method, a routing function,
and switching policy. The GeNoC framework will be presented in detail in Part II.
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GeNoC has been used to prove correctness theorems over a wide range of
NoCs. Borrione et al. made an instantiation of the HERMES NoC [99] with XY
routing [19, 20]. Schmaltz formalized double y-channel routing in a 2D mesh [125].
Schmaltz et al. used GeNoC to prove functional correctness of the Spidergon NoC
architecture [32] with a ring topology and shortest path routing [126]. Helmy
et al. have made an instantiation of the Nostrum chip with fully adaptive hot-
potato routing [71]. Tsiligiannis and Pierre present an approach complementary to
GeNoC that focuses on the veriﬁcation of register transfer level implementations
of communication interconnects [141].
In the current version of GeNoC [127, 21], the routing function is required to be
deterministic and routes must be computed from the current position of the mes-
sage all the way to its destination. Even if non-minimal and adaptive routing can
be represented, the formalization is restricted to special cases and the veriﬁcation
is cumbersome. The correctness criterion currently supported by GeNoC is restric-
ted to a safety property. The theorem states that messages reaching a destination
will reach the expected destination without modiﬁcation of their content. This is
rather weak, as the theorem holds trivially if no message ever reaches a destination.
The contribution of this thesis: Chapter 3 extends the GeNoC frame-
work with a new notion of correctness and a new theorem stating this correctness.
This correctness property – which will be referred to as productivity – is a strong
liveness property stating that always eventually messages are injected and always
eventually messages correctly arrive at their destination. We argue that productiv-
ity is a relevant correctness property by showing that it is commonly used as an
implicit assumption in related work. The generic network is further generalized to
support adaptive routing, which no longer needs to be computed all the way to the
destination. Chapter 4 provides a complete instantiation of a 2D mesh NoC with
adaptive west-ﬁrst routing, FIFO arbitration, wormhole switching and time-based
injection.
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Part II
Proving Productivity of
Communication Networks
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Chapter 3
GeNoC for Productivity Proofs
In this part, we extend the GeNoC framework for proving correctness of commu-
nication networks. Up to now, GeNoC supported the proof of partial functional
correctness only. This chapter informally introduces a new correctness criterion.
We call our correctness criterion productivity and relate it to other correctness cri-
teria such as deadlock freedom and liveness. We break down a proof of productivity
into a proof of several smaller proof obligations. The next chapter illustrates our
approach on an example. We prove productivity of a realistic Network-on-Chip.
For this particular example, 86% of the entire proof eﬀort can be derived automat-
ically using GeNoC. Chapter 5 reﬂects on both our approach and our correctness
criterion.
3.1 Correctness of Communication Networks
Intuitively, a communication network is correct if any message can always eventu-
ally be injected into the network and if any injected message will always eventually
be correctly consumed. A correct network behaves – from the point of view of the
application layer – just like a point-to-point network with nondeterministic delay.
This notion of correctness supports the design of distributed applications without
considering the details of the underlying communication structure.
We capture this type of correctness in the property we named productivity. It
states that:
1. any ﬁnite list of messages can eventually be injected;
2. for any injected message a bound can be deﬁned on its time in the network,
independent of the messages that are still to be injected;
3. any message is eventually consumed correctly, i.e., at its desired destination
and without modiﬁcation of its contents.
Our deﬁnition of productivity considers ﬁnite executions only. In Section 5.1 we
show that this is indeed suﬃcient to capture correctness.
Deadlock freedom is often considered as correctness property of interconnects.
Some consider deadlock freedom a global property, that is, a deadlock is a situ-
ation in which all messages are blocked [48]. Some consider deadlock freedom a
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local property, stating that it is not possible for any message to be permanently
blocked [73, 65]. Productivity encapsulates both types of deadlock freedom. In
case of a deadlock some set of messages have been injected in the network, but
they never arrive at their destination as they are permanently blocked. A deadlock
can also cause input queues to be permanently blocked, preventing messages from
being injected.
Productivity also subsumes livelock freedom and starvation freedom. Several
correctness properties on communication networks are considered in this thesis.
We present a short overview to show how the diﬀerent properties relate to each
other.
Deadlock freedom A network is deadlock-free if there is no reachable conﬁgur-
ation in which some set of messages is permanently blocked. Note that as
we consider deadlock prevention (see Section 2.2 on Page 20) a network is
considered deadlock-free only if no execution leads to a deadlock. Deadlocks
can be caused by incorrect routing, by injecting too many messages, or by
contention caused by switching.
Livelock freedom A livelock is a scenario in which some message moves around
inﬁnitely in the network. A routing function can cause livelocks by sending
messages into cycles.
Starvation freedom A starvation scenario occurs when a message wants to ac-
quire some resource but is denied access inﬁnitely often. Starvation is gen-
erally caused by unfair arbitration at merges.
Liveness of injection Injection of a network is live if always when the network
is empty and there is a message to be injected, eventually a message will
be injected. This property is trivial, but necessary for a formal proof of
productivity.
Functional correctness Functional correctness is a safety property stating that
if a message is moving through the network it moves in a correct way, i.e.,
it follows a correct path between connected resources, its contents are not
modiﬁed and if it is consumed, it is consumed at its desired destination.
Evacuation A network is evacuatable if any injected message is always eventually
consumed. Evacuatability does not state anything on functional correctness.
For example, a network in which all messages are dropped after a ﬁxed
number of hops is evacuatable.
Local liveness A network is locally live if at all times no injected message can
be permanently blocked. Any message will always eventually move from its
current resource to a next one. Both absence of deadlock and absence of
starvation are required for local liveness.
Reliability Reliability, or robustness, is a term commonly used in fault-tolerant
related research [101, 133, 96, 119, 149]. Reliability is generally considered
a probabilistic property representing the degree in which a system operates
correctly in presence of faults. Reliability is not considered in this thesis,
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but is mentioned here to emphasize the diﬀerence between reliability and
productivity.
Productivity Productivity is the main property proven in this thesis and repres-
ents the intuitive correctness criterion that messages can always be injected
and will alway correctly be consumed.
In-order delivery In-order delivery states that messages are consumed in some
speciﬁed order. For example, in a network it may be required that requests
are always consumed before responses.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview. The ﬁve upper properties are the primary
correctness properties. They are all required to prove productivity. In-order deliv-
ery is a stronger notion of correctness than productivity. Reliability is a separate
property independent of the others.
Figure 3.1: Relation between correctness properties.
3.2 Generic Communication Network
We prove a generic theorem that states that productivity is implied by several
proof obligations. This proof is structured in three parts for functional correctness,
evacuation and local liveness. Each of these properties has a section where we
formalize the property, provide proof obligations, and prove a generic theorem
stating that the proof obligations are suﬃcient. All these proofs revolve around
the generic communication network, which will be referred to withN. This section
introduces our generic model of communication networks.
3.2.1 Informal Overview
In a communication network, a set of resources can store messages. Messages are
injected into resources, subsequently moved from resource to resource, until they
can be consumed.
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The generic network consists of constituents that can be found in all commu-
nication networks. Such constituents are called generic constituents. From these
constituents, we build function Nbeh that determines the behavior of the generic
network N. We prove, e.g., that this function never drops a message, that it
never moves messages between unconnected resources and, ultimately, that it is
productive.
We deﬁne the correctness properties using two sources of information. First,
the current configuration stores all the information in the network, i.e., which
messages are currently injected and which resources are held by these messages.
Besides storing the current state of the network, a conﬁguration also stores
meta data. This is data that is not actually present in the network, but which
is required to formulate properties and prove theorems. For example, with each
message some unique identiﬁer is associated. In the conﬁguration, each bit of
information that is stored in some place in the network is linked to a message via
this identiﬁer. Other meta data includes which messages have arrived in previous
steps and which messages are still to be injected.
Function Nbeh takes as input the current conﬁguration and the current meta
data. It executes one step and recursively calls itself. It terminates when no
progression is possible. This means that it terminates when either the network
is empty and there are no new messages to be injected, or a deadlock has been
reached.
We establish functional correctness by proving invariants over function Nbeh.
For example, an invariant states that at any time, all messages have at least one
way to reach their destination. Evacuation is formulated and proven using meta
data. We prove that the list of consumed messages eventually equals the initial
list of uninjected messages. Local liveness is proven by computing an upper bound
on the time a message can wait in one resource.
Many of the proofs involve measure functions (also called ranking functions
in the literature). A measure function is a function that returns a value that
decreases – under some conditions – with each step. For example, we will deﬁne
a measure function for the time it takes for a message to be injected, under the
condition that the network is empty. The value of this measure function decreases,
under some well-founded relation, as long as the network is empty. From several
measure functions, we construct a measure proving termination of function Nbeh.
We let function Nbeh record a log for each message. The log stores the pro-
gression of a message as it traverses the network. We deﬁne functional correctness
using these logs. For example, we prove that it is an invariant that the logs of
enroute messages always constitute valid connected paths in the network. We
prove that uninjected messages have empty logs, and that the logs of consumed
messages are not altered. From these theorems, it follows that messages always
follow a correct route through the network.
Proof obligations which do not concern the behavior of the network, but meta
data only, are not mentioned in this thesis. For example, we require proof obliga-
tions that ensure the logs are kept correctly. Also, some proof obligations that are
considered trivial have been omitted. For example, a proof obligation states that
at all times the current conﬁguration is a syntactically valid data structure. These
omitted proof obligations are used as assumptions in the proofs in this thesis. We
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denote the set of implicit proof obligations with POι. All other proof obligations
have been included in this thesis.
Generic functions, such as Nbeh, will be denoted by bold capital letters. Func-
tions using meta data, such as the measures, will be denoted by bold Greek letters.
The correctness properties that are proven are denoted in sans serif font, e.g., pro-
ductivity is denoted by PROD.
The next section presents the generic network. The generic constituents are
presented, together with function Nbeh. This section introduces notation used
in the remainder of this part of the thesis. At the end of each section, a table
will provide an overview of the notation, generic functions, and proof obligations
presented in that section. The three next sections prove generic theorems related
to functional correctness, evacuation and local liveness. We then formally deﬁne
productivity and formulate our ﬁnal generic theorem.
3.2.2 Formal Network Model
We formally introduce the concepts of resources, messages and conﬁgurations.
Resources
Network N consists of a set of resources R. Generic function RGen generates
the resources given some instantiation speciﬁc parameters (e.g., the dimension of
a 2D mesh topology). These parameters are implicitly provided to most of the
generic functions mentioned in this paper. Each resource r has a certain capacity,
i.e., a certain number of places to store data of messages, denoted |r|. We assume
resources to be static, in the sense that neither the resources nor their capacities
change during execution of the network.
Messages
Messages are the unit of communication at the network layer. When a message
is injected into the network, it is wrapped into a data structure called a travel.
A travel t is a formal representation of an injected message. A travel stores the
progress of sending a message across a network. It is a tuple 〈id, org,msg, l, d, log〉
where id is a unique identiﬁer, org is the resource where the travel is to be injected,
msg represents the actual contents of the message, l represents the current location
of the travel (i.e., the resources it currently occupies), d is the destination, and log
is a history variable storing the path of resources the travel has occupied from its
injection to its current location. The domain of all travels is denoted T.
Note that a travel contains both meta data (e.g., an id and the log) and state
data (e.g., the contents of the message and the location). In the ACL2 code,
there is a clear distinction between both types of variables. It is ensured that the
behavior of any network constituent is based only on the network state, and not
on meta data. In this thesis, we do not distinguish between a message and its
formal representation as a travel including meta data. We always use the term
“message”.
Given a list of messages T and an identiﬁer id, let T [id] return the message in
T with identiﬁer id. As identiﬁers are unique, there is always at most one such
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message. If there is no such message, an error value is returned. We let T.ids
denote the list of ids of the messages in T .
Configuration
A configuration σ is a tuple 〈U,E,C〉, where E denotes the list of enroute messages,
i.e., messages that have been injected into the network, U is a list of uninjected
messages, and C is a list of consumed messages, i.e, messages that have been
en route but are removed from the network. The domain of all conﬁgurations is
denoted Σ. Given a list of messages U , let σǫ(U) denote the empty network con-
ﬁguration where U is the list of uninjected messages, formally, σǫ(U) = 〈U, [], []〉.
Again, note that a conﬁguration contains both meta data (i.e., U and C) and
state data (i.e., E). Any network constituent bases its behavior on the state only.
For example, the routing function takes a conﬁguration and yields a conﬁguration.
However, the routes may not be based on U or C, and additionally they cannot
make use of, e.g., the logs of the enroute travels.
Given a conﬁguration, function place can be used to retrieve the contents of
a place in a resource. For example, place(r, n, σ) returns the contents of the nth
place of resource r in conﬁguration σ. An empty place is denoted by ǫ. If n is
out of bounds, i.e., if n is greater than |r|, an error value is returned. Finally,
generic function υ(r, σ) returns true if and only if resource r is unavailable in
conﬁguration σ.
3.2.3 Generic Constituents
We informally describe the behavior of the generic constituents. Their exact be-
havior is axiomatized by the proof obligations presented in the next section.
Generic function I : Σ × N 7→ Σ represents the injection method. Given a
conﬁguration and the current time, it decides which uninjected messages are ready
for departure. It partitions list U of uninjected messages into a list D of departing
messages and a list P of postponed messages. Departing messages are injected in
the network and added to the list E of enroute ones. The list of departing messages
is denoted I(σ, z).D. The list of postponed messages is denoted I(σ, z).P .
Generic function R : R×R 7→ P(R) represents the routing function. From the
current resource and a destination it computes a set of next hops. We overload
this function to apply to a conﬁguration. Function R : Σ 7→ Σ loops over the set
of enroute messages and applies function R : R × R 7→ P(R) to each message. It
stores the set of next hops as meta data in each enroute travel. The conﬁguration
yielded by functionR : Σ 7→ Σ is thus equivalent to its input, with for each enroute
travel the next hops added as meta data. Note that function R : R × R 7→ P(R)
does not precompute an entire path for the message. It only supplies the next
steps the message may take. After each move, the routing function is applied to
the current location to recompute the set of next hops the message can take from
that location.
Generic function O : Σ 7→ Σ represents the starvation prevention mechanism.
Starvation can be avoided using a correct resource assignment scheme [48]. Ef-
fectively, such a scheme tells the switching policy which messages have priority in
case of contention. We represent a starvation prevention mechanism as a function
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which reorders the list of enroute messages of a conﬁguration, so that messages
with high priority are placed at the start of the list of enroute messages.
Generic function S : Σ 7→ Σ represents the switching policy . It performs two
tasks. First, it moves enroute messages. To move a message, it checks whether
there exists a next hop that is available and – in case of contention – whether
it has priority over other messages. If so, the message will be moved from its
current resource to the next. Secondly, it consumes messages that arrive at their
destination. An arrived message is removed from the list of enroute messages σ.E
and added to the list of consumed messages σ.C.
3.2.4 Deadlock Configuration
A conﬁguration is deﬁned as a tuple of three lists. Not any tuple is a legal conﬁgur-
ation. First, the list of enroute messages assigned to some resource may not exceed
the capacity of that resource. This is expressed by function fits : Σ 7→ B. Secondly,
the list of enroute messages may not violate invariants induced by the switching
policy. For example, in a packet-switched network an induced invariant is that
each message occupies at most one resource. Generic function ιS : Σ 7→ B returns
true if and only if the generic switching invariant holds for the given conﬁguration.
Definition 3.1 Conﬁguration σ is legal, notation legal(σ), if and only if no
capacities are exceeded and the generic switching invariant is satisﬁed.
legal(σ)
def
= fits(σ) ∧ ιS(σ)
The deﬁnition of deadlock is dependent on the type of network. In some
networks, deadlock can be deﬁned as a global property where all messages are
stuck. In some networks, deadlock is deﬁned as a local property, where some
message is permanently blocked. Generic predicate Ω : Σ 7→ B returns true if
and only if the given conﬁguration σ is a legal deadlock conﬁguration. Deadlock
freedom is deﬁned as the absence of deadlocks.
Definition 3.2 Network N is deadlock-free, notation DLF(N), if and only if
there exists no deadlock conﬁguration.
DLF(N) ≡ ∀σ ∈ Σ · ¬Ω(σ)
3.2.5 The Behavior of the Generic Network
We now have the means to deﬁne function Nbeh which deﬁnes the behavior of the
generic network. Besides the current conﬁguration, function Nbeh takes as input
the current time. Each recursive call corresponds to one step.
Nbeh(σ, z)
def
=


σ if σ.E = [] ∧ σ.U = []
σI if Ω(σI) ∧ σI.D = []
Nbeh(〈σI.P, σS.E, σS.C〉, z + 1)
where σS = S(σO)
σO = O(σR)
σR = R(σI)
σI = I(σ, z)
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First, function Nbeh checks whether there are enroute or uninjected messages.
If there are none, it terminates as all messages have been evacuated. If there are
messages, function Nbeh ﬁrst applies the injection method to the current conﬁg-
uration σ, resulting in conﬁguration σI. Messages are injected. If the resulting
conﬁguration is a deadlock and there are no new injections, function Nbeh ter-
minates. Secondly, it applies the routing function to conﬁguration σI, resulting in
conﬁguration σR. Routes are computed. Messages are reordered by a call to the
starvation prevention mechanism O, resulting in conﬁguration σO. Then function
Nbeh applies the switching policy to σO. Each message advances by one hop if
possible, yielding a new list of enroute message σS.E. The switching policy may
consume some messages, yielding a new list of consumed messages σS.C. The
new list of uninjected messages is the list of messages postponed by the injection
method. Time is increased by 1. Function Nbeh is called recursively with these
new parameters.
Note that – without further proof obligations on the behavior of the generic
constituents – this function does not necessarily terminate. For example, if the net-
work contains a livelock, functionNbeh executes the network perpetually. Proving
termination is a major issue addressed in this chapter. In Section 3.4 we provide
proof obligations which ensure termination.
In the next sections, we will reason about execution steps. We will denote one
step of Nbeh with step(σ, z), i.e.,:
step = S ◦O ◦R ◦ I
Table 3.1 summarizes the diﬀerent functions and parameters of the GeNoC
framework.
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Description
R Set of resources R
|r| Capacity of resource
t = 〈id, org,msg, l, d, log〉 Message t
T Domain of message lists
T [id] The message with identiﬁer id
T.ids The list of ids in T
σ = 〈U,E,C〉 Conﬁguration Uninjected, Enroute, Consumed
σǫ(U) Empty network conﬁguration 〈U, [], []〉
fits(σ) No resource capacities are exceeded
legal(σ) Conﬁguration σ is legal
Σ Set of all conﬁgurations
place(r, n, σ) The content of a place
ǫ An empty place
step(σ, z) One step
POι Implicit proof obligations
DLF(N) Deadlock freedom
N Generic communication network
RGen Generic resource generator
υ Generic unavailability predicate
I Generic injection method
R Generic routing function
S Generic switching policy
O Generic starvation prevention mechanism
ιS Generic switching invariant
Ω Generic deadlock conﬁguration
Nbeh Generic network behavior
Table 3.1: Notation and generic functions
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3.3 Functional Correctness
The previous section presented a formal model of communication networks. We
proceed with formulating correctness properties for this model. This section con-
siders functional correctness. We ﬁrst deﬁne the correctness property. Then we
formulate a set of proof obligations suﬃcient for functional correctness. Finally,
we formulate and prove our functional correctness theorem.
3.3.1 Definition of Functional Correctness
Functional correctness consists of the following properties:
1. When a message is consumed, its current location is its destination.
2. All messages traverse a correct route through the network.
3. The content of messages does not change.
Before we formalize functional correctness, we deﬁne the notion of a correct route.
Definition 3.3 List r = [r0, r1, . . . rn] is a correct route for destination d, nota-
tion correctroutep(r, d), if and only if it is path that can be established by the
routing function.
correctroutep(r, d)
def
= r0 ∈ R ∧ ∀0 < i ≤ n · ri ∈ R ∧ ri ∈ R(ri−1, d)
A correct route is a path of valid resources where each element is supplied as
a next hop by the routing function from the previous element.
Definition 3.4 NetworkN is functionally correct, notation FC(N), if and only if:
FC(N)
def
= ∀U ⊆ T · ∀t ∈ Nbeh(σǫ(U), 0).C ·


last(t.log) = t.d
correctroutep(t.log, t.d)
t.msg = U [t.id].msg
The deﬁnition considers all consumed messages after termination of function
Nbeh. It checks the logs and returns true only if the last element of each log
corresponds to the desired destination of the message. The logs must constitute
correct routes. Finally, if the content of the message is compared to its original
content, these must be equal. A network is functionally correct if this holds for any
list of uninjected messages U . We provide proof obligations suﬃcient for functional
correctness. Functional correctness holds trivially if no message is consumed. A
network that is stuck in a deadlock can still be functionally correct, as long as its
route so far has been correct.
3.3.2 Proof Obligations for Functional Correctness
To ensure that messages traverse a correct route, the routing function must always
supply at least one next hop. Also, no next hops may be supplied if a message has
arrived at its destination.
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Proof Obligation 1 Existence next hops
The routing function supplies a non-empty set of next hops as long as the message
has not arrived at its destination.
∀c, d ∈ R · c 6= d ⇐⇒ R(c, d) 6= ∅
To prove functional correctness we need to know that messages do not suddenly
appear in the network. The injection method can only inject messages from the
list of uninjected messages. All messages must either be injected or postponed.
Also, the set of injected messages must be disjunct from the postponed messages: a
message cannot be duplicated. Similarly, the switching policy can only advance en-
route messages. All enroute messages must either remain enroute or be consumed.
The sets of enroute messages, consumed messages, and uninjected messages are
always pairwise disjoint. This is expressed by the following proof obligations.
Proof Obligation 2 Partitioning injection method
The injection method partitions the uninjected messages into postponed and de-
parting messages.
{σI.P, σI.D} ⊕ σ.U where σI = I(σ, z)
Proof Obligation 3 Partitioning switching policy
The switching policy partitions the enroute messages into enroute and consumed
messages.
{σS.E, σS.C} ⊕ σ.E where σS = S(σ)
The switching policy can consume messages according to some consumption
criterion. A restriction is that messages are consumed at their destination only,
i.e., messages are not dropped at some intermediate location.
Proof Obligation 4 Consumption only at destinations
The switching policy consumes messages only at their destination.
∀t ∈ σS.C · last(t.log) = t.d
Finally, both the injection method and the switching policy must always yield
a legal conﬁguration.
Proof Obligation 5 Legal configuration (injection)
Given a legal conﬁguration, the injection method yields a legal conﬁguration.
legal(σ) =⇒ legal(σI) where σI = I(σ, z)
Proof Obligation 6 Legal configuration (switching)
Given a legal conﬁguration, the switching policy yields a legal conﬁguration.
legal(σ) =⇒ legal(σS) where σS = S(σ)
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3.3.3 Functional Correctness Theorem
Theorem 3.1 Proof Obligations 1 to 6 ensure functional correctness of generic
network N.
PO1(N) to PO6(N),POι(N) |= FC(N)
Proof. The proof of functional correctness is by structural induction on function
Nbeh. We do the proof for route correctness. The proofs that messages are
consumed only at their destination and have unchanged content are similar.
An implicit proof obligation states that the logs for all uninjected messages
are initially empty. The base case is therefore trivial. For the inductive case, we
need to prove that if the logs contain correct routes, after one step the routes are
still correct. We only need to consider the enroute messages, as we will prove that
the logs of the uninjected messages are always empty and the logs of consumed
messages remain unchanged.
Consider the call of the injection method in one step. New messages are injected
and we must prove that these new enroute messages have correct routes. This is
trivial, as the uninjected messages have empty logs. The calls of both the routing
function and the starvation prevention mechanism do not alter the logs or the
enroute messages and therefore preserve route correctness. It remains to be shown
that the call of the switching policy preserves route correctness.
By construction of Nbeh, the switching policy takes as parameter a conﬁgur-
ation where next hops have been computed by the routing function. By Proof
Obligation 1 there exists at least one. If an enroute message moves, the switching
policy adds the chosen next hop to the log. By typing of the routing function,
it is a valid resource. The last element of the logs is the current position of the
message. Adding the next hop as new element preserves the route correctness, as
the new element is a next hop for the previous element and the rest of the route
is correct by the induction hypothesis. This concludes the proof.
Two assumptions have been made here, which have yet to be proven. First,
the logs of the uninjected messages are assumed to remain empty until injection.
This holds since Proof Obligation 2 ensures that the list of uninjected messages is
always disjunct from the departing messages. By induction, this implies that the
list of uninjected messages is always disjunct from the enroute messages. Secondly,
the logs of the consumed messages are assumed to remain unchanged. This holds,
since Proof Obligation 3 ensures that the list of consumed messages is always
disjunct from both the enroute and uninjected messages.
Table 3.2 summarizes the notions and proof obligations related to functional
correctness.
3.4 Evacuation
A network is evacuatable if and only if every uninjected message will eventually
be injected and if every injected message will eventually be consumed. If, after
termination of function Nbeh, the list of consumed messages is equal to the initial
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Description
correctroutep(r, d) List of resources r is a valid route
FC(N) Functional Correctness
Proof Obligation 1 Existence next hops
Proof Obligation 2 Partitioning injection method
Proof Obligation 3 Partitioning switching policy
Proof Obligation 4 Consumption only at destinations
Proof Obligation 5 Legal conﬁguration (injection)
Proof Obligation 6 Legal conﬁguration (switching)
Table 3.2: Notation and proof obligations related to functional correctness
list of uninjected messages, all messages have been injected and all messages have
been consumed.
Definition 3.5 Network N is evacuatable, notation EVAC(N), if and only if any
list of uninjected messages U can be injected and processed by the network.
EVAC(N) ≡ ∀U ⊆ T · Nbeh(σǫ(U), 0).C.ids ⋍ U.ids
We deﬁne evacuation using the unique identiﬁers of the messages. After ter-
mination of function Nbeh the list of consumed messages must contain the same
identiﬁers as the initial list of uninjected messages. This does not state anything
about the actual contents of the messages. That is, given an identiﬁer id of some
consumed message mc, our deﬁnition of evacuation does not require that this
message is indeed equal to the initial uninjected message mu with the same iden-
tiﬁer. However, functional correctness ensures that identiﬁers indeed always refer
to the same messages. Combined with functional correctness, we can prove that
all messages correctly arrive at their destination.
3.4.1 Proof Obligations for Evacuation
If a network may reach a deadlock conﬁguration, it is not evacuatable. We require
deadlock freedom to prove evacuation. For now, deadlock freedom is not split up
into proof obligations. Proof obligations suﬃcient to prove deadlock freedom is
the major focus of this thesis. For sake of completeness, we formulate a proof
obligation that simply requires the network to be deadlock-free.
Proof Obligation 7 Deadlock Freedom
The network is deadlock-free.
DLF(N)
The remaining proof obligations for evacuation will be deﬁned using two meas-
ures. The injection measure, denoted µI, represents the progress of injection.
Initially, when no message has been injected, the value of the injection measure
is its maximum value. It decreases with each injection until all messages have
been injected. The switching measure, denoted µS represents the progress of the
enroute messages. It decreases with the progression of each enroute message. It
may increase when new messages are injected.
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Injection Measure
Function µI : T×N 7→ N takes as parameters the list of uninjected messages and
the current time. It returns the injection measure. We deﬁne the following proof
obligations:
Proof Obligation 8 Liveness of injection
Given an empty network and a non-empty list of uninjected messages, the injection
measure decreases after one call of the injection method.
σ.E = [] ∧ σ.U 6= [] =⇒ µI(σI.P, z + 1) < µI(σ.U, z)
where σI = I(σ, z)
Note that the injection measure only needs to decrease in case of an empty
network. This proof obligation eﬀectively formulates liveness: if nothing has been
injected yet, at some point injection must start.
At each step where the network is empty, the injection measure decreases.
If in other steps it increases, the measure cannot be used to prove termination of
injection. An inﬁnite injection sequence can exist where the measure decreases and
increases inﬁnitely often. We therefore need to ensure that the injection measure
never increases.
Proof Obligation 9 Partial ordering injection measure
The injection measure never increases.
µI(σI.P, z + 1) ≤ µI(σ.U, z)
where σI = I(σ, z)
Proof Obligation 10 Correctness injection measure
If after injection the injection measure has not changed, then no injections have
occurred.
µI(σI.P, z + 1) = µI(σ.U, z) =⇒ σI = σ
where σI = I(σ, z)
Proof obligation 10 formulates correctness of the injection measure: if the
injection method injects new messages into the network, the injection measure
decreases.
Combined, Proof Obligations 8, 9, and 10 are suﬃcient to prove termination
of injection. In each step, injection method I is called. As long as the network
is empty, the injection measure decreases. At some point injection must start.
With each consecutive injection the injection measure decreases. Since it never
increases, the sequence of injections terminates.
Switching Measure
Function µS : Σ 7→ L(N) takes as parameter the current conﬁguration. It returns
the switching measure, which is a list of natural numbers. We deﬁne the following
proof obligation:
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Proof Obligation 11 Livelock freedom
If there is no deadlock and there are enroute messages, the switching measure
decreases under lexicographical ordering after one call of switching and routing.
¬Ω(σR) ∧ σR.E 6= [] =⇒ µS(S(σR)) < µS(σ)
where σR = R(σ)
This proof obligation ensures livelock freedom. If the network is not in a dead-
lock, at least one message can progress towards its destination. There must exist a
measure which decreases with each step where the switching policy is applied to a
deadlock-free conﬁguration. This excludes livelock, as messages cannot inﬁnitely
move around in the network.
The switching measure represents the progress of the enroute messages. Re-
ordering the list of enroute messages does not inﬂuence the progress of these mes-
sages. The switching measure must remain equal if the list is reordered. This is
expressed as a proof obligation.
Proof Obligation 12 Irrelevance ordering enroute messages
The ordering of the messages passed to the switching measure is irrelevant for the
result.
σ0.E ⋍ σ1.E =⇒ µS(σ0) = µS(σ1)
Finally, we need to know that the starvation prevention mechanism reorders
the list of messages in its conﬁguration.
Proof Obligation 13 Reordering starvation prevention mechanism
The starvation prevention mechanism reorders the list of enroute messages.
O(σ).U = σ.U ∧O(σ).E ⋍ σ.E ∧O(σ).C = σ.C
3.4.2 Evacuation Theorem
Theorem 3.2 Proof Obligations 7 to 13 ensure generic networkN is evacuatable
if and only if it is deadlock-free.
PO8(N) to PO13(N),POι(N) |= EVAC(N)
Proof. Function Nbeh terminates in two cases. In the ﬁrst case, all initially un-
injected messages have been injected into the network and have been consumed.
In this case Nbeh(σ, z).C.ids ⋍ σ.U.ids. In the second case, a deadlock conﬁgura-
tion has occurred. In this case Nbeh(σ, z).C.ids 6⋍ σ.U.ids. By Proof Obligation 7,
the second case cannot occur. Thus a network is evacuatable if function Nbeh
terminates.
Termination is proven using a termination measure, i.e., a measure that de-
creases under some well-founded relation. The termination measure of function
Nbeh is deﬁned as follows:
µN(σ, t)
def
= [µI(σ.U, t)] ⊔ µS(σ)
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The termination measure is a list of two elements: ﬁrst the injection measure and
second the switching measure. It decreases with each recursive call of Nbeh under
lexicographical ordering.
In one recursive call function Nbeh applies injection, routing, reordering, and
switching. The proof proceeds by case distinction: the injection measure either
increases, decreases, or stays equal. By Proof Obligation 9 the ﬁrst case cannot
occur. In the second case, the termination measure decreases under lexicographical
ordering, regardless of the switching measure. It remains to be shown that in the
third case the switching measure decreases.
Assume that the injection measure stays equal. By Proof Obligation 10 there
are no new injections. We can ignore the injection method in this recursive call of
function Nbeh. By Proof Obligations 12 and 13, the call of starvation mechanism
O has no inﬂuence on the switching measure. Thus Proof Obligation 11 can be
applied: the switching measure decreases after one call of switching and routing.
This completes the proof, as measure µN decreases. However, Proof Obligation 11
has two assumptions which have to be discharged: the current conﬁguration is not
a deadlock conﬁguration and there are enroute messages. If the ﬁrst assumption
does not hold then there is a deadlock conﬁguration. Since by Proof Obligation
10 there are no departing messages, the second termination condition of function
Nbeh is satisﬁed and it terminates. If the second assumption does not hold then
there are no enroute messages. The network is empty. By Proof Obligation 8 the
injection measure decreases, which contradicts the assumption that the injection
measure stays equal.
From Proof Obligations 8 to 13 it follows that functionNbeh terminates. As by
Proof Obligation 7 there does not exist a deadlock, Nbeh(σǫ(U), 0).C.ids ⋍ U.ids
for any list of uninjected messages U .
Note that the return values of the injection and the switching measure are
restricted to respectively a natural number and a list of natural numbers. The
corresponding well-founded relations are respectively < and the lexicographical
ordering. From these values, it is easy to construct the termination measure µN
and the corresponding well-founded relation. Ideally, the proof obligations would
allow the values of the measures to decrease under arbitrary well-founded relations.
Theorem 3.2 states that evacuation follows from deadlock freedom, livelock
freedom, and liveness. Table 3.3 summarizes the diﬀerent notions and proof ob-
ligations related to deadlock freedom and evacuation.
3.5 Local Liveness
We formalize local liveness with another measure. We call this measure the waiting
measure, denoted µwait. The waiting measure takes as parameters a message t and
the current conﬁguration. It represents the maximum time it takes for t to wait
in its current location, i.e., the maximum time t can be blocked.
Definition 3.6 Network N is locally live, notation LL(N), if and only if:
LL(N) ≡ ∀σ ∈ Σ · ∀t ∈ σ.E · ∀z ∈ N ·
step(σ, z).E[t.id] = t =⇒ µwait(t, step(σ, z)) < µwait(t, σ)
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Description
EVAC(N) Network N is evacuatable
µI Generic injection measure
µS Generic switching measure
Proof Obligation 7 Deadlock freedom
Proof Obligation 8 Liveness
Proof Obligation 9 Partial ordering µI
Proof Obligation 10 Correctness µI
Proof Obligation 11 Livelock freedom
Proof Obligation 12 Irrelevance ordering enroute messages
Proof Obligation 13 Reordering starvation prevention
Table 3.3: Notation, generic functions, and proof obligations related to evacuation
Notation step(σ, z).E[t.id] = t expresses the fact that message t does not
move during one step. The message is enroute and is not modiﬁed. Measure µwait
decreases with each step in which message t does not move. If measure µwait
can be deﬁned in any conﬁguration, for any enroute message, the time a message
remains in one resource is always ﬁnite.
3.5.1 Proof Obligations for Local Liveness
Local liveness requires absence of deadlocks. We need an additional proof obliga-
tion to enforce that messages move when possible. This excludes, e.g., a switching
policy that delays messages arbitrarily. The proof obligation states that if there is
a message that is permanently blocked with unavailable next hops, there exists a
deadlock conﬁguration. Local liveness also requires starvation freedom. We deﬁne
two proof obligations which are suﬃcient for starvation freedom. In combination
with Proof Obligation 7, these three proof obligations are suﬃcient to prove the
existence of the measure µwait, and thereby the absence of permanent blocking.
Proof Obligation 14 states that if a network is deadlock-free, it possible to
deﬁne a measure called the deadlock measure. Function µΩ : T× Σ 7→ N returns
this measure. It takes as parameters a message t and the current conﬁguration.
This measure represents the maximum time that message t can wait for unavailable
resources. It decreases with each step where all next hops are unavailable.
Proof Obligation 14 Deadlock measure
Deadlock freedom implies that messages are not permanently blocked due to un-
available next hops.
DLF(N) =⇒ ∀σ ∈ Σ · ∀t ∈ σ.E · ∀z ∈ N ·
(∀r ∈ R(t.l, t.d) · υ(r, σ)) =⇒ µΩ(t, step(σ, z)) < µΩ(t, σ)
The proof obligations suﬃcient for starvation freedom use another measure
called the starvation measure, denoted µO. Starvation occurs when a message
has to wait inﬁnitely many times to acquire a resource, even though this resource
becomes available from time to time. If the time a message has to wait for an
available resource is bounded, no starvation can occur. The starvation measure
47
3 GeNoC for Productivity Proofs
represents the maximum time a message has to wait for an available resource. If
such a measure can be deﬁned, the number of times a message is not granted a
required available resource is ﬁnite.
Function µO : T× R × Σ 7→ N represents the starvation measure. It takes as
parameters a message t, a next hop of message t, and the current conﬁguration.
We deﬁne the following proof obligation:
Proof Obligation 15 Starvation Freedom
The time a message is not granted an available resource is ﬁnite.
∀t ∈ σ.E · ∀r ∈ R(t.l, t.d) · ¬υ(r, σ) ∧ step(σ, z).E[t.id] = t =⇒
µO(t, r, step(σ, z)) < µO(t, r, σ)
For any enroute message t and for any next hop r, if the next hop is available
and the message does not move, then the starvation measure decreases. This
implies that resource r is not granted to other messages inﬁnitely often. Here, we
need to ensure that the starvation measure never increases.
Proof Obligation 16 Partial ordering starvation measure
The starvation measure never increases.
∀t ∈ σ.E · ∀r ∈ R(t.l, t.d) · step(σ, z).E[t.id] = t =⇒
µO(t, r, step(σ, z)) ≤ µO(t, r, σ)
For any enroute message and for any next hop r, as long as message t does not
move, the starvation measure does not increase.
Deﬁning a waiting measure is a hard problem, as it requires deﬁning worst-
case bounds on latency of messages in the network. Deﬁning a deadlock measure
is equally hard. It is however relatively easy to prove the contrapositive version
of Proof Obligation 14, i.e., that if a message is permanently blocked, there exists
a deadlock. Such a proof merely shows the existence of a deadlock measure for a
deadlock-free network. The starvation measure is easy to deﬁne. Because we do
not deﬁne the deadlock measure, but merely show its existence, we also do not
deﬁne the waiting measure, but just show its existence.
3.5.2 Local Liveness Theorem
We now prove local liveness from the proof obligations.
Theorem 3.3 Proof Obligations 7 and 14 to 16 ensure local liveness of generic
network N.
PO7(N),PO14(N) to PO16(N),POι(N) |= LL(N)
Proof. Let t be an enroute message in conﬁguration σ waiting for next hop r. We
prove the existence of waiting measure µwait.
Proof Obligation 7 ensures networkN is deadlock-free. By Proof Obligation 14,
this means that no message can be inﬁnitely blocked by unavailable next hops.
From the deadlock measure µΩ and the starvation measure µO we construct µwait.
Message t waits to acquire a next hop. It takes at most µΩ(t, σ) steps before a
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next hop becomes available. When this happens, either message t acquires it or
not. By Proof Obligations 15 and 16, the second case happens at most µO(t, r, σ)
times per resource r. Figure 3.2 graphically depicts this process.
unavailable unavailable unavailable unavailable
# = µO
µΩ µΩ µΩ µΩ
Figure 3.2: Waiting measure
Thus the waiting measure can be deﬁned as follows:
µwait(t, σ)
def
= µΩ(t, σ) ·
∑
∀r∈R(t.l,t.d)
µO(t, r, σ)
Table 3.4 summarizes the diﬀerent notions and proof obligations related to
local liveness.
Description
LL(N) Local Liveness
µwait Generic waiting measure
µΩ Generic deadlock measure
µO Generic starvation measure
Proof Obligation 14 Deadlock measure
Proof Obligation 15 Starvation freedom
Proof Obligation 16 Partial ordering µO
Table 3.4: Notation, generic functions, and proof obligations related to local liveness.
3.6 Productivity
We can now formally deﬁne productivity.
Definition 3.7 Network N is productive, notation PROD(N), if and only if any
list of uninjected messages U can be injected and correctly processed by the net-
work.
PROD(N) ≡ FC(N) ∧ EVAC(N) ∧ LL(N)
The ﬁnal theorem of correctness is a direct corollary of the theorems in this
chapter.
Corollary 3.1 Proof Obligations 1 to 16 ensure productivity of generic net-
work N.
PO1(N) to PO16(N),POι(N) |= PROD(N)
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Table 3.5 gives an overview of all generic functions. To make an instantiation
of a complete network, one needs to provide a deﬁnition of all these functions.
From these deﬁnitions, an executable speciﬁcation of the network is automatically
generated.
Function Description
RGen Resource generator
I Injection method
R Routing function
S Switching policy
O Starvation prevention mechanism
Ω Deadlock conﬁguration
ιS Switching invariant
υ Unavailability predicate
µI Injection measure
µS Switching measure
µO Starvation measure
Table 3.5: Generic functions
Table 3.6 gives an overview of all proof obligations. Proof Obligations 1 to 6
are suﬃcient to prove functional correctness. Proof obligations 7 states deadlock
freedom. Proof obligations 8 to 13 are suﬃcient for evacuation. Finally, Proof
Obligations 14 to 16 formulate starvation freedom. The third column shows the
generic constituents on which the proof obligations depend.
PO Name Generics
1 Existence next hops R
2 Partitioning injection method I
3 Partitioning switching method S
4 Consumption only at destinations S
5 Legal conﬁguration (injection) I
6 Legal conﬁguration (switching) S
7 Deadlock freedom I,R,O,S
8 Liveness I
9 Partial ordering injection measure I
10 Correctness injection measure I
11 Livelock freedom R, S
12 Irrelevance ordering enroute messages R, S
13 Reordering starvation prevention mechanism O
14 Deadlock measure Ω, S
15 Starvation freedom O
16 Partial ordering µO O
Table 3.6: Proof Obligations
Figure 3.3 gives an overview of the proof structure. In order to prove productiv-
ity, one ﬁrst needs to prove functional correctness. This amounts to discharging
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Proof Obligations 1 to 6. Evacuation requires a proof of deadlock freedom and
termination. Proof Obligations 7 to 13 are suﬃcient for this. Local liveness re-
quires a proof of deadlock freedom and the discharging of the three additional
proof obligations 14 to 16 to prove starvation freedom. The proofs of evacuation
and functional correctness do not depend on these three constraints.
Figure 3.3: Overview of the proof structure
Our methodology requires an instantiation of 11 generic functions and a proof
of 16 proof obligations. The next chapter demonstrates our methodology on a
realistic example of a Network-on-Chip.
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Chapter 4
Application to HERMES
The previous chapter extended the GeNoC framework for productivity proofs. A
formal model of communication networks has been introduced, together with 16
proof obligations suﬃcient for productivity. The methodology is valuable as long
as discharging the proof obligations is signiﬁcantly easier than proving productivity
from scratch. This chapter demonstrates our methodology on an academic example
of a NoC called HERMES [99]. We instantiate all generic functions and discharge
all proof obligations. An overview is presented of the proof eﬀort required to prove
productivity of HERMES using our methodology.
4.1 HERMES
HERMES is based on a 2D mesh architecture (Figure 4.1a). Each core is connected
to a processing node. Each processing node contains a switch connected to ﬁve
bi-directional ports. Ports East, West, North, and South connect to the neighbor
switches. Port Local connects to the core (Figure 4.1b). The resources of the
network are the ports.
(a) 3x3 HERMES mesh
Switch
N
EW
S
L
(b) Node with two places per port
Figure 4.1: A 2D-Mesh HERMES NoC
We specify a HERMES chip with west-first routing and wormhole switch-
ing [61]. West-ﬁrst routing is an adaptive routing function for a 2D mesh which
ﬁrst routes west and then adaptively south, east, and north. The principle of
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Figure 4.2: Turns in west-first routing. Dashed turns are prohibited.
west-ﬁrst routing is that all turns to the west are restricted. This breaks many
dependency cycles (see Figure 4.2).
Restricting all turns to the west does not break all cycles. There may be a
cycle if one ﬁrst routes north, turns from north to south, and then from south to
north again. One of these turns must be prohibited as well. Arbitrarily, we have
chosen to restrict the south-north turn. This breaks all dependency cycles and
consequently there is no deadlock.
Even though the principle behind west-ﬁrst routing is straightforward, there
are subtleties in deﬁning it formally. First, in some ports the set of possible
destinations of the messages located in the port is restricted, e.g., a message in an
eastern out-port cannot be destined for any destination west of that port, as this
would mean that the message would have to turn west after going east.
Secondly, routing is not memoryless. That is, routing does not solely depend
on the current processing node and the destination. West-ﬁrst routing needs to
be deﬁned from channel to channel, instead of from processing node to channel.
When a message arrives at a processing node, to be forwarded to another, one
step of its history is needed to make the routing decision: from which direction
the message entered the processing node. For example, whether a message can
be routed west depends on at which in-port the message had arrived, i.e., from
which channel the message came. Only if a message arrives at the eastern or local
in-port of the processing node can it be routed west.
The cores generate and consume messages. Injection occurs in the local in-
ports of the processing nodes. Consumption occurs at local out-ports. We assume
that once a message arrives at the local out-port of the destination it is consumed
by the core. The GeNoC framework models the behavior of the cores, i.e., mes-
sage generation, by assuming an arbitrary and unbounded – but ﬁnite – list of
uninjected messages. With each message, an arbitrary desired injection time is
associated, representing the time at which the core generates the message. After
generation of the message it is injected into the local in-port as soon as all places
of this port are empty.
Messages are handled in a ﬁrst-in-ﬁrst-out (FIFO) order. During the time a
message m waits to acquire a port p, new messages that want to acquire port p are
put back in line and therefore served after message m. This prevents starvation,
as an available port cannot be granted to other messages inﬁnitely often.
4.2 User Input, Part I: Executable Specification
In this section we provide instantiated functions for each generic function of the
GeNoC framework (see Table 3.5). An instantiation i of a generic function F is
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denoted Fi.
Resource generator
Each port p is represented as a tuple 〈x, y, c, d〉 where x and y specify the coordin-
ates of the processing node to which p belongs, c is the channel name of the port (N,
S, E, W or L) and d is the direction (I or O). The resource generator takes a single
parameter dim which represents the dimension of the mesh. Function RGen2D
generates up to ten ports for each processing node (x, y) such that x < dim.x and
y < dim.y. Some ports on the border of the mesh are never used. For example,
both the northern and western ports of processing node (0, 0) are useless. We let
the resource generator remove these border ports from the set of resources.
Switching Policy
We reuse the speciﬁcation of the wormhole switching policy provided by the GeNoC
framework [21]. Let Swhs be that function. For each message, function Swhs checks
whether there exists an available next hop. If so, the message advances by one
hop. If it arrives at its destination, it is removed from the conﬁguration and added
to the list of consumed messages.
A port accepts a header ﬂit if it is completely empty. Thus predicate υwhs is
deﬁned as follows:
υ
whs(p, σ)
def
= ∃0 ≤ i < |p| · place(p, i, σ) 6= ǫ
A deadlock is a conﬁguration in which all enroute messages are blocked. A
message is blocked if and only if all its next hops are unavailable.
Ωwhs(σ)
def
= |σ.E| > 0 ∧ ∀t ∈ σ.E · ∀r ∈ R(t.l, t.d) · υ(r, σ)
Injection Method
We assume that a desired injection time is associated with each message, denoted
t.z. Function Iz injects messages as soon as possible after their desired injection
time.
Let function put(id, r, σ) place id in an empty buﬀer of resource r in conﬁgur-
ation σ. Let function postpone(t, σ) add travel t to the list of uninjected travels
σ.U . Function Iz checks for all messages whether its desired injection time has
been reached and whether the origin port of the message is available. If so, the
message is injected. Otherwise injection of the message is delayed. The instan-
tiation of the injection method uses recursive function Izrec, which is deﬁned as
follows.
Izrec(σ, z, n)
def
=


σ if n >= |σ.U |
Izrec(put(un.id, un.org, σ), z, n+ 1) if
{
¬υwhs(un.org, σ)
un.z ≤ z
Izrec(postpone(un, σ), z, n+ 1) if otherwise
where un = σ.U [n]
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Injection method Iz is deﬁned as:
Iz(σ, z)
def
= Izrec(σ, z, 0)
Routing Function
Function next_in(p) returns the in-port connected to out-port p. For example, the
in-port connected to the eastern out-port of processing node (0, 0) is the western
in-port of processing node (1, 0):
next_in(〈0, 0, E, O〉) = 〈1, 0, W, I〉
Function next_in is not deﬁned for local out-ports. Function trans(p, P, D) returns
the port speciﬁed by P and D in the same processing node as p:
trans(p, P, D)
def
= 〈p.x, p.y, P, D〉
Routing function Rwf computes a set of next ports from the current port, a des-
tination and the dimension of the mesh. Routing depends on the dimension of the
mesh as the routing logic is not equal in all processing nodes. For example, nodes
in the rightmost column cannot route east, whereas all other nodes can always
route east.
Rwf(p, d, dim)
def
=


next_in(p) iﬀ p.d = O
trans(p, W, O) iﬀ p.c ∈ {E, L} ∧ p.x > 0
trans(p, E, O) iﬀ d.x > p.x ∧ p.x < dim.x
trans(p, N, O) iﬀ d.x ≥ p.x ∧ p.y > 0 ∧ p.c 6= N
trans(p, S, O) iﬀ
{
(d.x > p.x ∨ (d.x = p.x ∧ d.y > p.y))
p.y < dim.y
trans(p, L, O) iﬀ d.x = p.x ∧ d.y = p.y
We provide detailed information on each case distinction:
• If the current port is an out-port, simply route to the connected in-port.
• It is only possible to route west if the message has just been injected – the
current port is local-in – or if the message was already going west – the
current port is east-in.
• It is possible to route east as long as the destination is east and as long
as it does not lead out of the dimension of the network. Going east if the
destination is not east, would mean that at some point we would have to
route west again, resulting in a violation of the west-ﬁrst principle.
• It is possible to route north as long as we are either in the right column
or if the destination is east of us. Routing north if the destination is west
would mean that after going north we would have to route west, resulting in
a violation of the west-ﬁrst principle. Furthermore, we can only route north
if it does not lead outside of the dimension. Lastly, we prevent south-north
turns. We cannot go north if we have been going in southern direction, i.e.,
if we are in a northern in-port.
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• It is always possible to route south if the destination is east of us. If we
are already in the right column, it is only possible to route south if the
destination is south. Otherwise, a south-north turn would be required to
reach the destination, whereas such turns are prohibited.
• Lastly, it is only possible to route to the local out-port if we have reached
the destination.
Starvation prevention method
Function OF : Σ 7→ Σ represents a FIFO starvation prevention mechanism. It
sorts the list of messages by pushing all messages that have moved in the latest
step to the back of the list of enroute messages. We let switching function Swhs
keep track of whether messages move or not. Function starving(t) returns true if
and only if message t has not moved in the last call of Swhs. We deﬁne function
OF as follows:
OF(σ)
def
= 〈σ.U, [t ∈ σ.E | starving(t)] ⊔ [t ∈ σ.E | ¬ starving(t)], σ.C〉
4.3 User Input, Part II: Proofs
There are sixteen proof obligations to discharge. Table 4.1 gives an overview of
these proof obligations and the eﬀort required to discharge them. Six proof ob-
ligations are automatically discharged by ACL2 and no eﬀort is required. Proof
Obligations 3, 4, 6, and 14 depend on the switching policy only. They have been
discharged in the wormhole switching module. Proof Obligation 5 could be proven
completely with theorems from the wormhole switching module. Only ﬁve proof
obligations require interaction with the ACL2 system. Two of them are straight-
forward. The ﬁnal three are more diﬃcult. They are related to the measures and
to deadlock freedom. These two aspects are detailed hereafter.
The complete proof presented in Part II, including the generic model, the proofs
of all the generic theorems, the speciﬁcation of the HERMES NoC in the ACL2
logic, and discharging of all proof obligations consists of 12258 lines of ACL2 code.
Only 1741 lines of code deal with the HERMES speciﬁc topology, routing function,
the injection method and the discharging of the corresponding proof obligations.
We will now provide details on the proofs.
4.3.1 Discharging Proof Obligations
The most intricate part of discharging the proof obligations is deﬁning correct
measures. We deﬁne the injection, switching and starvation measures and prove
them correct. For each measure, we ﬁrst provide the formal deﬁnition of the
measure and then formulate the major assisting lemma’s that were required to be
proven in ACL2. We prove informally that there exists a deadlock measure.
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PO Lines Aux. Theorems Proof Eﬀort (hrs)
1 6 0 0
2 142 27 1
3 N/A N/A N/A
4 N/A N/A N/A
5 N/A N/A N/A
6 N/A N/A N/A
7 834 70 12
8 11 0 0
9 5 0 0
10 10 0 0
11 307 18 4
12 17 5 0.5
13 0 0 0
14 N/A N/A N/A
15 367 38 8
16 63 0 0
Table 4.1: Proof effort
Injection measure: Definition
We need to deﬁne a measure that decreases with each injection and if the network
is empty. We deﬁne function µz
I
as follows:
µ
z
I(U, z)
def
=
∑
t∈U
(1 + |t.z − z|)
The injection measure adds at least a value of one for each uninjected message.
If the message is uninjected and its desired injection time has not been reached,
the diﬀerence between the desired injection time and the current time is added,
i.e., the time the message has to wait before its desired injection time has been
reached.
With each injection this measure decreases, as each message adds at least 1 to
the measure. If the network is empty, there are two cases: either there exists a
message whose injection time has been reached or not. In the ﬁrst case, at least
one message will be injected and the measure decreases. In the second case, the
time the messages have to wait decreases, i.e., for each message t the value of
|t.z − z| decreases with one. If the network is empty, the measure decreases with
each call of Iz, regardless of whether there are injections or not.
Injection measure: Proof
Proof obligations 8 to 10 required no further proof eﬀort, i.e., no further auxiliary
theorems, hints, or interactive theorem proving, to be discharged.
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Switching measure: Definition
For the switching measure we consider the maximum route, i.e., the longest route
that can be taken from the current port to some destination. As Figure 4.3 shows,
the maximum route is always the route destined for the upper-right processing
node. Regardless of the actual destination, the length of this maximum route
always decreases when progressing towards the actual destination, because the
actual destination is always somewhere on the maximum route.
Figure 4.3: The maximum west-first route from curr
The maximum route is taken if a message ﬁrst goes west to column 0, then goes
east column for column, where for each column one goes ﬁrst completely to the
north, then completely to the south. Therefore we take as measure a list [w, e, n, s]
such that each element denotes the maximum number of steps that can be taken
in respectively the western, eastern, northern and southern direction. This list
decreases under lexicographical ordering. Function µwf computes this measure. It
takes as parameters the current port and the dimension of the network.
If we do a step in the western direction, the second element of the list increases.
However, as the ﬁrst element decreases, the measure as a whole decreases under
lexicographical ordering. As long as we are heading in the western direction (de-
noted with ←), the other elements of the list actually do not matter and are set
to zero.
Once we are heading in the eastern direction (→), no more western steps can
be done, because west-ﬁrst routing routes in western direction ﬁrst. Thus the ﬁrst
element w must be zero. In this case the second element e represents the number
of steps that can be done in eastern direction. The remaining elements n and s
do not matter as long as the packet is heading east. They are both set to zero.
Similarly, if we are heading in the northern direction (↑), the number of steps
that can be taken in the southern direction increases. However, the measure
decreases as n – the number of steps that can be taken in the northern direction
– decreases. Once we do a north-south turn, we are heading in the southern
direction (↓). No more steps can be taken in northern direction, thus n is set to
zero. Element n remains zero until we do a step east in which case e decreases
and n and s can be reset.
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µ
wf(c, dim)
def
=
[c.x, 0, 0, 0] if ←
[0, dim.x− c.x, 0, 0] if →
[0, dim.x− c.x, c.y, dim.y] if ↑
[0, dim.x− c.x, 0, dim.y − c.y] if ↓
Function µwf
S
computes the switching measure. It is simply the pairwise addition
of the measure for all enroute messages.
µ
wf
S (σ, dim)
def
=
∑
t∈σ.E
µ
wf(t.l, dim)
Switching measure: Proof
Proof obligation 11 uses some auxiliary theorems. First we prove that measure µwf
indeed decreases under lexicographical ordering when a message advances from a
current port to a next hop, i.e., we prove:
µ
wf(n, dim) < µwf(c, dim) for all n ∈ Rwf(c, dest, dim)
This can be proven without further interaction. Secondly, we prove that measure
µ
wf
S
never increases after a call of the wormhole switching policy. For each travel
t, assuming it remains enroute and is not consumed, the measure µwf is computed
before and after switching. It never increases, intuitively meaning that messages
are not switched further away from their destination.
∀t ∈ Swhs(σ).E · µwf(Swhs(σ).E[t.id].l, dim) ≤ µwf(t.l, dim)
When the wormhole switching policy is called with a deadlock-free conﬁguration,
at least one message can move, i.e., one message can progress from its current
location to a next hop. The ﬁrst lemma states that for this message the switching
measure decreases. For all other messages, the second lemma states that the
measure does not increase. Combining the two auxiliary theorems, we prove Proof
Obligation 11, i.e., that if the wormhole switching policy is called with a deadlock-
free conﬁguration, the switching measure decreases.
¬Ω(σ) ∧ σ.E 6= [] =⇒ µwf
S
(Swhs(σ), dim) < µwf
S
(σ, dim)
Proof Obligation 12 states that the switching measure must be independent of
the ordering of the enroute messages. This holds as function µwf
S
is a sum. Proof
obligation 12 can easily be discharged.
Starvation measure: Definition
Let message t wait for next hop n. The characteristic of the FIFO starvation
prevention mechanism is that each time n becomes available, message t advances
in the list of all messages that wait for n. Therefore, we can take as measure the
index of message t in this list. Let function index(t, E) return the index of message
t in the list of messages E. We deﬁne function µF
O
as follows:
µ
F
O(t, n, σ)
def
= index(t, [t′ ∈ σ.E | n ∈ R(t′.l, t′.d)])
Function µF
O
ﬁlters all messages t′ that wait for next hop n and returns the index
of message t in this list.
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Starvation measure: Proof
Proving correctness of the starvation measure requires some proof eﬀort. We ﬁrst
prove that for any starving message t, i.e., any message t that has not moved in
the call of switching method Swhs even though a next hop n was available, the
index of t in the list of messages waiting for n decreases.
starving(t) =⇒ µF
O
(t, n,Swhs(σ)) < µF
O
(t, n, σ)
We require an auxiliary lemma. The switching module tries to move each message
in the list of enroute travels, starting with the ﬁrst travel in the list. If message t
did not move, a message t′ preceding t in the list of enroute messages acquired the
next hop. We prove that if a message preceding t is not starving, then the index
of t in the list of enroute messages decreases.
starving(t) ∧ ¬ starving(t′) ∧ µFO(t
′, n, σ) < µFO(t, n, σ) =⇒
µ
F
O(t, n,S
whs(σ)) < µFO(t, n, σ)
Then we prove that injecting new messages does not inﬂuence the measure of the
enroute travels. If a message is injected, it is initially non-starving. Appending
non-starving messages to the list does not inﬂuence the starvation measure of
starving messages. Let function add_enroute append a message at the end of the
list of enroute messages. We prove:
starving(t) ∧ ¬ starving(t′) =⇒ µF
O
(t, n, add_enroute(t′, σ)) = µF
O
(t, n, σ)
This holds as function OF appends non-starving message t′ at the end of the list,
thereby not inﬂuencing the index of t. This concludes the proof of both Proof
Obligations 15 and 16.
Deadlock measure
Proof Obligation 14 requires a proof that given a permanently blocked message,
there exists a deadlock. Our deﬁnition of deadlock, i.e., predicate Ωwhs, identiﬁes
deadlocks in which all messages are permanently blocked. We have to prove that if
there exists a conﬁguration in which at least one message is permanently blocked,
there exists a conﬁguration in which all messages are permanently blocked.
This proof has been done by Duato [48]. Assume a conﬁguration σ in which
the next hops of some message t are permanently unavailable. As there is no
starvation, this is due to a local deadlock. We drain the conﬁguration, by stopping
all injections and by waiting for all messages not participating in the local deadlock
to be consumed. This yields a deadlock conﬁguration σ′, in which all messages
are permanently blocked, i.e., for which Ωwhs(σ′) returns true.
Proof Obligation 14 assumes deadlock freedom. Consequently, the existence
of deadlock conﬁguration σ′ is a contradiction. This means that the existence
of conﬁguration σ – in which the next hops of some message t are permanently
unavailable – is a contradiction as well. Thus there does not exist a conﬁguration
σ in which the next hops of some message t are permanently unavailable. As for all
conﬁgurations no message can be permanently blocked by unavailable next hops,
there exists a deadlock measure that decreases with each step in which all next
hops are unavailable. Proof Obligation 14 is discharged.
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4.3.2 Deadlock Verification
Discharging Proof Obligation 7 is a major task. We reused an earlier proof eﬀort
on the theorem of Dally and Seitz that an acyclic dependency graph is suﬃcient for
deadlock freedom [36]. In order to discharge Proof Obligation 7, we have deﬁned
the dependency graph Gwfdep, proven that this dependency graph accurately reﬂects
the waiting relations in the network, and proven the graph acyclic. The latter
proof reused measure µwf: as there is a strict partial ordering on the vertices of
the dependency graph, the graph is acyclic.
First, we prove that if there exists a strict partial ordering ⊏ on the vertices
of a graph, the graph is acyclic. We prove a lemma stating that for any path
π = v0, v1, . . . vk any vertex vj (0 < j ≤ k) is smaller than the ﬁrst vertex.
path(π,G) ∧ 0 < j < |π| =⇒ vj ⊏ v0
This lemma follows directly from the transitivity of the partial ordering. The
proof proceeds by contradiction: assume there is some cycle c = c0, c1, . . . ck. We
instantiate the lemma with π = c0, c1, . . . ck, c0 and j = k + 1. Since c is a cycle,
π is a path. The lemma proves that c0 ⊏ c0. The contradiction follows from the
irreﬂexivity of the strict partial ordering.
Next, we prove that if the vertices of the dependency graph are converted to
lists of natural numbers using function µwf, the lexicographical ordering is a strict
partial ordering on the vertices of the dependency graph.
µ
wf(n, dim) < µwf(c, dim) for all n ∈ Awfdep(c, dim)
This proof needs no further interaction.
Besides proving that the dependency graph is acyclic, we also need to prove
correctness of the graph. We prove two theorems. First, we prove that if there is
an edge (r0, r1) in the graph, there exists a destination d such that if a travel with
destination d is located in r0 it is routed to r1.
r1 ∈ A
wf
dep(r0, dim) =⇒ ∃d ∈ P · r1 ∈ R
wf(r0, d, dim)
For this proof we deﬁne a function which computes a witness destination d for
the dependency. For west-ﬁrst routing, this is simply the processing node closest
to r1. Secondly, we prove that if a travel can be routed from r0 to r1, there is a
corresponding dependency edge. This proof is a straightforward case distinction.
Part of the proof for deadlock is general and could be re-used in other eﬀorts.
Proving that a graph is acyclic from a partial order is not speciﬁc to west-ﬁrst
routing, but should be part of some graph theory library. The same holds for
the proofs of e.g., transitivity, trichotomy, and irreﬂexivity of the lexicographical
ordering. These parts constitute approximately 168 lines of the total number of
834 lines required for this proof. However, the major part of the code is truly
instantiation-speciﬁc. Discharging Proof Obligation 7, i.e., proving deadlock free-
dom, requires the most interaction of the user and constitutes the major part of
the proof eﬀort.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this chapter, we reﬂect on our methodology. First, we consider the correctness
criterion presented in this part. Our deﬁnition of productivity takes ﬁnite execu-
tions into account only. Traditionally, starvation freedom is deﬁned using inﬁnite
executions. We defend our deﬁnition and argue about the relevance of our correct-
ness criterion by showing that productivity is commonly – but implicitly – used
as an assumption in papers dealing with applications of communication networks.
We proceed with a discussion on the strengths and weakness of the new GeNoC
framework.
5.1 Definition of Productivity
Our deﬁnition of productivity is constructive and deals with an arbitrary but ﬁnite
number of messages only. We prove theoretical worst-case ﬁnite bounds on the
time it takes for messages to be consumed. If such a bound can be deﬁned for
each message m, any message m will eventually reach its destination, provided
that this bound does not depend on the total number of uninjected messages.
It will not be permanently blocked in a deadlock, it will not permanently move
around in a livelock, or permanently wait due to a starvation scenario. Important
is that these bounds are required to be independent of the communications that are
still pending. Without this requirement, our ﬁnite deﬁnition would not correctly
distinguish starvation-free networks from networks where starvation may occur.
Traditionally, starvation is deﬁned using inﬁnite executions [5]. In order for a
starvation to occur, some inﬁnite execution must occur where some process – in our
case a message – never acquires the resources it requires, even though this resource
becomes available inﬁnitely often [48]. Even though the deﬁnition of starvation
requires the notion of inﬁnity, the deﬁnition of starvation freedom does not.
Figure 5.1 provides a network with a starvation scenario. The network has two
sources src1 and src2 where messages are injected into queues. Source src1 injects
only one messagem at the ﬁrst clock cycle. Source src2 eagerly injects a continuous
stream of messages from the ﬁrst clock cycle. Both queues are connected to an
arbiter which merges the incoming messages in the queues. It grants the turn to
one of its inputs and sends the message at the head of this queue to queue q. In
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the next clock cycle, the message in queue q is sent to a sink where it is consumed
immediately. The arbiter gives priority to the lower queue.
src1 
src2 
m 
stream 
q 
Figure 5.1: Starvation Scenario
As the arbiter gives priority to one of its inputs, it is not fair and does not
prevent starvation. We describe the starvation that occurs. Queue q becomes
available inﬁnitely often. At the ﬁrst clock cycle it is empty and thus available.
At each odd clock cycle it is empty and able to receive a message from the stream
injected by source src2. At each successive even clock cycle it is full as it still
has to transmit its message to the sink to be consumed. Message m is in a
starvation scenario as it permanently waits to acquire queue q, even though this
queue becomes available inﬁnitely often. The network is not productive.
Even though we have formulated our deﬁnition of productivity for ﬁnite com-
munications only, it correctly identiﬁes this network as unproductive. Property 2
of our deﬁnition (see Page 31) – stating that any message spends a ﬁnite time
in the network – does not hold. It is not possible to deﬁne a suitable bound on
the time message m spends in the network, i.e., on how long it takes for m to be
granted the turn by the arbiter.
Without the addition that the bound cannot depend on what messages are
to be injected, the deﬁnition would identify the network as productive. As we
consider ﬁnite communications only, the length of the stream at source src2 is ar-
bitrary but bounded by some number n. This means that at clock cycle 2n+1 all
messages from the stream have been injected, have moved through the network,
and have been consumed. At this point, message m can move. Thus a bound
can be deﬁned on the time message m is in the network, namely 2n + 2. This
bound depends on n, i.e., it depends on the number of messages that is still to be
injected. Our deﬁnition does not allow such bounds.
The term “productivity” has been borrowed from the stream community [131,
53, 52, 147]. In the stream community the term productivity captures an intuitive
correctness property expressing that a stream where suﬃcient data is coming in
is always able to produce correct data at the output. It represents the notion of
“unlimited progression” [52]. More formally, a stream is productive if every nth
element of the stream can be computed in ﬁnite time [147].
The notion of productivity in the stream community has similarities to our
notion of productivity. They both state that always eventually some token or
message will correctly and in ﬁnite time pass through some set of computations.
A diﬀerence is that we deﬁne and prove productivity over ﬁnite data structures.
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5.2 Productivity in Literature
We will now argue that our correctness criterion is a relevant and desired property
of communication networks. The major part of the literature on applications built
on top of communication networks assume the availability of a reliable network.
A well-built network should appear as a wire to its clients [37, 15]. Processes that
use the network to communicate assume that messages can be injected into the
network, can traverse the network, and will arrive intact at the intended destina-
tion [96]. Such behavior is ensured by productivity.
Productivity as assumption in the design of application layer protocols
The major part of the literature on application layer protocols built on top of
communication networks is on cache coherency. We provide some examples and
provide details on the assumptions they make on the network.
Bolotin et al. propose a hardware-based mechanism for eﬃcient distributed
directory-based cache-coherent access for NoCs [16]. A round-trip of a request
and response message between a processor and an L2-cache bank over the NoC
may induce delay, but this delay is assumed to be ﬁnite. This assumption is tan-
tamount to assuming productivity. They also assume that the network maintains
the ordering of messages for each source-destination pair. Productivity does not
deal with in-order packet delivery.
Pétrot et al. propose a software solution to the problem of sharing data in mul-
tiprocessor SoC’s [114]. They assume a generic system architecture which enforces
separation between IP functionality and IP communication. The interconnect is
assumed to behave like it provides direct point-to-point communication channels
between requesting nodes and target nodes. Assuming such bus-like behavior
equates to assuming productivity.
Massas and Pétrot provide a comparison of diﬀerent cache coherency protocols
implemented on top of a NoC [39]. They characterize the protocol actions with a
hop as atomic unit. A hop is deﬁned as the delay needed to cross the NoC from one
node to another. It is assumed that this delay is ﬁnite, i.e., that the interconnect
can always inject a message and deliver it at its desired destination.
Marescaux et al. provide a comparison between diﬀerent ways of achieving
memory sharing on NoCs [92]. Their comparison is based on a speciﬁc NoC ar-
chitecture with deterministic routing to guarantee deadlock freedom and in-order
packet delivery.
Without exception, these works assume productivity to decouple the design and
validation of application layer protocols from the underlying network architectures.
Productivity as assumption in the verification of application layer pro-
tocols
We provide examples on formal veriﬁcation eﬀorts related to application layer pro-
tocols. Again, we focus on cache coherency as this has been an active research ﬁeld
for many years. All methodologies mentioned in this section decouple the veriﬁc-
ation of the protocol from the veriﬁcation of the interconnect. They all abstract
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from the communication network by assuming availability of the interconnect and
by assuming that messages are reliably delivered to their destination.
Model-checking has been successfully applied to the veriﬁcation of high-level
descriptions of cache coherency protocols. Symbolic model checking is applied
to parameterized versions of write-invalidate and write-update cache coherency
protocols [41, 42]. The veriﬁcation is parametric in the number of processors
in the system. Emerson and Kahlon apply a custom model checking method to
verify snoopy cache coherence protocols such as MESI, MOESI, Illinois, Berkeley
and Dragon [51]. Each protocol is veriﬁed within a fraction of a second. Similar
results have been achieved with the Murphi model checker [30, 108, 26]. All these
studies verify safety properties at a high level of abstraction.
McMillan veriﬁes both safety and liveness properties [95]. He uses the SMV
model checker to support a counterexample driven methodology. The approach
ﬁrst naively tries to prove a property and when a counterexample arises, it dia-
gnoses the cause of the error and rules it out. SMV has also been used to verify
both safety and liveness properties [50]. Baukus et al. model a parameterized sys-
tem as a higher order transition system in a decidable logic [7]. These transition
systems are given to a model checker to check both safety and liveness properties.
Another veriﬁcation approach is theorem proving. Moore formalized a simple
write-invalidate cache scheme using the ACL2 theorem proving system [79]. An
arbitrary number of processor-cache pairs interacts with a global memory via a
bus which is snooped by the caches. Moore models both the cache system and the
memory system without cache as ﬁrst order functions and proves that executing
read and writes in the system with caches equals executing in the system without
caches. Park and Dill apply the PVS theorem prover to verify a directory-based
cache coherence protocol developed for the Stanford FLASH multiprocessor [113].
Their method compares a state graph representing the implementation of the
protocol with a state graph representing the desired abstract behavior. Some hy-
brid methods have been proposed, combining theorem proving with model check-
ing [120].
SMT solvers are applied in [111]. They generate invariants to verify directory
based protocols using a solver for ﬁrst order logic with uninterpreted functions
(EUF).
The eﬀorts reported so far focus on applying general veriﬁcation techniques
to cache coherency protocols. Application-speciﬁc tools have been proposed as
well. Plakal et al. present a special reasoning technique that assigns timestamps
to relevant protocol events [117]. These timestamps are used to construct a total
ordering of events. These total orderings are used to verify that the requirements
of a particular memory consistency model have been satisﬁed. Pong and Dubois
propose the tool SSM [118]. It is a state-based veriﬁcation tool based on an
abstraction technique preserving the properties to verify. Recently, Zhang et al.
proposed a correct by construction approach [148].
With exception of two recent papers [108, 26], processes communicate through
a bus instead of a network. However, O’Leary et al. abstract this network into a
set of point-to-point channels.
66
5.3 The GeNoC Framework
Productivity is commonly used as assumption in the design and veriﬁcation of
application layer protocols. Assuming productivity is used commonly to decouple
the application layer from the network layer.
5.3 The GeNoC Framework
We address the applicability, the restrictions and the usability of our methodology.
Applicability of GeNoC
The generality of our approach ensures a wide applicability. All proof obligations
have been deﬁned to be as weak as possible. They apply to a large family of
communication networks. Section 2.3.2 (see Page 26) gives some examples of
diﬀerent instantiations from the literature.
Switching can be instantiated with diﬀerent ﬂavors of packet, wormhole and
circuit switching. Injection can be, e.g., greedy, based on a per message desired
injection time, or credit-based. The starvation prevention mechanism can be in-
stantiated with, e.g., FIFO or round-robin arbitration. Routing and topology can
be instantiated with many diﬀerent functions.
As Table 3.6 shows (see Page 50), livelock freedom depends on both the routing
function and the switching policy. Some networks are livelock-free because of the
routing function, e.g., the routing function prevents messages from going into a
cycle. In such networks, the switching measure could be the sum of the lengths of
the routes of all messages. Some networks are livelock-free because of the switching
policy, e.g., networks where the time a message can spend in the network depends
on a counter in the header of the message [132]. In such networks, the switching
measure could be the sum of the counters. Both measures are sums and thus
irrelevant of the order of the messages. For both measures, Proof Obligations 11
and 12 can be discharged and thus both types of networks can be proven livelock-
free with our methodology.
Restrictions of GeNoC
The proof obligations enforce some limitations. First, the consumption assump-
tion is required. A message arriving at its destination is eventually consumed.
Without the consumption assumption, message dependencies occur [68] which can
currently not be modelled in GeNoC. The current deﬁnition of functional cor-
rectness (Deﬁnition 3.4 on Page 40) does not deal with dropping, duplication or
joining of packets. This prevents modelling of synchronizations in the network.
Each message is assumed to have one destination, making veriﬁcation of multicast
and broadcast algorithms diﬃcult. Finally, the network model is assumed to be
static. Dynamic failure of, e.g., channels or switching in the network cannot be
represented.
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Usability of GeNoC
We have shown in Chapter 4 that for a non-trivial example, approximately 86% of
the proof of productivity can be derived automatically from the GeNoC framework.
Part of this is due to the fact that those proof obligations that depend only on
the switching policy have been discharged once and for all for both packet- and
wormhole switching. These are the most commonly used switching policies. For
any network with either packet- or wormhole-switching, these proofs can be reused
without any modiﬁcation. Our ultimate goal is to develop a library containing
most common injection methods, switching techniques, and starvation prevention
mechanisms. These components are easily reusable.
Proof Obligation 7, which states that the network must be deadlock-free, is
hardest to discharge. The remainder of this thesis will focus on this proof oblig-
ation. We have examined weak sets of proof obligations under diﬀerent network
models. The weakest possible proof obligation is a necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tion. Chapters 6 presents necessary and suﬃcient conditions for deadlock freedom.
These conditions can replace Proof Obligation 7.
Still, discharging these necessary and suﬃcient conditions for some speciﬁc net-
work is a diﬃcult task. It requires a great deal of manual theorem proving. These
proofs are not easily reused for other instantiations. Chapters 7 and 9 present
algorithms that automatically prove deadlock freedom. For ﬁxed-size networks,
one can simply use these algorithms to discharge Proof Obligation 7.
In Chapter 8, the tool DCI2 is presented, which checks deadlock freedom and
discharges all proof obligations related to the topology, the resources and the rout-
ing function. DCI2 allows a user to automatically discharge all proof obligations
– and thereby prove productivity – for packet- and wormhole-switched networks.
In combination with an ACL2 library of common network modules, DCI2 provides
a completely automatic way of proving productivity for a large family of commu-
nication networks.
We presented a formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation environment for high-level
descriptions of communication networks. The environment supports the proof of
safety and liveness properties. Proofs are performed for parametric descriptions,
i.e., the number of nodes and the size and the number of messages are all left
uninterpreted. Key is the reusability of proofs.
Productivity has been broken down into ﬁve network properties: functional
correctness, deadlock freedom, livelock freedom, starvation freedom and liveness
of injection. Except for deadlock freedom, each of these properties has been broken
down into simple and elementary proof obligations. Breaking down deadlock free-
dom into smaller proof obligations is a hard problem. The next part of this thesis
is devoted to automatic ways of proving deadlock freedom of communication net-
works.
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Part III
Isolated Network Layer
Deadlock Verification
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Chapter 6
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
for Deadlock-free Routing
This chapter discusses new necessary and suﬃcient conditions for deadlock-free
routing in packet and wormhole networks. A detailed analysis of existing the-
orems will reveal the relevance of our new conditions. Existing conditions are
often counterintuitive and require many diﬀerent concepts and deﬁnitions. We
will expose a subtle discrepancy in Duato’s seminal condition for deadlock-free
routing in wormhole networks [44], showing that it is not complete. In contrast,
the conditions presented in this chapter are simple, correct and require only a few
concepts. This makes it possible to discharge them automatically using dedicated
algorithms. Our conditions satisfy the following properties:
Static A static condition does not consider the dynamic evolution of the network.
It does not consider the state of the network at a given time. Dally and
Seitz’ condition is static, as it solely depends on the dependency graph [36].
This graph can statically be computed from a speciﬁcation of the network
topology and the routing function. The major beneﬁt of a static condition is
that it is easier to discharge. Even for a small network, analysis of all possible
states, i.e., all possible injection sequences and all possible conﬁgurations
that can be reached during the evolution of such an injection sequence can be
impossible. In contrast, Dally and Seitz’ static condition can be discharged
just by computing the dependency graph and searching for cycles.
Wide Applicability Our conditions have as few assumptions as possible, widen-
ing their applicability. We do not require routing to be coherent (see Sec-
tion 6.7.1 for a discussion on coherency). Deﬁning a static necessary and
suﬃcient condition for incoherent routing functions has been an open prob-
lem up to now [48]. We do not require the routing function to prevent live-
locks. Livelocks can be prevented by other mechanisms such as hop counters
or packet dropping. Our conditions separate the proof of deadlock freedom
from the proof of livelock freedom and enable the veriﬁcation of networks
employing such mechanisms.
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Mechanically proven We have mechanically proven necessity and suﬃciency of
our conditions for absence of deadlocks using the ACL2 theorem prover. This
enabled us to get all deﬁnitions and proofs completely correct.
The ﬁrst part of this chapter deals with packet networks. The condition presen-
ted in this thesis is based on the notion of escapes. It states that “in any set of
channels there is at least one escape” is necessary and suﬃcient for the absence of
deadlocks. Of course, this depends on the deﬁnition of “escape”. We formalize the
exact requirements for a channel to be an escape. A discussion of our deﬁnition
of deadlock will show that it is irrelevant whether channels are implemented with
queues or buﬀers.
The second part of this chapter deals with wormhole networks. Again, our
condition states that in any set of channels there must be at least one escape.
However, a channel that is an escape in a packet conﬁguration is not necessarily
an escape in a wormhole network. We will stress the diﬀerences between the
conditions. Again, we discuss our deﬁnition of deadlock. This discussion will
show that our simpliﬁed deﬁnition of deadlock is logically equivalent to the more
complicated one used in the literature.
6.1 Notation and Definitions
All chapters in this part share the notations and deﬁnitions presented in this
section. At the end of this section, an overview is given.
We start by giving the formal deﬁnition of a network. This deﬁnition reﬁnes
the network model presented in Section 3.2.2 (see Page 35).
Definition 6.1 A network N is a tuple with a ﬁnite set of processing nodes P ,
a ﬁnite set of arcs C, a routing function R : P × P 7→ P(C), a domain of ﬂits
F , a domain of message identiﬁers M , two topology functions src : C 7→ P and
end : C 7→ P , a capacity function cap : C 7→ N, a function msg : F 7→ M , and a
function dest : M 7→ P .
N ::= 〈P,C,R, F,M, src, end, cap,msg, dest〉
The topology of network N is deﬁned by functions src : C 7→ P and end : C 7→
P . These functions return the processing nodes at the source and at the end of a
channel, respectively. The routing function computes from each processing node
s and each destination node d a set of next hops R(s, d). This set is non-empty if
s 6= d. Each channel c has a certain number of places, where each place can either
be empty or store exactly one ﬂit. An empty place is denoted with ǫ. We assume
ǫ /∈ F and let Fǫ
def
= F ∪ {ǫ} denote the domain of ﬂits plus the empty place.
The capacity of channel c, denoted cap(c), is deﬁned as the number of places of
channel c.
Flits are the atomic units of transfer that are transmitted through channels,
i.e., they are concrete pieces of data that are to be communicated. At any time,
channels may contain many non-unique ﬂits. Each ﬂit belongs to at most one
message, but each message may consist of multiple ﬂits. In our deﬁnitions and
proofs, we need to be able to distinguish equal ﬂits belonging to diﬀerent messages.
72
6.1 Notation and Deﬁnitions
To this end, the set of unique message identiﬁers M is used. Function msg is able
to retrieve, given a ﬂit f , the unique message id of the message to which ﬂit f
belongs. Since ﬂits are not unique, some additional bookkeeping is required for
the actual implementation of this function. Finally, function dest returns the
destination of the message corresponding to the given message identiﬁer.
For sake of presentation, we introduce some shorthand notations. Let f be a
ﬂit, and let list L be a subset of Fǫ.
dest(f) = dest(msg(f))
dests(L) = {d ∈ P | ∃f ∈ L− ǫ · dest(f) = d}
msgs(L) = {m ∈M | ∃f ∈ L− ǫ ·msg(f) = m}
Figure 6.1a gives an example of a network. There are two processing nodes
P = {n0, n1}, and two channels C = {A,B}. Figure 6.1b shows the routing
functionR. The set of ﬂits F consists of tuples 〈data, header〉 representing a packet
with data that is to be transmitted and a header that contains the destination of
the packet. Each packet can be uniquely identiﬁed by some natural number, i.e.,
M = N. The topology functions src and end can be derived from Figure 6.1a.
The capacity function cap assigns 3 places to each channel. Function dest looks
up the packet referred to by id n and returns its header.
n0 n1
A
B
(a) Network
n R(n, n0) R(n, n1)
n0 B
n1 A
(b) Routing Function
Processing Node
Channel
(c) Legend
Figure 6.1: Example of network
Since channels store messages and there are no further state holding compon-
ents in the network, the state of the network is determined completely by the state
of the channels. A state or conﬁguration contains information on which ﬂits are
in which places.
Definition 6.2 A configuration σ is an assignment of lists of ﬂits or empty places
to channels.
σ : C 7→ L(Fǫ)
Function σ returns a list of ﬂits. The list of ﬂits in channel c can be accessed
through σ(c). This list contains the ﬂit stored in the head of the channel ﬁrst,
followed by ﬂits stored in the tail of the channel. That is, given a channel c, the
ﬂit which occupies the head of the channel is returned by σ(c)[0]. The number of
ﬂits in c is denoted |σ(c)|. The empty conﬁguration is denoted by σǫ. The set of
all conﬁgurations is denoted by Σ.
Given a conﬁguration σ and a message id m, it is possible to compute the set
of channels that is occupied by the message corresponding to message id m. This
set of channels is denoted by channels(m,σ).
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Not any assignment of ﬂits to channels constitutes a legal conﬁguration. Con-
sider the network in Figure 6.1a. A possible conﬁguration is:
σ(A) = [f1, f1, f1] where dest(f1) = n1
σ(B) = [f0, f0, f0] where dest(f0) = n0
This conﬁguration assigns ﬂits belonging to a message destined for processing node
n1 to channel A. However, as processing nodes consume messages as soon as they
arrive, channel A can never contain such ﬂits. We introduce function τ : C 7→ P(P )
which given a channel returns the typing information of that channel, i.e., which
types of ﬂits can be in the channel. In other words, if d is a type of channel
c, channel c is reachable by messages destined for d. As example, the typing
information of channel A in Figure 6.1a is the set {n0}, as only ﬂits belonging to
messages destined for processing node n0 can ever reach channel A. A ﬂit with
destination d can reach channel c if and only if the processing node at the source
of c routes ﬂits destined for d towards c.
Definition 6.3 The typing information of channel c, notation τ(c) is deﬁned as
the set of destinations for which there exists a message that can be in channel c.
τ(c)
def
= {d ∈ P | c ∈ R(src(c), d)}
When drawing a network, we will sometimes add the typing information of the
channels. In this case, each channel name will be followed by a semicolon and
the typing information. For example, the network in Figure 6.1a will additionally
have the following information:
A : n0
B : n1
A routing path is a simple path established by the routing function for messages
destined for destination d.
Definition 6.4 Let d ∈ P be a destination in the network. Path πd is a routing
path for destination d, notation R -path(πd), if and only if πd is a list of channels
[c0, c1, . . . , ck] that constitute a route for a message destined for d.
R -path(πd)
def
=


c0 ∈ R(src(c0), d)
∧ ∀0 < i ≤ k · ci ∈ R(end(ci−1), d)
∧ ∀0 ≤ i, j ≤ k · i 6= j =⇒ ci 6= cj
We denote a set of routing paths {πd0 , πd1 . . . , πdk} with Π⋆.
A dependency between two channels c0 and c1 indicates that in some conﬁg-
uration a packet in c0 waits for channel c1 to become available. The dependency
graph reﬂects all dependencies in the network.
Definition 6.5 The dependency graph Gdep of network N is a directed graph
with as vertices the set of channels C. Function Adep : C 7→ P(C) represents the
arcs of the dependency graph. There is an arc between vertex c0 and c1 if and
only if there is a routing dependency between these channels:
Adep(c0)
def
= {c1 | ∃d ∈ τ(c0) · c1 ∈ R(end(c0), d)}
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For example, the dependency graph of the network in Figure 6.1a consists of
two vertices, namely channel A and B. There are no edges, indicating that there
are no waiting relations between the channels.
A dependency (c0, c1) is caused by destination d if and only if d is in the typing
information of c0 and if c1 ∈ R(end(c0), d). When drawing a dependency graph,
the destinations causing the dependencies will be used to label edges. We will
overload function Adep so that if an extra parameter d is given, it returns only the
dependencies caused by destination d. Finally, function τ(c0, c1) returns the labels
of dependency edge (c0, c1), i.e., the set of destinations causing the dependency.
Table 6.1 provides an overview of the deﬁnitions and notation used in this part.
Description Notation
Processing nodes P
Channels C
Source of channel src(c)
End of channel end(c)
Routing R(s, d)
Channel capacity cap(c)
Empty place ǫ
Domain of ﬂits F
Domain of ﬂits plus empty place Fǫ
Domain of message identiﬁers M
Message id of ﬂit msg(f)
Destination of message dest(m)
Destination of message of ﬂit dest(f)
Destinations of list of ﬂits dests(F )
Messages of list of ﬂits msgs(F )
Conﬁguration σ
Empty conﬁguration σǫ
Domain of conﬁgurations Σ
Channels occupied by message channels(m,σ)
Routing path R -path(πd)
Set of routing paths Π⋆
Typing information τ(c)
Channel c has type T c : T
Dependency graph Gdep = 〈C,Adep〉
Destinations causing a dependency τ(c0, c1)
Table 6.1: Overview of definitions and notation
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6.2 Packet Switching: Formal Condition
A deadlock conﬁguration is a legal conﬁguration that is reachable from the initial
empty conﬁguration. The behavior of packet switching induces some constraints
on which conﬁgurations are legal and which are not. As each channel with capacity
n can store at most n packets and as packets are the atomic units of transfer, a legal
conﬁguration σ cannot assign more than cap(c) packets to channel c. Secondly, if
a packet p is assigned to channel c, channel c must be reachable by packets with
destination dest(p).
Definition 6.6 In a packet network a conﬁguration σ is legal, notation legalps(σ),
if and only if for all channels the capacity is not exceeded and all packets can be
routed towards their current channel.
legalps(σ)
def
= ∀c ∈ C · |σ(c)| = cap(c) ∧ dests(σ(c)) ⊆ τ(c)
If it is clear from the context that the deﬁnition concerns packet networks, the
superscript ps will be omitted.
Definition 6.7 For packet network N , a conﬁguration σ is a deadlock config-
uration, notation Ωps(σ), if and only if it is a legal and non-empty conﬁguration
where all packets are blocked.
Ωps(σ)
def
= legal(σ) ∧
σ 6= σǫ ∧
∀c ∈ C · ∀f ∈ σ(c)− ǫ · ∀n ∈ R(end(c), dest(f)) · |σ(n)− ǫ| = cap(n)
For any packet f in any channel c, all next hops n supplied by the routing
function from the processing node connected to the end of c to the destination of
f must be full.
Even though not explicitly stated, Deﬁnition 6.7 correctly deals with the fol-
lowing aspects:
• Any deadlock is actually reachable;
• A conﬁguration in which some part of the network is in deadlock, but in
which some other set of messages can still move is correctly recognized as a
deadlock;
• The deﬁnition is correct both for packet networks where channels are imple-
mented with buﬀers and with queues.
Section 6.3 provides lemma’s which justify Deﬁnition 6.7 and which allow us to
proceed with this trimmed deﬁnition.
6.2.1 Our Condition
In a deadlock conﬁguration, the set of channels that are involved in the deadlock
forms a subgraph of the dependency graph. We consider subgraphs as a subset of
the vertices, removing edges only if the source or end of the channel is not in the
subset. An escape for a subgraph is a channel where any packet can be routed
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outside of the subgraph, regardless of the destination. This is either because
messages are routed to channels not in the subgraph, or because messages arrive
at their destination to be consumed. A channel with no dependency neighbors at
all is a channel where any message arrives at its destination. We will call such
channels sinks.
Definition 6.8 Given a subgraph S, a channel e ∈ S is an escape for S, notation
esc(e, S) if and only if it is a sink or if for all possible reachable destinations there
exists a dependency neighbor that is not contained in S:
esc(e, S)
def
= e ∈ S ∧ (Adep(e) = ∅ ∨ ∀d ∈ τ(e) ·Adep(e, d) * S)
Using two examples, we will show that a deadlock can never contain an escape
and conversely, that if some subgraph has an escape, this set of channels does not
form a deadlock. The ﬁrst example has a deadlock, the second is deadlock-free.
Example 6.1 Consider the interconnection network in Figure 6.2a without the
dashed channel F . The network consists of ﬁve processing nodes. For sake of clar-
ity, only processing nodes d0 and d1 are destination nodes. The routing function
is depicted in Figure 6.2b. There is exactly one deadlock possible, in subgraph
S = {A,B,C}. If channel A is ﬁlled with messages destined for d1, channel B
is full, and channel C is ﬁlled with messages destined for d0, a circular wait oc-
curs. This circular wait is represented by the cycle in the dependency graph in
Figure 6.2c. None of the messages can be routed outside of the cycle. As subgraph
S has no escape, there is a deadlock.
n0
n1
n2
d0 d1
A
B C
E DF
(a) Interconnection network
n R(n, d0) R(n, d1)
n0 B, E B
n1 C C
n2 A A, D
(b) Routing Function
d0
B
A CE D
d1
d0, d1 d0, d1
d0, d1
d0
F
(c) Dependency graph
Processing Node
Channel (in network)
Channel (in graph)
Dependency
(d) Legend
Figure 6.2: Example of deadlock in a packet network. The dashed arrows are used in
Example 6.2 only.
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Example 6.2 Consider again the interconnection network in Figure 6.2a, in-
cluding the dashed channel F . Routing is extended with R(n2, d0) = {A,F}. The
network is deadlock-free. Subgraph S = {A,B,C} can contain packets particip-
ating in a circular wait. However, channel C is an escape for subgraph S. For all
destinations, i.e., for both d0 and d1, there is a dependency neighbor not in sub-
graph S. Any message in C can be routed outside of the subgraph. As subgraph
S has an escape, it cannot form a deadlock.
If a channel is in deadlock it must either be in some dependency cycle or there
must exist a path that leads to some deadlocked cycle. The condition is based on
the idea that as long as dependency cycles have an escape, there is always a way to
prevent the creation of deadlocks. Assume a cycle of full channels, i.e., a circular
wait. As long as such a cycle has an escape there is always at least one message
with a next hop outside the cycle. If all sets of such cycles have an escape, it is
always possible to prevent deadlocks. Hence, the following condition:
A packet network is deadlock-free if and only if all sets of cycles in the
dependency graph have an escape.
Figures 6.3a, 6.3b, and 6.3c illustrate the condition. Assume a deadlock-free net-
work such that its routing function has a cyclic dependency graph. Figure 6.3c
shows the strength of the theorem. At some point, the escape of a cycle may lead
to next hops which are included in cycles which have already been escaped. The
theorem states that this set of cycles again has an escape, so that at least one
message will eventually be able to escape this cycle of cycles.
(a) The escape leads mes-
sages out of the cycle.
(b) The escape leads to a
cycle with a new escape.
(c) The escape leads to a
cycle of cycles with a new
escape.
Figure 6.3: Sets of cycles with escapes
The necessary and suﬃcient condition is formulated as follows:
Theorem 6.1 A packet network is deadlock-free if and only if all subgraphs have
an escape.
DLF(N) ⇐⇒ ∀S ⊆ C · S 6= ∅ =⇒ ∃e ∈ S · esc(e, S)
Theorem 6.1 is logically equivalent to stating that all sets of cycles have an
escape. This formulation is easier to formalize and to prove.
6.2.2 Proof
Our proof transforms conﬁgurations to graphs in such a way that a deadlock always
yields a graph with a knot1. A knot is a subgraph where every vertex has at least
1Knots have proven to be a useful concept in deadlock detection [97].
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one outgoing edge, and all outgoing edges from vertices in the knot end in the knot
itself (see Appendix A.4 for a formal deﬁnition). Consider the following deadlock
conﬁguration σ for the network in Figure 6.2a:
σ(A) = [p1, p1, p1]
σ(B) = [p0, p1, p0]
σ(C) = [p0, p0, p0]
where p0 and p1 denote packets destined for d0 and d1 respectively
Figure 6.4a shows the ﬁrst step of this transformation. Given a conﬁguration, we
deﬁne the waiting graph. This graph depicts the waiting relations in conﬁgura-
tion σ. There is a waiting edge if and only if a packet is waiting to acquire a
channel. A deadlock always yields a knot in the waiting graph: as all packets wait
for each other, all waiting edges point to each other.
B
A CE D
p1, p1, p1 p0, p1, p0
p0, p0, p0
(a) Waiting graph. The labels denote the packets
that are waiting.
B
A CE D
d0
d0
d1
(b) Restricted dependency graph.
Figure 6.4: Transformation from deadlock to knot in a graph. Per channel only one
destination is considered.
The waiting graph is not static as it depends on which packets are assigned
to which channels in conﬁguration σ. It is only used as an intermediary between
a conﬁguration and a knot in a static graph. Figure 6.4b shows the second step
of the transformation. We show that if the dependency graph is restricted to
contain dependencies caused by one destination per channel only, this restricted
dependency graph is a subgraph of the waiting graph. Thus, given a deadlock, this
graph contains a knot as well.
This completes the proof, as a knot in the restricted dependency graph is a
subgraph that has no escape. Since for each channel in the knot there is one
destination that leads back into the knot, there is no channel in the knot for which
all destinations lead out of the knot. The knot has no escape. We have therefore
proven the contrapositive version of Theorem 6.1: given a deadlock, there exists a
subgraph without an escape.
Definitions
The waiting graph is dynamically deﬁned by conﬁguration σ. Informally, two
channels c0 and c1 are connected in the waiting graph if there is packet in a place
of c0 that is routed to c1. Figure 6.5 gives an example.
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(a) Configuration (b) Waiting graph
Figure 6.5: An example configuration and its waiting graph. In the configuration each
channel has two places. Each arrow points to the next hop of the packet in the place.
Definition 6.9 Given a conﬁguration σ, the waiting graph is deﬁned by set of
vertices C and arc function Aσwait. There is an arc (c0, c1) ∈ A
σ
wait if and only if
there exists a packet in a place of c0 with c1 as next hop.
In the proof we consider subgraphs of the dependency graph deﬁned by some
restriction function δ : C 7→ P . This restriction function maps channels to des-
tinations. At each channel c, it restricts the dependency graph to arcs leading to
destination δ(c). Figure 6.6 gives an example.
A
B
C
(a) Dependency graph
A
B
C
(b) Restricted dependency
graph
A
B
C
(c) Restricted dependency
graph
Figure 6.6: Let B and C be the only destinations. There are two δ-restricted dependency
graphs: graph 6.6b is defined by δ(A) = B; graph 6.6c is defined by δ(A) = C.
Definition 6.10 Given a restriction function δ : C 7→ P , the δ-restricted de-
pendency graph is deﬁned by set of vertices C and arc function Aδdep. There is an
arc (c0, c1) ∈ Aδdep if and only if c1 ∈ Adep(c0, δ(c0)).
The Proof
We prove that there is a deadlock if and only if there exists a δ-restricted depend-
ency graph with a knot. Assume a deadlock conﬁguration σ. We show that this
deadlock conﬁguration implies a knot S in the waiting graph of σ (Lemma 6.1).
We then construct a restriction δ, such that S is a knot in the δ-restricted depend-
ency graph as well (Lemma 6.2). Assume a restriction δ and a knot S. We can
construct a deadlock conﬁguration by ﬁlling all channels in S with packets destined
for the destinations provided by δ (Lemma 6.3). Hence, the contrapositive version
of our theorem has been proven.
Lemma 6.1 A deadlock conﬁguration σ implies there exists a knot S in the
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waiting graph of σ.
∀σ ∈ Σ ·Ω(σ) =⇒ ∃S ⊆ C · knot(S,Gσwait)
Proof. Take as S the set of full channels in σ. We prove that S is a knot by
contradiction. All the waiting-graph neighbors of S are full, since otherwise there
would exist a channel with a packet with a next hop that is not full. This would
imply that this packet can move, which contradicts the assumption of deadlock.
Since all waiting-graph neighbors of S are full, and since S is the set of all full
channels, S is a knot.
The deadlock does not necessarily consist of full channels only: there can be
a packet in an available channel, as long as each next hop for this packet is full.
However, these available channels are not needed for the deadlock: the deadlock
can be reduced to a set of full channels only, while preserving the fact that each
packet is stuck.
Lemma 6.2 A knot S in the waiting graph of σ implies there exists a restriction
δ such that S is a knot in the δ-restricted dependency graph.
∀S ⊆ C · (∃σ ∈ Σ · knot(S,Gσwait) =⇒ ∃δ : C 7→ P · knot(S,G
δ
dep))
Proof. Choose δ such that for all channels c ∈ S, δ(c) returns the destination of
one of the packets that is located in c in conﬁguration σ. The set of neighbors
created by this destination is a subset of the waiting-graph neighbors of c – and
thus also a subset of S – since the waiting-graph neighbors include all next hops
created by the destinations of all packets in c.
Lemma 6.3 A knot in the δ-restricted dependency graph implies the existence
of a deadlock conﬁguration.
∃S ⊆ C∃δ : C 7→ P · knot(S,Gδdep) =⇒ ∃σ ∈ Σ ·Ω(σ)
Proof. Construct a conﬁguration σ by ﬁlling each channel c ∈ S completely with
packets destined for δ(c). The set of next hops of a packet in c is the set of
dependency neighbors created by destination δ(c). Since this is a subset of S
and since each channel in S is ﬁlled completely, all next hops of all packets are
unavailable. Thus the conﬁguration is in deadlock.
From Lemma’s 6.1 to 6.3 it follows that there exists a deadlock if and only
if there exists a restriction δ such that the corresponding restricted graph has a
knot. The existence of an escape for all subgraphs is exactly the negation of the
existence of such a knot.
∃S ⊆ C · ∃δ : C 7→ P · knot(S,Gδdep)
= ∃S ⊆ C · ∃δ : C 7→ P · S 6= ∅ ∧ ∀c ∈ S ·Aδdep(c) 6= ∅ ∧A
δ
dep(c) ⊆ S
⇐⇒ ¬∀S ⊆ C · ∀d ∈ P · S 6= ∅ =⇒ ∃c ∈ S ·Adep(c) = ∅ ∨Adep(c, d) * S
= ¬∀S ⊆ C · S 6= ∅ =⇒ ∃e ∈ S · esc(e, S)
Thus a new necessary and suﬃcient condition for deadlock-free routing has been
obtained: all subgraphs must contain an escape.
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6.3 Definition of Deadlock
We justify our deﬁnition of deadlock. We prove Lemma 6.4 to show that it is not
necessary to include reachability in Deﬁnition 6.7. Static analysis suﬃces to check
for the absence of deadlocks, i.e., expensive reachability analysis is not necessary.
Lemma 6.5 is used to prove that it suﬃces to check for deadlocks in which all
packets are permanently blocked. Finally, Lemma 6.6 shows that Deﬁnition 6.7
applies both to networks with buﬀers and networks with queues.
Reachability
Duato has informally proven a lemma stating that any legal conﬁguration is reach-
able [45]. This lemma allows us to omit reachability from Deﬁnition 6.7. Here, we
formalize the lemma and its proof. This requires a formalization of reachability,
and thus a transition relation. Such a transition relation contains two types of
transitions. First, transitions that take a conﬁguration and move packets from
channel to channel according to the routing function and the semantics of packet
switching. Secondly, transitions that take a conﬁguration and inject a packet.
Formalizing the ﬁrst type of transitions is quite involved. It depends among others
on whether packets move synchronously or asynchronously, and on the implement-
ation of the channels. For the proof of the reachability lemma, it is only necessary
to formalize the second type of transitions. Since routing is memoryless, we can
consider each packet as injected by the source node of its current channel [45].
This formalization makes use of function repl(L, l1, l2) which takes a list L and
replaces the rightmost occurrence of l1 with l2, if l1 ∈ L.
Definition 6.11 The transition relation
ps
−→ ⊆ Σ×Σ is deﬁned by the following
transitions:
σ
ps
−→ σ′ if σ′ is the result of moving one or more injected packets from their
current channel to a next hop
σ
ps
−→ σ′ if ∃ci ∈ C·
{
∀c ∈ C · c 6= ci =⇒ σ
′(c) = σ(c)
σ′(ci) = repl(σ(ci), ǫ, f) with R(src(ci), dest(f)) = ci
We use the transitive closure of this transition relation, denoted with →
ps
− , to
deﬁne reachability.
Definition 6.12 A conﬁguration σ is reachable, notation reachable(σ), if and
only if there is a sequence of transitions from the empty conﬁguration to σ.
reachable(σ)
def
= σǫ →
ps
− σ
We prove a lemma stating that any legal conﬁguration is also reachable.
Lemma 6.4 A conﬁguration σ is reachable if it is legal.
legal(σ) =⇒ reachable(σ)
Proof.
Let σ be a legal conﬁguration. We build a sequence starting in σǫ leading to σ,
using only the second, completely formalized type of transition. Since the routing
function has no memory, i.e., is of type P ×P 7→ P(C), and since we assume that
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all processing nodes can send messages destined for all other processing nodes,
each packet f stored in some channel c in σ can be considered as generated by
the processing node S at the source of channel c. Therefore, the sequence can be
constructed as follows. Let c be some channel not empty in σ. Initially, channel c is
empty, since we start with σǫ. All packets assigned to channel c in conﬁguration σ
are injected starting with the rightmost packet. With each injection, the transition
relation requires 1.) the destination d of the packet to adhere to R(S, d) = c,
and 2.) at least one of the places in c to be empty. As the deﬁnition of a legal
conﬁguration enforces that all packets can be routed towards their current channel,
the ﬁrst requirement is met. As the deﬁnition of a legal conﬁguration enforces that
at most k packets are assigned to a channel with k places, an empty place always
exists.
Non-canonical deadlocks
Deﬁnition 6.7 recognizes canonical deadlocks, i.e., deadlocks in which all packets
are permanently blocked. Generally, non-canonical deadlocks are of interest as
well. We prove that the existence of a non-canonical deadlock is logically equivalent
to the existence of a canonical deadlock. Therefore checking only for canonical
deadlocks suﬃces to check for non-canonical deadlocks.
The proof uses the concept of sub-conﬁgurations.
Definition 6.13 Conﬁguration σS is a sub-configuration of σ, notation σS ⊆ σ,
if and only if for some set of channels its assignment is equivalent to that of σ,
and for the remaining channels it is empty.
σS ⊆ σ
def
= ∃C ′ ⊆ C · ∀c ∈ C · σS(c) =
{
σ(c) if c ∈ C ′
[ǫ, . . . , ǫ] if c /∈ C ′
Definition 6.14 A conﬁguration σ is a non-canonical deadlock configuration,
notation Ψ(σ), if and only if there exists a sub-conﬁguration that is in deadlock.
Ψ(σ)
def
= legal(σ) ∧
∃σS ⊆ σ ·Ω(σS)
Lemma 6.5 There exists a non-canonical deadlock conﬁguration if and only if
there exists a canonical deadlock conﬁguration.
∃σ ∈ Σ ·Ψ(σ) ⇐⇒ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ ·Ω(σ′)
Proof.
(=⇒)
Assume a non-canonical deadlock conﬁguration σ. By Deﬁnition 6.14, there exists
a sub-conﬁguration σS that is in deadlock. Conﬁguration σS is legal, non-empty,
and all packets are permanently blocked. Note that Lemma 6.4 ensures that this
canonical deadlock is also reachable.
(⇐=)
Assume a canonical deadlock conﬁguration σ′. This is a non-canonical deadlock
conﬁguration as well.
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Buffers vs. queues
Packet switching allows two types of networks: networks with queues and networks
with buﬀers. One might expect two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of deadlock. Our deﬁnition
(Deﬁnition 6.7) deﬁnes deadlock for networks with buﬀers. A deadlock in a network
with buﬀers requires all packets to be blocked as their next hops are full. In a
deadlock in a network with queues, only the packets at the head of the queues
are blocked because their next hops are full. These packets subsequently block the
packets in the tail of the queue. We prove Lemma 6.6 stating that these deﬁnitions
are logically equivalent.
Definition 6.15 For packet network N with queues, a conﬁguration σ is a dead-
lock configuration, notation Ωq(σ), if and only if it is a legal, non-empty conﬁgur-
ation where all packets at the head of the queues are blocked.
Ωq(σ)
def
= legal(σ) ∧
σ 6= σǫ ∧
∀c ∈ C · σ(c)[0] 6= ǫ =⇒
∀n ∈ R(end(c), dest(σ(c)[0])) · |σ(n)− ǫ| = cap(n)
We prove that the existence of a deadlock conﬁguration in both types of net-
works is logically equivalent.
Lemma 6.6 For any network N , there exists a deadlock in N with queues if and
only if there exists a deadlock in N with buﬀers.
∃σ ∈ Σ ·Ωq(σ) ⇐⇒ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ ·Ω(σ′)
Proof.
(=⇒)
Assume a conﬁguration σ that is a deadlock in a network with queues. We con-
struct a conﬁguration σ′ that is a deadlock in a network with buﬀers (see Fig-
ure 6.7). Replace in σ each packet in the tail of a queue with a copy of the packet
at the head of the queue. Conﬁguration σ′ is legal, and all packets are blocked.
n0
n1
n0
n1
Figure 6.7: Transformation from a packet network with queues to a packet network with
buffers.
(⇐=)
Assume a conﬁguration σ′ that is a deadlock in a network with buﬀers. This
conﬁguration is a deadlock in a network with queues as well.
Lemma 6.6 states that deadlock freedom does not depend on whether channels
are implemented with queues or buﬀers. A necessary and suﬃcient condition
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that applies to networks with buﬀers also applies to networks with queues. An
algorithm that decides deadlock freedom for one type of networks, is also a decision
procedure for the other. Since Deﬁnition 6.7 involves fewer concepts, we use this
as formal deﬁnition of deadlock.
6.4 Relation to Duato
There is only one previous necessary and suﬃcient condition for deadlock-free
adaptive routing in packet switching. It has been deﬁned by Duato [45]. We
include his condition and a short clariﬁcation, but for an extensive explanation we
refer to Duato’s book [48].
6.4.1 Duato’s Condition
A connected and adaptive routing function R for an interconnection
network I is deadlock-free if and only if there exists a routing subfunc-
tion R1 that is connected and has no cycles in its extended dependency
graph DE .
The intuition can be summarized as follows: assume a subgraph C1 which contains
all processing nodes, but contains only a subset of the channels of the network. Let
C1 satisfy two assumptions: (1) C1 is acyclic and (2) the routing function is able to
route any packet to any destination using channels in C1 only. Then each message
will always eventually reach its destination. Even if a message is stuck in a cycle,
the channels of this cycle do not belong to C1 by Assumption (1). Assumption (2)
states that for each node, any message can be routed to its destination through
channels in C1. Thus the message can always escape the cycles it is in by using
channels in C1.
Duato formalizes this notion using the concept of routing subfunction. Such
a function only selects a subset of the possible next hops for each destination.
This routing subfunction must be connected, i.e., able to route any packet to any
destination. Furthermore, he extends the dependency graph with direct cross
dependencies. If a packet stored in some channel could not have been routed to
this channel by routing subfunction R1, then dependencies involving this channel
are direct cross dependencies. The extended dependency graph is the dependency
graph with added direct cross dependencies.
6.4.2 Relation to our Condition
Our condition is logically equivalent to Duato’s one. Both conditions are both
necessary and suﬃcient for deadlock-free routing and the deﬁnitions of deadlock
are equal. Furthermore, both conditions formalize the same intuition: there must
always be an escape. Both conditions isolate the network layer. The data-link
layer is abstracted by assuming a message is stuck if and only if all its next hops
are unavailable. Assuming that processing nodes can send messages destined for
all other processing nodes abstracts away from the application-layer.
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The diﬀerences lie in the formalization of the intuition. We straightforwardly
formulate that there must always exist a packet that is able to escape instead
of stating that there must exist a routing subfunction capable to route packets
through an acyclic subgraph. Moreover, the use of the regular dependency graph
instead of the extended dependency graph reduces the complexity.
The proofs are completely diﬀerent. We prove the contrapositive form, namely
that a deadlock is a subgraph without an escape. This enables a more constructive
approach, since we merely had to construct a knot from a deadlock conﬁguration.
Duato constructs in his proof an acyclic connected routing subfunction from a
network where no deadlock conﬁguration is possible. This is the most diﬃcult
part of his proof.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for deadlock-freedom of adaptive routing
functions in packet networks has been presented. We will now present such a
condition for wormhole networks. Some of the deﬁnitions can be reused, e.g., the
dependency graph. Some – most notably the deﬁnitions of deadlock and escape –
cannot and will be redeﬁned for wormhole networks.
6.5 Wormhole Switching: Formal Condition
Similar to packet networks, wormhole networks pose constraints on which conﬁg-
urations are legal. Again, no channel capacities may be exceeded. In contrast to
packet networks, wormhole switching allows messages to acquire a resource only
when it is completely empty. Thus, each channel can contain ﬂits belonging to
one message only. Also, while packets occupy one place in some channel, worms
occupy paths of channels in the network.
Definition 6.16 In a wormhole network a conﬁguration σ is legal, notation
legalwhs(σ), if and only if for any channel the capacity is not exceeded, all ﬂits
belong to at most one message, and all ﬂits can be routed towards their current
channel.
legalwhs(σ)
def
= ∀c ∈ C


|σ(c)| = cap(c) (1)
|msgs(σ(c))| ≤ 1 (2)
∀m ∈ msgs(σ(c)) ·R -path(channels(m,σ)) (3)
If it is clear from the context that the deﬁnition concerns wormhole networks,
the superscript whs will be omitted.
A deadlock conﬁguration is required to be legal. Just as for packet networks,
it must be non-empty. Additionally, all header ﬂits are blocked. A header ﬂit is
blocked if all its next hops contain at least one ﬂit. As will be shown in Section 6.6,
there is no need for tail ﬂits to be blocked as well. We assume predicates hd and
tl are available which return true if and only if the given ﬂit is a header (tail) ﬂit.
The following three properties make a legal conﬁguration a deadlock:
4. It is not empty.
5. No header ﬂit has arrived at its destination.
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6. All header ﬂits are blocked.
Definition 6.17 For wormhole network N , a conﬁguration σ is a deadlock con-
ﬁguration, notation Ωwhs(σ), if and only if it is legal, non-empty and satisﬁes the
following properties.
Ωwhs(σ)
def
=
legal(σ) ∧ (1–3)
σ 6= σǫ ∧ (4)
∀c ∈ C · ∀f ∈ σ(c)− ǫ · hd(f) =⇒{
dest(f) 6= end(c)
∀n ∈ R(end(c), dest(f)) · |σ(n)− ǫ| > 0
(5)
(6)
6.5.1 Our Condition
There are two major complications inherent to wormhole switching with respect
to packet networks. First, for packet switching any subgraph can be ﬁlled with
packets in such a way that a legal conﬁguration is obtained. In wormhole net-
works, only subgraphs that can be ﬁlled with pairwise disjoint worms can yield
a legal conﬁguration. Secondly, in packet networks any packet can be routed
autonomously towards its next hops. In wormhole networks, the header ﬂit moves
autonomously, but the tail ﬂits always follow the header ﬂit.
To illustrate the ﬁrst issue, Figure 6.8 shows a legal and an illegal deadlock
conﬁguration. The legal conﬁguration contains three messages. Message 1 is
destined for node A. It is blocked by Message 2 that holds channel c1. This channel
is the only channel leading from channel c4 to node A. Message 2, destined for
node A as well, is blocked by Message 3. Message 3, consisting of one ﬂit only, is
blocked by Message 2.
The illegal conﬁguration violates the property that in wormhole networks a
channel contains ﬂits of at most one message. Channel c3 contains ﬂits of Messages
1 and 2. In a legal conﬁguration, the worms alwys constitute a pairwise disjoint
set of routing paths. Our condition requires a pairwise disjoint set of paths to
form a deadlock.
To illustrate the second issue, Figure 6.9 shows a legal conﬁguration that is
not in deadlock. As in Figure 6.8a there are three messages. Messages 2 and 3
are blocked. Message 1 is not blocked, as it can now use the new channel c8 to
advance towards its destination. It can escape the congested area. Our condition
requires the absence of escapes to form a deadlock.
Channel c8 does not necessarily provide an escape. First, channel c4 must be
ﬁlled with a header ﬂit. Only a header ﬂit can escape, as tail ﬂits follow the header
ﬂit and cannot use the escape. For example, Figure 6.8a shows a deadlock conﬁg-
uration, even though there is an escape for the tail ﬂits in channel c1. Secondly, the
escape must be supplied by the routing function for the destination of the worm.
Consider the network in Figure 6.9. If channel c8 is not supplied for destination
A, it cannot be used as an escape for Message 1. We need to redeﬁne the notion
of escape for wormhole networks.
Definition 6.18 Given a set of routing paths Π⋆, a channel e is an escape for
Π⋆, notation esc(e,Π⋆), if and only if channel e is the head of some path and if
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Figure 6.8: Legal and illegal deadlock configurations.
either e is a sink or e has a dependency neighbor that is not contained in Π⋆.
esc(e,Π⋆)
def
= ∃πd ∈ Π⋆ · e = πd[0] ∧ (Adep(e, d) = ∅ ∨Adep(e, d) *
⊔
Π⋆)
Our condition states that the absence of escapes for some pairwise disjoint set of
routing paths is necessary and suﬃcient to create a deadlock, or contrapositively:
Theorem 6.2 A wormhole network is deadlock-free if and only if all pairwise
disjoint sets of routing paths have an escape.
DLF(N) ⇐⇒ ∀Π⋆ ∈ P(L(C)) ·


Π⋆ 6= ∅d
Π⋆ = ∅
R -paths(Π⋆)
=⇒ ∃e ∈ C · esc(e,Π⋆)
We provide two examples: one with a deadlock and one where the network is
deadlock-free.
Example 6.3 Consider the interconnection network in Figure 6.10a without the
dashed channel G. The network consists of ﬁve processing nodes. For sake of
clarity, only the processing nodes d0 and d1 are destination nodes. The routing
function is depicted in Figure 6.10b. There is exactly one deadlock possible. This
deadlock has two worms. One worm occupies channels A and B. Its tail is in A
and its header ﬂit is in B. One worm occupies channel C only and is destined
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Figure 6.9: A legal configuration that is not in deadlock.
for d0. The worms wait for each other and have no alternative routes towards
their destinations. The circular wait is represented by the cycle in the dependency
graph in 6.10c. The set of paths {[B,A], [C]} has no escape. There is a deadlock.
Example 6.4 Consider again the interconnection network in Figure 6.10a, in-
cluding the dashed channel G. Routing is extended with R(n2, d0) = G. We prove
the network deadlock-free with our condition, by considering all pairwise disjoint
sets of routing paths. Set {[B,A], [C]} is such a set. Channel C is an escape, as it
is a channel at the head of one of the paths and it provides an alternative route
for both destinations. Set {[A], [B], [C]} is another set. Again, channel C is an
escape. There are similar sets of paths. In each pairwise disjoint set of routing
paths, either channel A or channel C is an escape. There is no deadlock.
6.5.2 Proof
We prove the contrapositive version of Theorem 6.2. We split up the proof into two
lemmas. Lemma 6.7 proves that our condition is suﬃcient for deadlock freedom.
The intuition is that from a deadlock we construct a witness, i.e., a set of routing
paths that falsiﬁes our condition. Lemma 6.8 proves necessity of our condition.
The proof is again constructive: we build a witness, i.e., a deadlock, from a set of
routing paths.
Lemma 6.7 There is a pairwise disjoint set of routing paths without an escape
if there is a deadlock conﬁguration.
Proof. Assume a deadlock conﬁguration σ. We construct a witness Π⋆:
Π⋆
def
= {channels(m,σ) | ∃c ∈ C ·m ∈ msgs(σ(c))}
We show that this witness falsiﬁes our condition. We prove that is satisﬁes the
three properties on the left hand side of the implication in Theorem 6.2, but that
it does not satisfy the right hand side. A deadlock conﬁguration is by Property (4)
non-empty and therefore Π⋆ contains at least one path. Property (2) of Deﬁnition
6.17 ensures that channels contain ﬂits of at most one message. This means that
all paths in Π⋆ are pairwise disjoint. Property (3) of Deﬁnition 6.17 ensures
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Figure 6.10: Example of deadlock in a wormhole network. The dashed channels are
used in Example 6.4 only.
that the worms constitute routing paths. The left hand side of the implication is
satisﬁed. We now prove Π⋆ has no escape. Property (5) of Deﬁnition 6.17 states
that no header has reached its destination. Hence, the head of each routing path
in Π⋆ has at least one dependency neighbor for its destination. Property (6) of
Deﬁnition 6.17 states that all next hops of all header ﬂits are unavailable, i.e.,
they contain at least one ﬂit. Thus, these next hops are part of some routing path.
This shows that for any routing path in Π⋆ the set of dependency neighbors of its
head for its destination is a subset of the union of Π⋆. A deadlock implies a set of
pairwise disjoint paths without an escape.
Lemma 6.8 There is a deadlock conﬁguration if there is a pairwise disjoint set
of routing paths without an escape.
Proof. Assume a pairwise disjoint set of paths Π⋆. We build a witness deadlock
conﬁguration σ by building a list of messages M . For each path πd in Π⋆, there is
a message with destination d. This message ﬁlls each channel in πd with one ﬂit.
We show that σ satisﬁes the six properties of a deadlock conﬁguration:
(1) As the paths are pairwise disjoint, each channel contains at most one ﬂit. No
buﬀer capacity in σ is exceeded. For each channel c in each routing path πd,
destination d is in the typing information of channel c.
(2) As the paths are pairwise disjoint, each channel is ﬁlled with ﬂits belonging
to one message only.
(3) As the worms are built from routing paths, they are valid worms.
90
6.6 Deﬁnition of Deadlock
(4) As there is at least one routing path, there is at least one worm.
(5) As the head of each path has at least one dependency neighbor, no message
arrives at its destination.
(6) As all d-neighbors are included in the union of Π⋆ and as each channel in each
path in Π⋆ is ﬁlled, no header ﬂit has an available next hop.
Theorem 6.2 follows directly from Lemmas 6.7 and 6.8.
6.6 Definition of Deadlock
Deﬁnition 6.17 is justiﬁed by lemma’s similar to Lemma’s 6.4 and 6.5 (respect-
ively [45] and [48]), which state that any legal conﬁguration is reachable, and that
is suﬃces to check for canonical deadlocks. Additionally, we prove Lemma 6.9 that
states that adding a case distinction for tail ﬂits is superﬂuous. Wormhole net-
works have tail and header ﬂits. Header ﬂits are blocked by their next hops. Tail
ﬂits are blocked if the channel occupied by the next ﬂit in the worm is full. It is
possible that the header ﬂit of a worm is blocked, but tail ﬂits can still move. Since
both are blocked under diﬀerent conditions, one might expect that Deﬁnition 6.17
includes a case distinction for both types of ﬂits. The extra case distinction for
tail ﬂits is formalized as follows. We assume that given a tail ﬂit of a worm, it
is possible to compute the channel occupied by the next ﬂit in the worm. Func-
tion next : F × Σ 7→ C returns the next channel of a tail ﬂit given the current
conﬁguration.
Definition 6.19 For wormhole network N , a conﬁguration σ is a deadlock con-
ﬁguration with blocked tail ﬂits, notation Ω(1–7)(σ), if and only if it is legal,
non-empty and satisﬁes the following properties.
Ω(1–7)(σ)
def
=
Ω(σ) (1–6)
∀c ∈ C · ∀f ∈ σ(c) · tl(f) =⇒ |σ(next(f))− ǫ| = cap(next(f))) (7)
From a conﬁguration where tail ﬂits can still advance, it is possible to construct
a deadlock conﬁguration with blocked tail ﬂits that satisﬁes all seven properties.
Lemma 6.9 There exists a deadlock conﬁguration with blocked tail ﬂits if and
only if there exists a conﬁguration which satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6.17.
∃σ ∈ Σ ·Ω(1–7)(σ) ⇐⇒ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ ·Ω(σ′)
Proof.
(=⇒)
Take σ′ = σ. Since Properties (1) to (7) hold for σ, Properties (1) to (6) hold
for σ′.
(⇐=)
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Consider a conﬁguration σ′ that satisﬁes Properties (1) to (6). We show there
exists a legal deadlock conﬁguration σ. Construct σ by ﬁlling all channels with
the exact same worms as in σ′, but with all channels ﬁlled completely. Thus
some worms in σ may consist of more ﬂits than they originally consisted of in σ′.
Since σ′ satisﬁes Properties (1) to (6), conﬁguration σ does as well. Furthermore,
conﬁguration σ′ satisﬁes Property (7) as all resources are ﬁlled completely.
6.7 Relation to Duato
Duato deﬁned a necessary and suﬃcient condition for adaptive deadlock-free rout-
ing. This condition is presented, together with a counterexample showing that
Duato’s condition is not necessary and suﬃcient. We will show that our theorem
subsumes Duato’s.
6.7.1 Duato’s Condition
Duato formalized the notion of escapes using the concept of a routing subfunction.
Duato proved that if it is possible to restrict a routing function in such a way
that the corresponding dependency graph – called the extended dependency graph
– becomes acyclic, the routing function is deadlock-free. The resulting routing
subfunction must still be able to route any message to any destination, i.e., it
must still be connected.
An interconnection network with adaptive routing functionR is deadlock-
free if there exists a connected routing subfunction R1 with an acyclic
extended dependency graph.
Consider the channel dependency graph in Figure 6.11a. The dependency graph
contains a cycle. This indicates the existence of a circular wait in the network.
There is an adaptive point where a message can either escape the cycle or be
routed into the dependency cycle. At this point the circular wait can be resolved,
as a message can escape the cycle. The cycle is not suﬃcient to create a deadlock.
It is possible to restrict the routing function in such a way that the extended
dependency graph becomes acyclic. Namely, if the routing subfunction supplies
the escape channel only and restricts the use of the channel leading into the cycle.
Figure 6.11b gives the corresponding acyclic extended dependency graph. If there
exists a connected routing subfunction with an acyclic extended dependency graph,
the original routing function is deadlock-free.
When the routing subfunction restricts the use of a channel, this does not
mean that the channel is not used by the original routing function. Consider
Figure 6.11c. Say the routing subfunction restricts the use of channel B, making
the extended dependency graph acyclic. However, as channel B is supplied by the
original routing function, a worm might occupy channels A and B simultaneously.
Then the escape for channel A cannot be used as the tail ﬂits in channel A follow
the header ﬂit in channel B. The cycle must have another escape.
In this case, progression of the message in channel A depends on the message in
channel C. The extended dependency graph must reﬂect this dependency. Duato
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Figure 6.11: Extended dependency graphs
introduces indirect dependencies. If there is a routing path of channels not supplied
by the routing subfunction, there is an indirect edge (see Figure 6.11d).
Duato’s theorem involves two other types of edges: cross direct and cross
indirect edges. As we do not require them in this Section, we will provide no
further details. For a more extensive introduction to Duato’s theorem we refer to
Duato’s papers [48, 44].
Duato’s theorem holds only for coherent routing functions. Let π be some
path from channel A to B that can be established by the routing function for
some destination d. A routing function is coherent if and only if any subpath of π
from channel A to an intermediate channel B′ can be established by the routing
function for destination d′ as well, where d′ is the processing node at the end of
channel B′. Duato provides an example of an incoherent deadlock-free routing
function that cannot be proven deadlock-free with his theorem [44]. We provide
this example.
See Figure 6.12 for the interconnection network. The routing function is deﬁned
as follows: if destination j is higher than current node i, use cHi or cA1 if i = 1 or
cB2 if i = 2. For j < i, use cLi. This routing function is incoherent. There is a path
[cH2, cA1, cB2, cH1] supplied for destination 3 (note that the ﬁrst channel in the
path is its head). However, the subpath [cB2, cH1] is not supplied for destination
1. The network is deadlock-free but cannot be proven deadlock-free with Duato’s
theorem.
cH0 cH1 cH2
cL0 cL1 cL2
cB2
cA1
3210
Figure 6.12: Example of incoherent routing function [44]
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6.7.2 A Counterexample
We show our counterexample. We then point to the root cause for this counter-
example and propose a ﬁx to keep the condition necessary.
Consider the interconnection network in Figure 6.13. It has processing nodes
ni (0 ≤ i ≤ 5), d0 and d1. Figure 6.13 only shows the channels – A to K – relevant
to our counterexample. For all pairs of processing nodes (ni, nj) (i 6= j), there is
a dedicated channel Dij from ni to nj . Also, there are dedicated channels from
d0 to all other processing nodes. The same holds for d1. Since these dedicated
channels lead directly to their destination, they are empty in any canonical dead-
lock conﬁguration. Any such deadlock conﬁguration consists of messages created
in some node ni and destined for some node di. Our counterexample considers
those messages only. For sake of clarity we do not mention the dedicated channels
any further.
The routing function is speciﬁed by the table in Figure 6.13 for destinations
d0 and d1. For any s = ni and d = nj (i 6= j), let R(s, d) supply – besides the
dedicated channels – all channels that start a shortest path from ni to nj . For
instance, R(s, d) supplies both the dedicated channel D05 and channel A. This
makes the routing function coherent.
A:d0 B:d1
D:d1
d0
n0
n1
n2
E:d0n4
d1
G:d0d1 C:d0d1 H:d0d1
n3 n5
F:d1I:d1 J:d0K:d0 R d0 d1
n0 A I
n1 {C, K} {C, F}
n2 J B
n3 G G
n4 E D
n5 H H
Figure 6.13: The interconnection network and the routing function
This network is deadlock-free. This can be seen as follows. Channels I, F , K
and J have to be empty. Otherwise a message can arrive at its destination. If
there is a header ﬂit in either channel A or B, this header ﬂit can escape to channel
F or K and arrive at its destination. If channels A and B both contain tail ﬂits
only, at least one of the channels F or K contains a header ﬂit, implying a message
arrives at its destination. If either channel A or B is ﬁlled with tail ﬂits only and
the other is empty, there is always a header ﬂit that can move. Say channel A has
tail ﬂits only and channel B is empty. There is a header ﬂit in either C, E or H
that can move forward. Say channel B has tail ﬂits only and channel A is empty.
There is a header ﬂit in either C, D or G that can move forward. No deadlock is
possible.
Duato’s condition states that a network is deadlock-free if and only if there
exists a routing subfunction that is connected and has no cycles in its extended
dependency graph. For our purpose it is enough to deﬁne this graph as being the
dependency graph extended with indirect dependencies. We now show that there
is no such routing subfunction for the network deﬁned in Figure 6.13.
We have to consider all possible connected routing subfunctions R1 and show
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that the corresponding extended dependency graph contains a cycle. As Figure
6.13 shows, processing node n1 is the only adaptive point. Restricting the routing
functions at other points than n1 makes the routing subfunction disconnected.
Regarding processing node n1, restricting the use of channels F and K makes no
sense, as this cannot possibly make the dependency graph acyclic. Thus, there are
three connected routing subfunctions: restrict the use of channel C completely or
restrict the use of C for one of the destinations d0 or d1.
A B
G C H
I D E J
K F
(a) Dependency graph
A B
G H
I D E J
K F
(b) Extended dependency graph
Figure 6.14: The dependency graph and the extended dependency graph corresponding
to the routing subfunction restricting channel C completely. The dotted arrows denote a
indirect edge.
Figure 6.14a shows the dependency graph of the network. We consider the case
where routing is restricted such that channel C is not used for any destination.
Edges (A,C), (B,C), (C,D) and (C,E) can be removed from the dependency
graph. The current routing subfunction creates two indirect edges: (A,E) and
(B,D). Let us consider edge (A,E). There is a path from src(A) = n0 to end(E) =
n5 for messages destined for d0 such that A and E are respectively the ﬁrst and
last channels of this path and the only ones supplied by R1. Channel C, the only
intermediate channel, is not supplied by R1. Analogously for edge (B,D). The
extended dependency graph is not acyclic. It contains cycle [A,G,D,B,H,E,A]
(Figure 6.14b).
The other two routing subfunctions, created by restricting the use of channel
C for one of the destinations d0 or d1, are cyclic for the exact same reason. As all
routing subfunctions have cyclic extended dependency graphs, Duato’s condition
states that the network has a deadlock, whereas it is deadlock-free.
The network could be in deadlock, if worms could intersect. Consider the
following – illegal – conﬁguration. Channels G and H are ﬁlled with messages
destined for d0 and d1 respectively. There are two intersecting worms, one oc-
cupying channels A, C, and E (destined for d0) and one occupying B, C and D
(destined for d1). None of these messages can move. There is a deadlock.
In wormhole networks, channels can contain ﬂits belonging to one message
only. Duato states this in Assumption 5 of his article [44]. Duato mentions this
assumption in his informal deﬁnition of a legal conﬁguration. However, he omits
this in his formal deﬁnition of a legal conﬁguration. The consequence is that when
proving the condition – Theorem 4, parts b2a) and b2b2) – a conﬁguration is
built by ﬁlling indirect edges with ﬂits belonging to one message. By deﬁnition,
information on which channels are used in an indirect edge are lost. To build a
true conﬁguration one has to prove that these edges do not intersect. Otherwise,
Assumption 5 may be violated and the deadlock conﬁguration is not legal.
95
6 Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for Deadlock-free Routing
We suggest a possible ﬁx for this issue. A legal cycle is deﬁned as a cycle in
the extended dependency graph such that the (cross) indirect edges can constitute
paths of channels that are pairwise disjoint. The ﬁxed condition would become:
A coherent, connected and adaptive routing function R for an inter-
connection network is deadlock-free if and only if there exists a routing
subfunction R1 that is connected and has no legal cycle in its extended
dependency graph.
The proof of this Theorem is an exact copy of Duato’s proof, with a small extension
in parts b2a) and b2b2) to deal with the new deﬁnition of a legal conﬁguration.
The discrepancy is caused by an omission in the formalization of the deﬁnition
of deadlock. We did not ﬁnd any inconsistency in Duato’s informal deﬁnitions
or in his complex proof. In Chapter 7, we will show that this minor discrepancy
makes deciding deadlock freedom on wormhole networks co-NP-complete, instead
of polynomial.
6.7.3 Relation to our Condition
We will show that if Theorem 6.2 identiﬁes a deadlock, Duato’s condition does as
well. The other direction cannot be shown.
Assume a set S which is the union of a set of routing paths for which no head
has an escape. Figure 6.15a gives an example. We show that any connected routing
subfunction R1 has a cyclic extended dependency graph. First we show this for
the unrestricted routing function R. Let π be the routing path for destination
d starting in channel A. Channel B is a d-neighbor of the head of π. In the
dependency graph there is a path of dependencies from channel A to B. As S has
no escape, channel B is again member of some routing path for some destination
d′. Thus there is another path of dependencies from B to a channel C in another
routing path for some destination d′′, and so on. As S has no escape, the paths of
dependencies will eventually lead into one or more cycles, see Figure 6.15b.
These cycles cannot be broken by restricting the routing function. The routing
subfunction can be restricted either 1) inside some routing path, 2) at the head of
a routing path, or 3) none of these.
First, say the routing subfunction restricts routing inside a routing path. This
may break such a path into pieces. However, since a routing path consists of
dependencies created by the same destination only, any hole in the path will be
bridged by an indirect edge. Thus the cycle remains intact. Figure 6.15c shows an
indirect edge in a routing path. Secondly, say the routing subfunction is restricted
at the head of some routing path. E.g., say the routing subfunction restricts
routing in channel F to use channel E only. This breaks dependency (F,B) but
does not break all cycles. As S has no escape all dependencies at head F caused
by destination d lead back to S. This means that to break all cycles, all these
dependencies must be broken. In the example this means that both dependencies
(F,E) and (F,B) must be broken to break all cycles. This is not possible as the
routing subfunction must be connected.
Lastly, restricting the routing function outside of the routing paths will not
break any of the dependency cycles.
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(a) A set of routing paths in the dependency graph. The
arrows point to the dependency neighbors caused by the des-
tination of the routing path of the head of each path.
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Figure 6.15: A set of routing paths related to Duato’s condition.
Assuming the existence of a set of routing paths without an escape, there is no
connected routing subfunction with an acyclic extended dependency graph. The
other direction does not hold necessarily. A cycle in the extended dependency
graph can be translated to a set of routing paths, but as it is unknown what
channels are needed to ﬁll an indirect dependency, the paths are not necessarily
pairwise disjoint.
In contrast to Duato’s theorem, our condition holds for incoherent routing
functions as well. We prove the example in Figure 6.12 deadlock-free. Figure
6.16a shows the dependency graph. The edges are labeled with the destinations
causing the dependencies. We show that there is no pairwise disjoint set of paths
where no header has an escape. Assume such a set of paths. We proceed by
contradiction.
We ﬁrst show that channel cB2 must be the head of a path and that channels
cA1 and cH1 must be included in the tails of some paths. Channel cH2 must be
empty as it has no neighbors. Channels cA1 and cH1 cannot be heads as otherwise
channel cH2 is an escape. Thus there are only two possible channels which can be
at the head of a path: cH0 and cB2. Channels cA1 and cH1 must be included in
the tails of some paths since otherwise they would be escapes for both cH0 and
cB2. Channel cB2 must be the head of a path since otherwise the paths containing
cA1 and cB2 have no heads.
Thus channel cB2 is the head of a path and channels cA1 and cH1 are included in
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(a) Dependency graph
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(b) Two paths where no head has an escape.
Figure 6.16: Dependency graph of network in Figure 6.12
the tails of some paths. Here we have arrived at a contradiction. Channel cB2 can
be the head of at most one path. This path must contain both cA1 and cH1. This
cannot be done without the worm intersecting itself. E.g., path [cB2cH1cB2cA1]
is a path with its head in cB2 that contains channels cA1 and cH1. However, this
path intersects itself. There is no pairwise disjoint set of paths where no head has
an escape. By Theorem 6.2 the network is deadlock-free.
Note that there exists a set of routing paths where no header has an escape.
Consider the set of paths {[cB2, cA1] , [cB2, cH1]}, both drawn in Figure 6.16b.
For this set of paths no head has an escape. It is however not a pairwise disjoint
set of paths.
6.8 Relation to Schwiebert and Jayasimha
6.8.1 Schwiebert and Jayasimha’s Condition
Schwiebert and Jayasimha deﬁned a necessary and suﬃcient condition for deadlock-
free routing.
A routing function R is deadlock-free if and only if R is wait-connected
for some subgraph S and S has no True Cycles in the waiting graph.
Schwiebert and Jayasimha’s condition depends on the waiting graph. The waiting
graph has as vertices the channels of the network. There is an edge between two
channels A and B if B is a waiting channel for A, i.e., if a blocked message in A
can wait for channel B to become available. Channels A and B do not necessarily
have to be topological neighbors: if a worm occupies multiple channels, among
which channel A, and waits for channel B then B is a waiting neighbor of A.
Consider the network in Figure 6.17a. Channels c0 to c3 all are waiting neigh-
bors of each other. Channel c4 is a waiting neighbor of channels c0 to c3. Figure
6.17b gives the corresponding waiting graph.
To discharge Schwiebert and Jayasimha’s condition, one needs to selectively
remove waiting edges until an acyclic subgraph is obtained. The subgraph must
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c0 : d0
c3 : d0
c4 : d0
c2 : d0
c1 : d0
(a) Network (b) Waiting graph
Figure 6.17: Example of the waiting graph
remain wait-connected, i.e., each channel must have at least one waiting channel. If
there is an acyclic wait-connected subgraph, the routing function is deadlock-free.
An edge in the waiting graph may span multiple channels. Given a cycle of
waiting edges, there might not be a legal conﬁguration ﬁlling all channels corres-
ponding to the waiting edges. For example, two edges may share a channel, in
which case they can only be ﬁlled by intersecting worms. Cycles which can(not) be
ﬁlled are called True Cycles (False Resource Cycles). A network is deadlock-free
if and only if there is a wait-connected subgraph S that contains no True Cycles.
6.8.2 Relation to our Condition
Schwiebert and Jayasimha’s condition is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
deadlock-free routing. It is deﬁned for a broad class of routing functions. The
routing function need not to be memoryless, i.e., routing functions of type C×P 7→
C are supported. Also, it allows routing functions to make a distinction between
blocked messages and messages that are not blocked. Such routing functions allow
more ﬂexibility when messages are not blocked, which can prevent deadlocks.
However, Schwiebert and Jayasimha’s condition is a dynamic condition. It does
not only depend on a static graph, but also on conﬁgurations. In order to determine
whether a cycle in the waiting graph is a True Cycle, it must be determined whether
there is some reachable conﬁguration that ﬁlls the cycle. Note that since routing
is not necessarily memoryless, a legal conﬁguration is not necessarily reachable.
Thus analysis of injection sequences of messages is required to distinguish True
Cycles from False Resource Cycles [48]. Schwiebert and Jayasimha provide an
algorithm which performs this analysis, but this algorithm is exponential [128].
As their condition is dynamic and deﬁned for diﬀerent types of routing func-
tions, we do not further relate this condition to ours.
6.9 Relation to Taktak et al.
6.9.1 Taktak’s Condition
Taktak et al. deﬁned a suﬃcient condition for deadlock-free routing [138]. Fur-
thermore, they created an algorithm checking this condition in polynomial time.
Their condition depends on a labeled dependency graph. A channel is labeled with
destination d if a message destined for d can occupy the channel. Taktak et al.
99
6 Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for Deadlock-free Routing
deﬁne a tagging condition and prove that if all labels can be tagged, the network
is deadlock-free.
Definition 6.20 A label l of a node v is tagged if and only if for all successors of
v which owns l as label, l is tagged, and there is at least one successor of v having
all its labels tagged.
An interconnection network is deadlock-free if there is at least one label
of one channel that cannot be tagged.
Consider the cycle in Figure 6.18. Say we want to determine whether label l0 can
be tagged for channel A. This recursively depends on the next channel on the cycle.
During this process visited channels are assumed to be untagged. Eventually, label
l1 must be tagged for channel B. In order to tag label l1 for channel B a neighbor
is required which has all its labels tagged. This cannot be neighbor A, as A has
already been visited and thus label l0 is considered untagged. The only way to tag
label l1 for channel B is to have an unvisited escape channel C where all labels,
including label l1, can be tagged.
A:l0l1
C:l1
B:l1
l0
l0l1
l0
Figure 6.18: Example of cyclic tagging
If C again leads into a cycle, than this cycle must again have an unvisited
escape in order to get labels tagged. In a deadlock-free network, all cycles will
eventually be escaped and all labels will be tagged.
6.9.2 Relation to our Condition
We show that any deadlock identiﬁed by Theorem 6.2 is identiﬁed as a deadlock by
the condition of Taktak et al. The reverse does not hold, as the condition of Taktak
et al. identiﬁes false deadlocks. The counterexample presented in Section 6.7.2
also applies to their condition.
Consider again the pairwise disjoint set of routing paths in Figure 6.15a. Let
the tagging start in channel A. Tagging of A recursively depends on the next
channel in the path. Arriving at channel F , both channel B and E must be
tagged. The tagging of B eventually leads to D and thus into a cycle. This cycle
has an unvisited escape, namely channel E. This path also leads into a cycle. Since
S has no escape, eventually all paths will lead into a cycle and thus eventually
there will be no unvisited escape. The result is that for each channel in a routing
path for destination d, this destination cannot be tagged. Any deadlock identiﬁed
by Theorem 6.2 is identiﬁed as a deadlock by Taktak et al.
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6.10 Conclusion
We have presented necessary and suﬃcient conditions for deadlock freedom of
packet and wormhole networks. Using the notion of escapes, we could deﬁne sim-
pler conditions than previous ones. They involve fewer concepts and require fewer
deﬁnitions. Most notably, the conditions have been deﬁned using only the regular
dependency graph. As this graph can be statically computed from a speciﬁcation
of the routing function and the network topology, our conditions are static. Our
condition has fewer assumptions, widening its applicability. It can be applied to
routing functions which can send messages into a cycle. Eﬀectively, this separates
the proof of deadlock freedom from the proof of livelock freedom. Our conditions
have been shown to subsume all previous conditions.
To ensure correctness of all deﬁnitions and proofs, we have mechanically proven
our conditions correct using the GeNoC framework and the ACL2 theorem prover.
This mechanical proof has demonstrated its value, as we have found discrepancies
in previous work. In all previous work, the deﬁnition of a deadlock in wormhole
networks has been incorrect. We have supplied a counterexample showing that
Duato’s condition is only suﬃcient. The issue is subtle but essential: worms
necessarily do not intersect. As a result, our condition for wormhole networks is
the ﬁrst static necessary and suﬃcient condition for deadlock freedom.
Still, discharging these conditions for an actual chip design is a non-trivial
and cumbersome task. In the next chapter, we present algorithms that given a
speciﬁcation of the network automatically check whether these conditions hold.
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Chapter 7
Deadlock Detection Algorithms
The previous chapter presented theorems for deadlock-free routing. These theor-
ems provide exact conditions under which a network is deadlock-free. This chapter
presents a quick and fully automated approach to determine that a network actu-
ally satisﬁes these conditions.
We present two algorithms that take as input a speciﬁcation of the topology and
the routing function (see Figure 7.1). In case of a deadlock, the algorithms provide
detailed and accurate feedback on the cause of this deadlock. The correctness of
our algorithms has been mechanically veriﬁed using the ACL2 theorem prover.
For packet networks, our algorithm decides deadlock freedom in linear time
with respect to the size of the dependency graph. One might expect that a similar
result is feasible for wormhole networks. However, we prove that for wormhole
networks deciding deadlock freedom is co-NP-complete. We point to the cause of
this complexity and formulate a notion of deadlock freedom that is decidable in
polynomial time. The wormhole algorithm checks this suﬃcient condition, which
means that if it returns a deadlock-free result, this result is sound. However, if it
returns a deadlock, this is not necessarily a legal and reachable deadlock.
The ﬁrst part of this chapter deals with packet networks. The algorithm is
explained in detail using examples from the previous chapter. Pseudo code is
presented of which correctness and algorithmic complexity is proven. The second
part deals with wormhole networks. The algorithm is very similar but has to
deal with the many subtleties of wormhole switching. In the presentation of this
algorithm we focus mainly on the diﬀerences between the two algorithms.
Topology
Routing
Algorithms
if deadlock then
    detailed feedback
else
    "OK"
Figure 7.1: Our approach for determining deadlock freedom.
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7.1 Packet Switching: Algorithm by Example
The basic objective of the algorithm is to mark each channel as deadlock-immune
or deadlock-sensitive. The intuition behind these markings is that in a deadlock-
immune channel no packet can be permanently blocked, whereas in a deadlock-
sensitive channel some packet can possibly be permanently blocked. After termin-
ation of the algorithm, the markings are used to either output the exact reason
for deadlock or to state that the network is deadlock-free.
In order to determine the marking of a channel, the algorithm classiﬁes all
destinations in the typing information of that channel. A classiﬁcation x | y of
channel c stands respectively for destinations that may lead packets from channel
c into a circular wait and for destinations for which channel c is an escape. As
routing is adaptive, a destination may be classiﬁed as both. If any destination
that leads packets into circular waits also provides escapes out of these cycles,
the channel will be marked deadlock-immune. Otherwise, it will get the marking
deadlock-sensitive.
We ﬁrst demonstrate by example the notions of deadlock-immunity and sens-
itivity. Secondly we provide an example trace of the algorithm, showing how it
detects a deadlock. Lastly, we provide an example trace that reveals the necessity
of a post-processing step.
7.1.1 Deadlock-immunity and -sensitivity
We recapitulate the deadlock in the network of Example 6.1. Figure 7.2a shows
the dependency graph. Subgraph {A,B,C} can form a deadlock. For channel A
destination d1 leads into the subgraph. As there is a destination that does not
lead out of the subgraph, channel A is not an escape. The same holds for channel
C and destination d0. Subgraph {A,B,C} is a subgraph without an escape.
Figure 7.3h shows the result of our algorithm. The channels A, B and C have
been marked deadlock-sensitive. The other channels are deadlock-immune. For
channel A destination d1 is classiﬁed as a destination that leads into a circular wait,
but that does not provide an escape. Again, the same thing holds for channel C
and destination d0. Figure 7.2b shows the deadlock that is represented by these
markings.
d0
B
A CE D
d1
d0, d1 d0, d1
d0, d1
(a) Dependency graph
n0
n1
n2
A
B
C
d1
d0
d0 ∨ d1
(b) Deadlock returned by algorithm
Figure 7.2: Example dependency graph. The black channels can form a deadlock.
The algorithm determines for each channel c a classiﬁcation x | y of all des-
tinations in the typing information of c, i.e., for all reachable destinations. If x
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is not a subset of y, the channel is marked deadlock-sensitive. Otherwise it is
deadlock-immune.
For example, we derive the marking of channel C. Destination d1 is a type of
channel C. As it leads to a sink (channel D) it is classiﬁed as a destination for
which there is an escape. But as destination d1 can also lead packets to channel
A, it is also classiﬁed as a destination that may lead packets to a circular wait.
Destination d0 also leads to channel A and is thus classiﬁed as a destination that
may lead packets to a circular wait. The classiﬁcation of channel C becomes
d0d1 | d1. As there is a destination, namely d0, that may lead packets to a circular
wait, but for which there is no escape, channel C is marked deadlock-sensitive.
Deadlock-sensitive Channel c is classiﬁed with x | y and x * y. There exists a
destination that leads to a circular wait, but for which there is no escape.
Deadlock-immune Channel c is classiﬁed with x | y and x ⊆ y. For all destina-
tions, there is an escape.
After all marks have been determined, a deadlock can be constructed from all
deadlock-sensitive channels. If all channels are deadlock-immune, the network is
deadlock-free.
7.1.2 Example Trace
The algorithm consists of two steps. The ﬁrst step is basically a depth-ﬁrst search
through the dependency graph. It expands a spanning tree, and after expanding
the tree forwards, information is propagated backwards. The second step performs
some post-processing. Initially, all channels are unmarked. Eventually, all chan-
nels get marked either deadlock-sensitive or -immune. We use a temporary mark
“visited” for channels that have been expanded but whose marking is currently
unknown. This ensures termination.
Consider the dependency graph in Figure 7.2a. Let the algorithm start in
channel A. The diﬀerent steps of the run of the algorithm are shown in Figure 7.3.
The algorithm expands a tree spanning over the reach of A. It starts by marking
channel A as visited (Step 1). Destinations d0 and d1 lead to channel B, and
destination d0 leads to channel E. To determine the classiﬁcation of channel A,
both neighbors must be expanded.
The algorithm proceeds with channels B and C and marks them as visited
(Steps 2 and 3). From channel C, destination d0 leads to E and destinations
d0 and d1 lead to channel A. To determine the classiﬁcation of channel C, both
neighbors must be expanded.
First consider the expansion of channel D. As it is a sink, all destinations
provide an escape. The classiﬁcation of D becomes _ | d1 (Step 4). This classiﬁc-
ation produces two results (Step 5). First channel D can be marked as deadlock-
immune, as the empty set is a subset of {d1}. Secondly, this information can be
propagated upwards in the tree towards channel C. All destinations leading from
C to D lead to a deadlock-immune channel. Thus all these destinations (C,D) can
be classiﬁed as leading from parent C to an escape. The classiﬁcation of channel
C becomes _ | d1.
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A
_ | _
(a) Step 1
B
A
C
_ | _
_ | _
_ | _
(b) Steps 2-3
B
A
C
D
_ | _
_ | _
_ | _
_ | d1
(c) Step 4
B
A
C
D
_ | _
_ | _
_ | d1
_ | d1
(d) Step 5
B
A
C
D
_ | _
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | d1
_ | d1
(e) Step 6
B
A
C
D
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | d1
_ | d1
(f) Step 7
B
A
C
E
D _ | d1
_ | d0
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | d1
(g) Step 8
B
A
C
E
D
d0d1 | d0
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | d1
_ | d1
_ | d0
(h) Step 9
Visited
Deadlock-immune
Deadlock-sensitive
(i) Legend
Figure 7.3: Example trace. For sake of presentation, the set braces { and } have been
omitted from the sets in the classifications. The underscore _ denotes the empty set to
avoid similarity between ∅ and the vertices of the tree.
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Now consider the expansion of channel A. It has already been visited. This
indicates a circular wait. Destinations d0 and d1, leading from channel C to channel
A, are classiﬁed as such. The classiﬁcation of parent C becomes d0d1 | d1. Again,
two results are produced (Step 6). First, channel C is marked deadlock-sensitive
as {d0, d1} * {d1}. Secondly, since all destinations leading from B to C lead to
a deadlock-sensitive channel, all these destinations are classiﬁed as leading into a
circular wait. The classiﬁcation of channel B becomes d0d1 | _.
As there are no other arcs going out of channel B, the mark of channel B
is determined as deadlock-sensitive. This information is propagated upwards to
channel A (Step 7). To complete the classiﬁcation of channel A, channel E must
be expanded as well (Step 8). As this is a sink, it is deadlock-immune. This in-
formation is propagated upwards to channel A, yielding the complete classiﬁcation
d0d1 | d0 of channel A. Channel A is marked deadlock-sensitive (Step 9).
As all channels have been marked, the algorithm terminates. It outputs a
deadlock, consisting of the three deadlock-sensitive channels (see Figure 7.2b). In
this deadlock, each deadlock-sensitive channel c with marking x | y is ﬁlled with
packets destined for a destination in x that is not in y.
7.1.3 Post-processing
Consider the dependency graph in Figure 7.4a. We do not present the correspond-
ing network and routing function, as it is just an artiﬁcial example used to show
the need for a post-processing step. The network corresponding to this depend-
ency graph is deadlock-free. To prove this, the only possible subgraph that needs
to be considered is subgraph {A,B}. This graph has an escape, namely channel
A. For all destinations, i.e., for both d0 and d1, there is a neighbor not in the
subgraph.
We provide a trace where the algorithm yields an incorrect result without post-
processing. The ﬁrst step of the algorithm starts in channel A and marks it as
visited. In this speciﬁc trace, the ﬁrst neighbor of A that is expanded is channel
B. Destination d1 leads from channel B to a sink. Destination d0 leads back to
visited channel A. Consequently, the classiﬁcation of channel B becomes d0 | d1
(see Figure 7.4b). Channel B is marked deadlock-sensitive, as {d0} * {d1}.
The algorithm continues with the expansion of the other neighbors of A. Since
both destinations d0 and d1 lead to a sink, the classiﬁcation of channel A becomes
d1 | d0d1. Channel A is marked deadlock-immune. Channel B however, is still
marked as deadlock-sensitive.
If the algorithm would stop here, it would conclude that this network is not
deadlock-free as not all channels have been marked as deadlock-immune. The
problem is that in this specific trace at the time channel B was marked deadlock-
sensitive, channel A had not been expanded completely. In other words, it was
not known at the time that channel A is deadlock-immune. A post-processing step
is added to the algorithm to overcome this issue. This step adds to all deadlock-
sensitive channels all destinations leading to deadlock-immune channels. In this
step, a deadlock-sensitive channel can become deadlock-immune (see Figure 7.4c).
We claim that a network is deadlock-free if and only if after termination of the
two steps of the algorithm all channels are marked deadlock-immune.
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BAC D
d0
d1
d1
d0 d1
(a) Dependency graph
B
A
D
C
d1 | d0d1
d0 | d1
_ | d1
_ | d0
(b) Result before post-processing
B
A
D
C
d1 | d0d1
d0 | d1d0
_ | d1
_ | d0
(c) Result after post-processing
Figure 7.4: Example of a trace where post-processing is needed.
7.2 Pseudo Code
Let us consider the ﬁrst part of the algorithm, that is, the unfolding of the span-
ning tree (Algorithm 1). It takes two parameters: CI is a set of channels that is to
be explored. Arrays cyclics and escapes are assumed to be globally available. The
algorithm keeps track of the parent of the channels in CI with parameter p. This
enables backwards propagation. The algorithm keeps expanding new neighbors
until no unmarked neighbors exist. The current channel under investigation is
c0. For each channel, the algorithm stores the classiﬁcation in two arrays. Array
cyclics stores the destinations that lead into circular waits Array escapes stores
the destinations that provide escapes. The marks of the channels are stored in
array mark. There are four diﬀerent marks:
0 unmarked A channel is unmarked;
1 visited A channel is visited, i.e, not all neighbors have been marked;
2 immune All neighbors have been marked, the channel is deadlock-
immune;
3 sensitive All neighbors have been marked, the channel is deadlock-
sensitive.
If channel c0 is either a sink or deadlock-immune (Line 8), all destinations
τ(p, c0) provide escapes for p. Thus these destinations are added to escapes(p).
Otherwise, channel c0 is marked either 3 or 1 (Line 5). In the ﬁrst case, c0 has
already been shown to be deadlock-sensitive. In the second case, it is unknown
at this point whether c0 is deadlock-sensitive or -immune. In both cases, all
destinations τ(p, c0) are considered to lead into circular waits from channel p.
They are are added to cyclics(p). This consideration might be wrong. The post-
processing step will check this and ﬁx it if necessary.
If c0 is neither a sink or marked, the algorithm continues its forwards expansion
by expanding the neighbors of c0 (Line 14). When this terminates, the gathered
information is propagated backwards through the graph as follows: if there exists a
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destination in cyclics(c0) that is not in escapes(c0), channel c0 is deadlock-sensitive.
Thus τ(p, c0) is added to cyclics(p) and c0 is marked with 3 (Lines 19–20). If the
set of destinations cyclics(c0) is a subset of escapes(c0), channel c0 is deadlock-
immune. The destinations τ(p, c0) is added to escapes(p). Channel c0 is marked
with 2 (Lines 16–17).
As for the post-processing step (Algorithm 2), this step initially considers all
3-marked channels with 2-marked neighbors. For all these channels it adds the
destinations leading to 2-marked neighbors, which have not been added already
(Line 6). If, as a result of this, a channel c gets marked 2 (Lines 7–8), all parents of
c have a new 2-marked neighbor. Thus, all parents must be reconsidered (Line 9).
Main wraps up the two steps. It executes CreateTree for all unmarked chan-
nels c, with CI = Adep(c) and p = c. After this, it executes Post-Processing.
It returns the – possibly empty – set of 3-marked channels.
Algorithm 1 CreateTree(CI , p)
Require: CI ⊆ Adep(p)
1: if CI = ∅ then
2: return
3: else
4: Pick element c0 from CI
5: if mark(c0) ∈ {visited, sensitive} then
6: cyclics(p) := cyclics(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
7: CreateTree(CI − c0, p)
8: else if mark(c0) = immune ∨Adep(c0) = ∅ then
9: mark(c0) := immune
10: escapes(p) := escapes(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
11: CreateTree(CI − c0, p)
12: else
13: mark(c0) := visited
14: CreateTree(Adep(c0), c0)
15: if cyclics(c0) ⊆ escapes(c0) then
16: escapes(p) := escapes(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
17: mark(c0) := immune
18: else
19: cyclics(p) := cyclics(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
20: mark(c0) := sensitive
21: end if
22: CreateTree(CI − c0, p)
23: end if
24: end if
7.3 Analysis
We prove that the computational complexity of our algorithm is O(|A|), where A
is the set of arcs in the dependency graph. We then prove correctness, by proving
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Algorithm 2 Post-Processing(CI)
1: if CI = ∅ then
2: return
3: else
4: Pick element c0 from CI
5: if mark(c0) = sensitive then
6: escapes(c0) := escapes(c0) ∪ {d ∈ τ(c0, c1) | mark(c1) = immune}
7: if cyclics(c0) ⊆ escapes(c0) then
8: mark(c0) := immune
9: CI := (CI − c0) ∪ {p ∈ parents(c0) | mark(p) = sensitive}
10: end if
11: Post-Processing(CI − c0)
12: else
13: Post-Processing(CI − c0)
14: end if
15: end if
Algorithm 3 Main
1: for all ci ∈ C do
2: if mark(ci) = 0 then
3: CreateTree(Adep(ci), ci)
4: end if
5: end for
6: Post-Processing(C)
7: return {c ∈ C | mark(c) = sensitive}
that Algorithm 3 returns the empty set if and only if the condition in Theorem 6.1
holds.
7.3.1 Computational Complexity
CreateTree visits each dependency arc exactly once, since after visitation a
channel becomes permanently marked. The total running time of all calls of
this step is therefore O(|A|). It is basically a depth-ﬁrst search, with backwards
propagation.
The running time of the post-processing step is O(|A|). A 32-arc is an arc
from a 3-marked channel to a 2-marked channel. The algorithm starts with 32-
arcs only. For all 32-arcs, the algorithm adds the destinations labelling the arc to
the escapes-array of the source of the arc (Line 6). The arcs considered in Line 6
are considered once: they could be permanently removed from the data-structure
storing the graph. This holds since any 2-mark is always stable. Line 9 adds new
parents to CI , thereby adding new arcs that are to be taken into consideration.
All these arcs were initially 33-arcs, but have just become 32-arcs as channel c0
has just been marked 2. As the algorithm only considers 32-arcs, none of these
new arcs have been dealt with before. Each arc is considered at most once.
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The running time of Main is the sum of the running times of CreateTree and
Post-Processing. After post-processing it enumerates the 3-marked channels
in O(|C|) time. Since the number of arcs is of a higher order than the number of
channels, the total running time of the algorithm is O(|A|).
Note that O(|A|) is the order of the number of recursive calls. Each recursive
call performs list operations such append and subset. However, no elements are
deleted from a list. Using an advanced data structure such as a ﬁbonacci heap, all
the necessary list operations are O(1) [56].
7.3.2 Correctness
The proof is structured in two parts: Lemma 7.3 states that our algorithm marks
all channels immune if the network is deadlock-free. Lemma 7.4 states that any
channel that can be part of a deadlock is marked sensitive. The proofs of these
lemmas requires two auxiliary Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2.
The lemmas of the proof concern 2- and 3-marked channels. Mark 1 is only
given during the execution of the algorithm, but will always be overwritten by
either 2 or 3. This is stated by our ﬁrst lemma.
Lemma 7.1 After termination of CreateTree(Adep(c0), c0) all channels in the
reach of the channels in P are either marked 2 or 3.
Proof. Any unmarked channel in the reach will eventually get marked 1. Any
1-marked channel will eventually become marked either 2 or 3. A channel is only
marked 1 on Line 13. Eventually the algorithm will reach either Line 17 or Line 20,
where the channel is marked either 2 or 3. Once a channel is marked 2 or 3, it
will never become either unmarked or marked 1.
We prove that if a channel c has escapes for all destinations in τ(c), i.e., if all
destinations lead to a deadlock-immune neighbor, the channel will not be marked
3. This lemma requires the post-processing step.
Lemma 7.2 After termination of Post-Processing, if for any channel c all
destinations in τ(c) lead to a 2-marked neighbor, channel c is not marked 3.
Proof. The post-processing step ensures that for all 3-marked channels the escapes
array contains all destinations leading to 2-marked neighbors. Since, by assump-
tion, all destinations in τ(c) lead to a 2-marked neighbor, all these destinations are
included in escapes(c). Thus τ(c) ⊆ escapes(c). The algorithm classiﬁes destina-
tions only if they are in τ(c), i.e., it classiﬁes a destination d only when it is actu-
ally possible for a message with destination d to reach channel c. Thus necessarily
cyclics(c) ⊆ τ(c). By transitivity of ⊆, we have established cyclics(p) ⊆ escapes(p).
As this is the criterion under which channels are not marked 3, this implies channel
c can never become marked 3.
We now prove that in a deadlock-free network, any channel gets marked 2.
Thus, the algorithm will return the empty set if the condition for deadlock freedom
holds. Lemma 7.3 is proven as follows. If the algorithm marks a channel 3 and this
marking is preserved by the post-processing step, it is possible to create a subgraph
without an escape. This proof completely formalizes the intuition in Figure 7.2: a
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deadlock is created from all deadlock-sensitive channels. Subgraph S3 is created
by taking all 3-marked channels. Lemma 7.2 proves that for each channel c in
subgraph S3 there is a destination d ∈ cyclics(c) /∈ escapes(d) that leads only to
3-marked neighbors. Since subgraph S3 contains all 3-marked channels and since
channel c has destination d which leads to 3-marked channels only, channel c is
not an escape for this subgraph. Since this holds for all channels c in subgraph
S3, the subgraph has no escape.
Lemma 7.3 Assume all non-empty subgraphs have an escape. After termination
of Main any channel c is marked 2.
Proof. By Lemma 7.1, channel c is either marked 2 or 3. The proof is by contradic-
tion. Assume channel c is marked 3. We prove that the set of 3-marked channels
does not have an escape. Let c′ be any 3-marked channel. By Lemma 7.2 there
is at least one destination d that does not lead to any 2-marked neighbor. By
Lemma 7.1 destination d leads to 3-marked channels only. Since there is a des-
tination that does not lead outside of the subgraph consisting of all 3-marked
channels, channel c′ is not an escape for this subgraph. This holds for all c′ in the
subgraph. Thus the subgraph does not have an escape. Furthermore this subgraph
is not empty, since otherwise there would be no 3-marked channels and channel c
is marked 3. Thus the assumption that all non-empty subgraphs have an escape
has been contradicted.
Lastly, we prove that if the algorithm returns the empty set, i.e., if all channels
get marked 2, the condition for deadlock-free routing holds. In other words, if
the condition does not hold, there is some channel that will not be marked 2.
Lemma 7.4 states that any channel in a deadlock cannot be marked 2. Since all
channels eventually are marked either 2 or 3 (Lemma 7.1), any channel that can
be in a deadlock gets marked 3.
Lemma 7.4 If a channel c is in a subgraph S that has no escape, the channel
will not be marked 2.
Proof. The lemma holds initially since all channels are unmarked. We show by in-
duction on CreateTree that this lemma is preserved during this step. The exact
similar argument holds for Post-Processing. Thus the lemma is an invariant
for the algorithm.
Assume that channel c ∈ S and that S has no escape. The only reason a
channel c gets marked 2 is when cyclics(p) ⊆ escapes(p). We prove that this
implies channel c is an escape. When channel c becomes marked 2 all neighbors of
channel c have been explored. Thus all destinations in τ(c) are either in cyclics(c)
or in escapes(c). Since by assumption cyclics(c) ⊆ escapes(c), all destinations
in τ(c) are in escapes(p). If a destination is in escapes(p) then it leads to a 2-
marked neighbor. Thus for all destinations, there is a 2-marked neighbor. By the
Induction Hypothesis, none of the channels in subgraph S are marked 2. Thus for
all reachable destinations there is a neighbor not in the subgraph: c is an escape
for the subgraph. This contradicts the assumption that c is in a subgraph without
an escape. Thus channel c cannot have been marked 2.
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Together, Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4 state that a channel gets marked 3 if and only
if it is in some subgraph without an escape. The algorithm returns the empty set
if and only if all channels get marked 2. By Theorem 6.1, the algorithm returns
the empty set if and only if the network is deadlock-free. If a non-empty set is
returned, a deadlock can be constructed from all 3-marked channels.
Theorem 7.1 A network is deadlock-free if and only if Main returns the empty
set.
Main(N) = ∅ ⇐⇒ DLF(N)
Proof. Theorem 6.1 states that a communication network is deadlock-free if and
only if all subgraphs have an escape. Assume all subgraphs have an escape. By
Lemma 7.3 all channels will be marked 2 and thus Main returns the empty set. As-
sume Main returns the empty set. Then all channels are marked 2. By Lemma 7.4
there is not a channel in a subgraph without an escape. Thus all subgraphs have
an escape.
We have deﬁned a linear algorithm for deciding deadlock freedom of packet
networks. We now proceed with wormhole networks.
Wormhole Switching
Detecting deadlocks in wormhole networks is much harder than detecting dead-
locks in packet networks. The main cause of this increase in complexity is the
requirement that in a legal wormhole conﬁguration, worms do not intersect. In
Section 7.7, we will show that this requirement makes deciding deadlock freedom
in wormhole networks co-NP-complete. The search for an eﬃcient polynomial al-
gorithm can be stopped. If we want to deﬁne a notion of deadlock that is decidable
in polynomial time, we have to drop this requirement. We call such a deadlock a
quasi-deadlock-configuration.
The fact that worms may not intersect is directly expressed in Property (2)
of Deﬁnition 6.17. It is also reﬂected in Property (1) which states that channel
capacities may not be exceeded. This can be seen as follows. We prove our
conditions and algorithms correct with parametric channel capacities, i.e., function
cap : C 7→ N+ is left generic. Thus, they also hold when the capacity of each
channel is one. In a network where all channels have capacity one, requiring
Property (1) is tantamount to requiring that all worms do not intersect.
Definition 7.1 A quasi-deadlock-configuration is a conﬁguration which satisﬁes
Properties (3) to (6) of Deﬁnition 6.17. A network is quasi-deadlock-free, notation
Q-DLF(N), if and only if there exists no quasi-deadlock-conﬁguration.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition presented in Theorem 6.2 is easily ad-
justed for quasi-deadlocks. We only have to lift the requirement that the set of
routing paths is pairwise disjoint.
Theorem 7.2 A wormhole network is quasi-deadlock-free if and only if all sets
of routing paths have an escape.
Q-DLF(N) ⇐⇒ ∀Π⋆ ∈ P(L(C)) ·
{
Π⋆ 6= ∅
R -paths(Π⋆)
=⇒ ∃e ∈ C · esc(e,Π⋆)
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A quasi-deadlock is not necessarily an actual deadlock, as it might not be a legal
conﬁguration. However, if a network is quasi-deadlock-free, it is also deadlock-free.
Q-DLF(N) =⇒ DLF(N)
We present an algorithm for ﬁnding quasi-deadlock-conﬁgurations in wormhole
networks. Using Theorem 7.2, it can prove a wormhole network deadlock-free in
polynomial time.
7.4 Algorithm by Example
The wormhole algorithm is an extension of our algorithm for packet networks.
Exactly as for the packet algorithm, for each channel c a classiﬁcation x | y is de-
termined for any destination in τ(c). The crucial diﬀerence between the algorithms
is that x ⊆ y no longer guarantees that a channel can be marked deadlock-immune.
If x is a subset of y, the set of destinations that lead messages into circular waits
is a subset of the set of destinations for which there is an escape out of these
cycles. Any packet can be routed towards an escape. However, in wormhole net-
works, a channel can be ﬁlled with tail ﬂits. These ﬂits cannot autonomously be
routed towards an escape as they always follow the header ﬂit. Therefore, a new
mark deadlock-attainable is introduced. The intuition behind this mark is that in
a channel no header ﬂit can be permanently blocked, but it is possible that some
tail ﬂit is permanently blocked.
Let c be a channel with classiﬁcation x | y, where x is a subset of y. No header
ﬂit can be permanently blocked. But if channel c is ﬁlled with tail ﬂits, these can
still be permanently blocked. Channel c is marked deadlock-attainable under the
following two conditions. First, the tail ﬂits must be part of some worm with its
head in channel h. Secondly, the header ﬂit in channel h must be permanently
blocked.
The basic objective of our algorithm is to mark each channel as deadlock-
immune, deadlock-sensitive, or deadlock-attainable. After termination of the al-
gorithm, either all channels are marked as deadlock-immune and the network is
deadlock-free or a deadlock can be created by ﬁlling all deadlock-sensitive channels
with header ﬂits and all deadlock-attainable channels with tail ﬂits.
7.4.1 Deadlock-attainability
We recapitulate Example 6.3. Figure 7.5a shows the dependency graph of the
network. Subgraph {A,B,C} can form a deadlock consisting of two worms: [B,A]
and [C]. The ﬁrst worm is destined for d1, the second for d0. Figure 7.6g shows
the result of our algorithm. Channels B and C – the heads of the worms – have
been marked deadlock-sensitive. Channel A – the tail of a worm – is marked
deadlock-attainable. The other channels are deadlock-immune. Figure 7.5b shows
the deadlock represented by these marks.
The algorithm knows that a header ﬂit in channel h can be permanently blocked
if channel h is marked deadlock-sensitive. Thus a channel is deadlock-attainable if
there exists a routing path towards a deadlock-sensitive channel (see Deﬁnition 6.4
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d0
B
A CE D
d1
d1 d0, d1
d0, d1
d1
F
(a) Dependency graph
n0
n1
n2
A
B
Cd1
d0
(b) Deadlock returned by algorithm
Figure 7.5: Example dependency graph. The black and crossed channels can form a
deadlock.
for a formal deﬁnition of routing path). This routing path can be established for
some destination d, which is the destination of the worm. To know whether tail
ﬂits can be permanently blocked, there must be no escape for destination d at the
head of the routing path.
Deadlock-sensitive Channel c is classiﬁed with x | y and x * y. There exists a
destination that leads into a circular wait, but for which there is no escape.
Deadlock-attainable Channel c is classiﬁed with x | y, with x ⊆ y, and there is
a routing path for some destination d leading to a deadlock-sensitive channel
h with classiﬁcation x′ | y′. Destination d must be in x′, but cannot be a
member of y′.
Deadlock-immune Channel c is classiﬁed with x | y, with x ⊆ y, and channel c
is not deadlock-attainable.
After all marks have been determined, a deadlock can be constructed from
all deadlock-sensitive and -attainable channels. In this deadlock, each deadlock-
sensitive channel c with marking x | y is ﬁlled with a header ﬂit destined for
a destination in x that is not in y. Each deadlock-attainable channel c is ﬁlled
with tail ﬂits belonging to a message with a header ﬂit in some deadlock-sensitive
channel. If all channels are deadlock-immune, the network is deadlock-free.
7.4.2 Example Trace
Figure 7.6 presents an example trace of our algorithm on the dependency graph
in Figure 7.5a. The ﬁrst six steps of the trace are equivalent to the example trace
of the packet algorithm and will not be detailed (see Figure 7.3).
During Step 6, channel C has been marked deadlock-sensitive. Step 7 propag-
ates this information upwards. As channel C is the only neighbor of channel B,
the mark of channel B is determined as deadlock-sensitive. Destination d1 is the
only destination leading from A to B. The classiﬁcation of channel A becomes
d1 | _, indicating that destination d1 leads from channel A into a circular wait.
To complete the classiﬁcation of channel A, channels E and F must be expan-
ded as well (Steps 8 and 9). As they are sinks, they are deadlock-immune. The
classiﬁcation of channel A becomes d1 | d0d1.
Channel A is marked deadlock-attainable. First, because {d1} is a subset of
{d0, d1}. Secondly, because there is a routing path to deadlock-sensitive channel B.
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A
_ | _
(a) Step 1
B
A
C
_ | _
_ | _
_ | _
(b) Steps 2–3
B
A
C
D
_ | _
_ | _
_ | _
_ | d1
(c) Step 4
B
A
C
D
_ | _
_ | _
_ | d1
_ | d1
(d) Step 5
B
A
C
D
_ | _
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | d1
_ | d1
(e) Step 6
B
A
C
D
d1 | _
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | d1
_ | d1
(f) Step 7
B
A
C
E
D
d1 | d0d1
d0d1 | _
d0d1 | d1
_ | d1
_ | d0 F _ | d1
(g) Steps 8–9
Visited
Deadlock-immune
Deadlock-sensitive
Deadlock-attainable
(h) Legend
Figure 7.6: Example trace. For sake of presentation, the set braces { and } have been
omitted from the sets in the classifications. The underscore _ denotes the empty set to
avoid similarity between ∅ and the vertices of the tree.
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This path can be established for destination d1. Thirdly, because the classiﬁcation
of channel B is d0d1 | _ and destination d1 is in {d0, d1}, and it is not in the
empty set.
7.5 Pseudo Code
Algorithm 4 shows the ﬁrst part of the algorithm. The algorithm uses the same
data structures as the packet algorithm. A fourth marking is added.
4 attainable All neighbors have been marked, the channel is deadlock-
attainable.
Algorithm 4 CreateTree(CI , pf)
Require: CI ⊆ Adep(p)
1: if CI = ∅ then
2: return
3: else
4: Pick element c0 from CI
5: if mark(c0) ∈ {visited, sensitive,attainable} then
6: cyclics(p) := cyclics(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
7: CreateTree(CI − c0, p)
8: else if mark(c0) = 2 ∨Adep(c0) = ∅ then
9: mark(c0) = immune
10: escapes(p) := escapes(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
11: CreateTree(CI − c0, p)
12: else
13: mark(c0) = visited
14: CreateTree(Adep(c0), c0)
15: if cyclics(c0) * escapes(c0) then
16: cyclics(p) := cyclics(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
17: mark(c0) = sensitive
18: else if cyclics(c0) 6= ∅ then
19: cyclics(p) := cyclics(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
20: mark(c0) = attainable
21: else
22: escapes(p) := escapes(p) ∪ τ(p, c0)
23: mark(c0) = immune
24: end if
25: CreateTree(CI − c0, p)
26: end if
27: end if
The diﬀerence between this algorithm and Algorithm 1 is in Lines 18 to 20.
Line 14 continues the forward expansion by expanding the neighbor of channel c0.
When this terminates, the gathered information is propagated upwards in the tree
as follows: if there exists a destination in cyclics(c0) that is not in escapes(c0),
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channel c0 is marked deadlock-sensitive. The set of destinations τ(p, c0) is added
to cyclics(p) and channel c0 is marked 3 (Lines 16–17). This is still the same as
for the packet algorithm.
The diﬀerence is that now, if there is at least one destination in cyclics(c0) we
give channel c0 mark 4 (Lines 19–20). As there is one such destination, there is
at least one neighbor that is not deadlock-immune. There is a path to a neighbor
that is deadlock-sensitive. If the channel cannot be marked deadlock-attainable,
it is marked 2 (Lines 22–23).
As for the post-processing step (Algorithm 5), this step initially considers all
3- and 4-marked channels with 2-marked neighbors. For all 3-marked channels it
adds the destinations leading to 2-marked neighbors to the escapes array (Line 6).
If, as a result of this, the deadlock-sensitive destinations become a subset of the
deadlock-immune destinations, the channel no longer must be marked 3. The
channel is marked 4, if there exists a routing path from the current channel leading
to a 3-marked channel (Line 8). This path must adhere to the requirements for
marking a channel deadlock-attainable: ﬁrst, destination d for which the path is
supplied must be a member of the cyclics array for the head of the path, but must
not be an escape. Second, the path must at least be of length two. As the current
channel is marked 3, trivially there is a path of length one. However, the algorithm
has just concluded that the 3-mark is to be changed, thus this path is not valid.
If there no such path, the channel is marked 2 (Line 12).
If the marking of a channel changes from 3 to 4, all 4-marked parents must be
reconsidered (Line 10). Similarly, if the marking of a channel changes from 3 to 2,
all 4- and 3-marked parents must be reconsidered (Line 13). If the post-processing
considers a 4-marked channel, it checks whether there still exists a valid routing
path to some 3-marked channel (Line 17). If not, it is marked 2 and reconsiders
all 3-marked parents (Lines 18–19).
Main wraps up the two steps. It executes CreateTree for all unmarked chan-
nels c, with CI = Adep(c) and p = c. After this, it executes Post-Processing.
It returns the – possibly empty – set of 3- and 4-marked channels.
7.6 Analysis
7.6.1 Computational Complexity
The algorithm consists of two steps. Algorithm 4, is basically a depth-ﬁrst search
with backwards propagation with O(|A|) recursions.
The running time of the post-processing step is O(|A||C|). The algorithm
loops over a bag of arcs. It starts with 32- and 42-arcs only. For all 32-arcs,
the algorithm adds the destinations labelling the arc to the escapes-array of the
source of the arc (Line 6). This can make the arc either a 42-arc or a 22-arc
(Lines 9–12). For all 42-arcs, the algorithm checks whether the parent of the arc
is correctly labelled 4. This can make the arc a 22-arc. Arcs of type 22 have no
need to be considered, as at all times a mark 2 is deﬁnite. Thus each 32-arc is
considered at most twice and each 42-arc is considered at most once. This yields
O(|A|) recursions. The computational complexity of one recursive call is O(|C|)
in the worst-case, as in order to determine whether a channel must be marked
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Algorithm 5 Post-Processing(CI)
1: if CI = ∅ then
2: return
3: else
4: Pick element c0 from CI
5: if mark(c0) = sensitive then
6: escapes(c0) := escapes(c0) ∪ {d ∈ τ(c0, c1) | mark(c1) = immune}
7: if cyclics(c0) ⊆ escapes(c0) then
8: if ∃πd ·


last(πd) = c0 ∧
mark(πd[0]) = sensitive ∧
d ∈ cyclics(πd[0]) ∧
d /∈ escapes(πd[0]) ∧
|πd| > 1
then
9: mark(c0) = attainable
10: CI := CI ∪ {c ∈ parents(c0) | mark(c) = attainable}
11: else
12: mark(c0) = immune
13: CI := CI ∪ {c ∈ parents(c0) | mark(c) ∈ {sensitive,attainable}}
14: end if
15: end if
16: else if mark(c0) = attainable then
17: if ¬∃πd ·


last(πd) = c0 ∧
mark(πd[0]) = sensitive ∧
d ∈ cyclics(πd[0]) ∧
d /∈ escapes(πd[0]) ∧
|πd| > 1
then
18: mark(c0) = immune
19: CI := CI ∪ {c ∈ parents(c0) | mark(c) = sensitive}
20: end if
21: end if
22: Post-Processing(CI − c0)
23: end if
Algorithm 6 Main
1: for all ci ∈ C do
2: if mark(ci) = 0 then
3: CreateTree(Adep(ci), ci)
4: end if
5: end for
6: Post-Processing(C)
7: return {c ∈ C | mark(c) ∈ {sensitive,attainable}}
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deadlock-attainable the algorithm has to traverse the dependency graph once in
search for a deadlock-sensitive channel.
The running time of Main is the sum of the running times of CreateTree
and Post-Processing. After post-processing it enumerates all 3- and 4-marked
channel in O(|C|) time. The total running time of the algorithm is O(|A||C|).
7.6.2 Correctness
Our algorithm is correct if it returns the empty set if the condition of Theorem 7.2
holds, and if a quasi-deadlock can be constructed from any non-empty result. First,
we prove suﬃciency, i.e., if the algorithm returns the empty set then the network
is deadlock-free. This proof completely follows the intuition of Figure 7.5: after
termination of the algorithm, a deadlock can be created from all deadlock-sensitive
and deadlock-attainable channels. In this proof, we create a set of paths without
an escape. We do not – and cannot – show that this set of paths is pairwise disjoint.
Our algorithm returns true if and only if the network is quasi -deadlock-free.
Lemma 7.5 Assume all non-empty sets of routing paths Π⋆ have an escape.
After termination of Main any channel c is marked 2.
Proof. After termination of the Main, channel c is either marked 2, 3 or 4. The
proof is by contradiction. Assume channel c is marked 3 or 4. We prove that the
set of 3- and 4-marked channels is a set of paths without an escape, contradicting
the assumption. Take the set of paths Π34 obtained by taking for each 3-marked
channel c the singleton path [c] and for each 4-marked channel a routing path lead-
ing to a 3-marked channel. The paths are chosen such that for each routing path
π ∈ Π34 the destination for which the path can be established is in cyclics(π[0])
but not in escapes(π[0]).
Each 3-marked channel c in the set of paths Π34 has a destination d that
is a member of cyclics(c) and not a member of escapes(c), since channels are
marked 3 only if cyclics(c) * escapes(c). Since, if some destination leads to 2-
marked neighbors it is added to escapes(c), destination d does not lead to 2-marked
neighbors. Since destination d does not lead to 2-marked neighbors, it leads to
channels marked 3 or 4 only. Since 1.) the set of paths Π34 contains all 3- and
4-marked channels, since 2.) channel c is the head of a path, and since 3.) there
exists a destination d such that all neighbors are included in Π34, we can conclude
that channel c is not an escape for Π34.
For each 4-marked channel c in the set of paths Π34, there exists a routing
path π towards a 3 marked channel. This routing path can be established for
some destination d. As destination d is a member of cyclics(π[0]) but not in
escapes(π[0]), the head of this path has no escape.
Set of paths Π34 has no escape. It is non-empty, as by assumption channel c
is marked 3 or 4. This assumption is contradicted. Channel c is marked 2.
Secondly, we prove necessity, i.e., if our algorithm returns a non-empty set
there exists a quasi-deadlock-conﬁguration. We prove an invariant: if a channel is
marked deadlock-immune, it cannot be a member of any set of paths without an
escape. This invariant implies that if after termination of the algorithm all channels
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are deadlock-immune, there cannot exist a non-empty set of paths without an
escape. This implies deadlock freedom.
Lemma 7.6 If a channel c is in a set of paths Π⋆ that has no escape, the channel
will not be marked 2.
Proof. The lemma holds initially since all channels are unmarked. We show by in-
duction on CreateTree that this lemma is preserved during this step. The exact
similar argument holds for Post-Processing. Thus the lemma is an invariant
for the algorithm.
Assume some set of routing paths Π, some channel c ∈
⊔
Π, and assume
that Π has no escape. The only reason channel c gets marked 2 is when 1.)
cyclics(c) ⊆ escapes(c) and 2.) there is no routing path towards a 3-marked
channel. We prove that these conditions imply there exists an escape for Π. As
this contradicts our assumption, channel c cannot be marked 2.
First, assume channel c is the head of one of the paths in Π. We show channel
c is an escape. When channel c becomes marked 2 all neighbors of channel c
have been explored. Thus all destinations in τ(c) are either in cyclics(c) or in
escapes(c). Since by 1.) cyclics(c) ⊆ escapes(c), all destinations in τ(c) are in
escapes(c). If a destination is in escapes(c), it leads to a 2-marked neighbor. Thus
for all destinations, there is a 2-marked neighbor. By the Induction Hypothesis,
none of the channels in subgraph
⊔
Π are marked 2. Thus for all destinations
there is a neighbor not in the subgraph. Channel c is an escape for Π.
Now assume channel c is not the head of one of the paths in Π. As channel c is
in the tail of some path π, there exists a routing path from c to the head h = π[0]
of this path. By 2.) there exists no routing path towards a 3-marked channel.
Channel h cannot be marked 3. We have already proven that channel h cannot
be marked 2, as channels at the head of one of the paths in Π cannot be marked
2. We prove that it cannot be marked 4 either. For each 4-marked channel, there
exists a routing path towards a 3-marked channel. Thus there exists a path from
channel c to a 3-marked channel x as well, by appending the path from c to h and
the path from h to x. This contradicts 2.), which states there exists no routing
path towards a 3-marked channel. As channel h cannot be marked 2, 3 or 4, we
have a contradiction. Channel c cannot be not at the head of one of the paths in
Π
If channel c is in
⊔
Π, channel c is not marked 2.
These lemmas suﬃce to prove that the algorithm decides the necessary and
suﬃcient condition of Theorem 7.2.
Theorem 7.3 A network is quasi-deadlock-free if and only if Main returns the
empty set.
Main(N) = ∅ ⇐⇒ Q-DLF(N)
Proof. Theorem 7.2 states that a communication network is quasi-deadlock-free if
and only if all sets of routing paths have an escape. Assume all such sets have an
escape. By Lemma 7.5 all channels will be marked 2 and thus Main returns true.
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Assume Main returns true. Then all channels are marked 2. By Lemma 7.6 there
is no a channel in the union of a set of routing paths without an escape. Thus all
sets of routing paths have an escape.
As a direct consequence of Theorem 7.3, a network is deadlock-free if Main
returns the empty set.
7.7 Proof of co-NP-completeness
To prove co-NP-completeness, we ﬁrst deﬁne the complement of the decision prob-
lem, i.e., the problem of deciding whether there exists a deadlock in a wormhole
network with adaptive routing. This problem will be referred to as WHS-DL. The
proof is a standard problem reduction (see Figure 7.7). We reduce the set packing
problem [83] to WHS-DL. That is, we assume there exists a machine MWHS-DL
that can solve WHS-DL in polynomial time. We show that under this assumption
the set packing problem can be solved in polynomial time as well, by building a
machine MSP. The set packing problem has been shown to be NP-complete [83].
The polynomial transformation from an instance of SP to an instance of WHS-DL is
done by machine τ .
MWHS-DLτ
N
MSP
¬DLF(N)
DLF(N)
k disjoint sets
no k disjoint sets
〈U, S, k〉
Figure 7.7: A reduction of SP to WHS-DL.
Definition 7.2 The Wormhole Switching Deadlock Decision Problem (WHS-DL)
is deﬁned as follows:
Given a communication network N = (P,C) with routing function
R : P × P 7→ P(C), does there exist a deadlock conﬁguration?
Definition 7.3 The Set Packing Problem (SP) is deﬁned as follows:
Given a universal set U = {0, . . . n}, a list of subsets S = s0s1 . . . si where
sj ⊆ U (∀0≤j≤i), and an integer 0 < k ≤ i, does S contain k pairwise disjoint
sets?
The idea behind the transformation is to create a network such that it contains
deadlocks, but these deadlocks can only occur in one speciﬁc area in the network.
This area contains a channel for each integer in U . We will refer to these channels
as U -channels. The network is created in such a way that any deadlock requires
exactly k worms. Furthermore, these worms have to cross the area containing the
U -channels. The routing function creates a route through these channels for each
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set in S. That is, for each set si the network contains a corresponding node si.
This node is used as destination to route through the U -channels corresponding to
set si. If there is a deadlock, there are k pairwise disjoint worms holding channels
of paths created by the routing function for k destinations si, corresponding to k
pairwise disjoint sets in S.
Transformation τ is ﬁrst presented with an example. We give an instance of SP,
i.e., a universal set U , a set of sets S, and a value for k, and transform this instance
to an instance of WHS-DL, i.e., a network N with some routing function R.
7.7.1 Transformation Example
Consider the following instance of SP: U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, S = {s0, s1, s2} =
{{0, 1, 2}, {4, 5}, {2, 4}} and k = 2. There is a set of k pairwise disjoint sets,
namely s0 and s1. We transform this instance to a network and routing function
such that there is a deadlock conﬁguration if and only if there are k pairwise
disjoint sets in S.
Consider the network in Figure 7.8. Two nodes n0 and n1 are located at
respectively the start and the end of an area consisting of ﬁve layers. The middle
layer consists of a set of six U -channels corresponding to the six integers in U .
Each set si has a corresponding node, also called si. As each set si has its own
node – which is a destination for some messages – each set si can be associated
with its own routing. More speciﬁcally, each set si has its own route to get from
n0 to n1, through the U -channels of its set. For example, set s0 = {0, 1, 2} routes
from n0 to n1 through U -channels 0, 1 and 2. At the second and fourth layer,
messages destined for si are routed respectively towards the smallest element in
set si, and from the greatest element in set si. The ﬁrst and ﬁfth layer ensure that
there can be at most k worms traversing the area.
Furthermore, there is a node n2, two channels A and B and a node x. These
elements are needed to create a cycle in the network, thereby making deadlocks
possible. Node x serves only as a destination for a worm holding channels A and
B.
For sake of clarity, nodes x and si are not drawn in Figure 7.8. These nodes
are used only as destinations and not part of any deadlock that might occur.
A worm is drawn in Figure 7.8 in thick lines. It is destined for node s0. The
corresponding set is {0, 1, 2}. At node n0 it could have taken any of the two (k)
channels going to layer 1. From the nodes at layer 1, only one channel can be
taken by a message destined for s0. This channel leads to layer 2, and then to the
U -channel corresponding to integer 0, as 0 is the least element in s0. Then a path
from U -channel 0 to U -channel 1 to U -channel 2 is taken. After all U -channels
corresponding to the set {0, 1, 2} have been taken – in increasing order – the worm
proceeds to any of the nodes at layer 4. Finally, its head is in the channel leading
from layer 4 to node n1.
Each worm that spans channels from n0 to n1 holds the U -channels corres-
ponding to a set si ∈ S. The drawn worm holds U -channels 0, 1 and 2. A worm
from n0 to n1 destined for s2 holds U -channels 2 and 4. A legal conﬁguration
cannot have these two worms simultaneously, as both worms hold U -channel 2.
Analogously, sets s0 and s2 are not pairwise disjoint.
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Figure 7.8: Example of transformation τ
Not all channels of the network are drawn. For all pairs of processing nodes
(p0, p1) such that p0 6= p1 and p0 6∈ {n0, n1}, there is a dedicated channel leading
from p0 to p1. This dedicated channel is used only for messages destined for
p1. Thus, for all processing nodes other than n0 and n1 any message with any
destination can be routed directly to its destination.
Dedicated channels cannot be involved in a deadlock. In a deadlock conﬁg-
uration all dedicated channels are empty, as otherwise a message arrives at its
destination. A header of a message can only be permanently blocked in channels
leading to either n0 or n1.
Consider the conﬁguration where the two left channels A and B are ﬁlled with
a worm destined for x. As n0 has no outgoing dedicated channels, this worm needs
to acquire one of the k channels going out of processing node n0. If all these k
channels are permanently blocked, a deadlock conﬁguration is reached. However,
if one of these channels contain a header, this header will be able to use a dedicated
channel to arrive at its destination. Thus all these k channels must contain tail
ﬂits only. This holds for all channels leading from n0 to the k channels going into
n1. In a deadlock conﬁguration, all of these channels must contain tail ﬂits only.
Besides channel B, the only channels that can contain a header ﬂit that can
be permanently blocked are the k channels going into n1. As processing node n1
has no outgoing dedicated channels, the headers in these channels must acquire
channel A, which is held by a worm. Thus, any deadlock conﬁguration in this
network contains exactly k + 1 worms: one worm holding channels A and B and
k worms holding channels from n0 to n1.
In this example, there were k = 2 pairwise disjoint sets in S, namely s0 =
{0, 1, 2} and s1 = {4, 5}. Thus the translated network must contain a deadlock
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conﬁguration. The channels of the worm concerning s0 have been drawn in thick
lines. There is also a worm for s1 going through channels 4 and 5. These two
worms, together with a worm holding channels A and B constitute a deadlock.
The reason there is a deadlock is that the area of U -channels can be crossed by 2
worms that do not intersect.
In general, if there is a deadlock conﬁguration, apparently there is a way to
construct k worms crossing the area of the U -channels. These worms are pairwise
disjoint. Each worm holds the channels belonging to one of the sets si. Thus k
pairwise disjoint sets in S have been found. Assuming there is an algorithm that
decides WHS-DL in polynomial time, it is possible to create an algorithm deciding
SP in polynomial time. Problem WHS-DL is NP-complete. The complement of this
problem, i.e., deciding deadlock freedom of adaptive routing functions in wormhole
networks, is co-NP-complete.
7.7.2 Formal Proof
Theorem 7.4 WHS-DL is NP-complete. That is:
LSP ∝ LWHS−DL
Proof. We deﬁne a polynomial transformation τ and prove that:
x ∈ LSP ⇐⇒ τ(x) ∈ LWHS−DL
This proof follows the exact intuition in Figure 7.8. First, we formally deﬁne the
transformation τ . Secondly we show that, given k pairwise disjoint sets, we can
create a deadlock conﬁguration in the communication network. All six properties
of Deﬁnition 6.17 hold for this conﬁguration. Lastly, we show that any deadlock
conﬁguration necessarily has k + 1 worms, where k worms cross the area of U -
channels. Since these worms are – by Deﬁnition 6.17 – pairwise disjoint, k pairwise
disjoint paths through the U -channels exist. Each path corresponds to a set in S.
Thus there are k pairwise disjoint subsets in S.
Definition of τ
Given a universal set U = {0, . . . , u′}, a set of subsets S = {s0, . . . si′} and an
integer k′, a communication network Nτ is constructed: Nτ = (Pτ , Cτ ).
We explain set of processing nodes Pτ by Figure 7.8. Nodes n0 and n1 are given.
Node n2 is the node between channels A and B. Nodes n1k and n
4
k (0 ≤ k < k
′)
are the k′ nodes at respectively the ﬁrst and the fourth layer. Nodes n2u and n
3
u
(0 ≤ u ≤ u′) are the u′+1 nodes at respectively the second and third layer. There
is a node x, which serves as separate destination for the worm in channels A and
B. Lastly, each node si (0 ≤ i ≤ i′) serves as destination for the worms crossing
the area of U -channels.
Pτ = {n0, n1, n2} ∪
{n10, . . . n
1
k′−1, n
2
0, . . . , n
2
u′ , n
3
0, . . . , n
3
u′ , n
4
0, . . . , n
4
k′−1, x, s0, . . . , si′}
The set of channels Cτ is deﬁned as follows. There is a channel from n0 to each
node n1k. There is a channel from each node n
1
k to each node n
2
u. There is channel
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for each pair (n2u, n
3
u). For all u < v ≤ u
′, there is a channel from node n3u to n
2
v.
There is a channel from each node n3u to each node n
4
k. There is a channel from
each node n4k to n1. Lastly, there are two channels A and B, respectively from n1
to n2 and from n2 to n0. All channels speciﬁed are identiﬁed by their processing
nodes. E.g. channel A is identiﬁed as (n2, n0).
There is also a set of dedicated channels. For each set of processing nodes
(p0, p1), where p0 /∈ {n0, n1}, there is a dedicated channel identiﬁed as Dp0p1 .
Nodes n0 and n1 have outgoing dedicated channels as well, but not leading to any
of the nodes si or x. This concludes the deﬁnition of the communication network.
Routing function Rτ is deﬁned as follows: given a current node s and a destin-
ation d, always supply the dedicated channel Dsd. Furthermore, adaptively supply
the extra channels for the pairs (s, d) speciﬁed in Table 7.1.
(s, d) Channels
< n0, si > {(n0, n
1
k)}
< n0, x > {(n0, n1k)}
< n1k, si > (n
1
k, n
2
u) if and only if u is the least element of set si
< n2u, si > (n
2
u, n
3
u) if and only if u ∈ si
< n3u, si > (n
3
u, n
2
v) if and only if v is the next element in si after u
< n3u, si > {(n
3
u, n
4
k)} if and only if u is greatest element of si
< n4k, si > (n
4
k, n1)
< n1, si > A
< n1, x > A
< n2, x > B
Table 7.1
This routing function only requires the current node and the destination node
to compute the set of next hops. Its type is therefore P×P 7→ P(C) and it satisﬁes
our assumption that routing is memoryless. A worm spanning channels from n0
to n1 crosses the U -channels in increasing order.
Proof
(=⇒)
Assume a universal set U = {0, . . . , u′}, a set of subsets S = {s0, . . . si′} and an
integer k′. Also, assume that there exists k′ pairwise disjoint sets in S. Let L be
a list of k′ indices such that for all indices i and j in L (i 6= j), sets si and sj have
an empty intersection.
We show that the transformation has a deadlock. This deadlock is obtained by
creating k′+1 worms. One worm, destined for destination x, holds channels A and
B. Each worm wk (0 ≤ k < k′) is destined for sL[k]. The tail holds the following
channels: (n0, n1k) and the intermediate path of (non-dedicated) channels supplied
by the routing function from n1k to n
4
k for destination sL[k]. The head of the worm
holds channel (n4k, n1). Each channel c of a worm is ﬁlled with exactly cap(c) ﬂits.
To show that this is a deadlock, the six properties of a deadlock conﬁguration
have to be discharged. Properties (1) and (5) clearly hold. These respectively
state that buﬀer capacities are not exceeded and that no header ﬂit has arrived
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at its destination. Property (2) states that each channel has ﬂits belonging to
one message only. Channels (n0, n1k) and (n
4
k, n1) are ﬁlled with ﬂits belonging
to worm wk only. The channels of the intermediate paths are ﬁlled with ﬂits be-
longing to one worm, as all sets sL[k] are pairwise disjoint. Property (3) holds,
as for each worm wk both the starting channel (n0, n1k), the last channel (n
4
k, n1)
and the channels of the intermediate path are supplied for destination sL[k]. The
conﬁguration is non-empty, as k > 0, and thus Property (4) holds. As for Property
(6), the worm holding channels A and B has no available next hops as node n0
has no dedicated channel for destination x and all channels (n0, n1k) are ﬁlled with
tails of the worms wk. As for the worms wk, as node n1 has no dedicated channels
for any of the destinations si, all these worms require channel A. This channel is
unavailable. The created deadlock is a legal conﬁguration which satisﬁes all six
properties.
(⇐=)
Assume a communication network Nτ and a routing function Rτ , result of the
transformation τ(x), where x = 〈U, S, k′〉. Also, assume a deadlock conﬁgura-
tion σ. We show that there exists k′ pairwise disjoint subsets in S.
In Nτ , any deadlock conﬁguration satisﬁes the following constraints. First, any
deadlock conﬁguration has k′ worms, whose tails start in the channels (n0, n1k),
and whose heads are in the channels (n4k, n1). Lastly, any deadlock conﬁguration
has a worm holding channels A and B.
This is shown by analysis of the possible locations of the headers of the worms
in the deadlock. In a deadlock, a header cannot be in a dedicated channel, as
this contradicts Property (5) of the deadlock deﬁnition. If the dedicated channel
contains tail ﬂits only, a header has arrived at is destination and all these ﬂits
will eventually evacuate the network. In a deadlock conﬁguration all dedicated
channels are empty.
This implies that any channel leading to a dedicated channel for all destinations
cannot contain a header ﬂit. Otherwise Property (6) is contradicted. Since all
channels lead to dedicated channels for all destinations, except for channel B and
the channels (n4k, n1), the header ﬂits of a deadlock must be in these channels.
There are no dependency cycles in the area of U -channels, as the routing func-
tion supplies all channels (n2u, n
3
u) in increasing order. Thus between nodes n0 and
n1 there are no dependency cycles. The only other channels are A and B and the
only other dependency is from A to B. Thus any cycle in the dependency graph
of Nτ contains the dependency from A to B. As any deadlock necessarily contains
a dependency cycle [36], channels A and B must be ﬁlled. Channel A cannot
contain a header, implying that channels A and B contain a worm. This worm is
destined for destination x, as channel B contains the header of this worm and can
only contain messages destined for x. The worm cannot hold any other channels
than A and B: all channels (n4k, n1) are not supplied by Rτ for destination x.
This worm has k′ possible next hops: the channels (n0, n1k). Thus all these
channels must be ﬁlled with tail ﬂits. This requires k′ diﬀerent worms, as it is
impossible to route - for one destination - from channel (n0, n1k) to another channel
(n0, n
1
l ). This holds because channel B is only supplied for messages destined for
x and channels (n4k, n1) are only supplied for destinations si.
Thus σ has k′ + 1 worms. Each worm wk starts in node n0 and ends at node
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n1. Each worm wk has as destination si for some i, as its header is in some
channel (n4k, n1) and this channel can only be used by messages destined for some
si. Furthermore, there are no two worms with the same destination si, as this
implies they would intersect at the channels (n2u, n
3
u) with u ∈ si. Thus each worm
wk corresponds – one to one – to a destination si.
Each channel (n2u, n
3
u) corresponds to an element u ∈ U . Each destination si
routes a worm through channel (n2u, n
3
u) if and only if u ∈ si. Since 1.) the k
′
worms are destined for diﬀerent si, 2.) each worm holds a path from n0 to n1,
3.) each path from n0 to n1 for destination si holds channels corresponding to the
set of si, and 4.) all worms are pairwise disjoint, there are k′ sets in S that are
pairwise disjoint.
7.7.3 Deadlock Freedom versus Deadlock Prediction
The only other paper devoted to the computational complexity of deadlock related
problems in wormhole networks is that of Di Ianni [78]. Di Ianni proves that pre-
dicting deadlock in wormhole networks is co-NP-complete. Arbib et al. prove a
similar result for store-and-forward networks [2]. The deadlock prediction problem
(DP) consists in deciding if a given conﬁguration will necessarily result in a dead-
lock. Deadlock prediction could be of beneﬁt to deadlock avoidance mechanisms,
whereas deciding deadlock freedom of a routing function could be of beneﬁt to
deadlock prevention.
The result of this section – co-NP-completeness of deciding deadlock freedom
– is not implied by co-NP-completeness of DP. For store-and-forward networks,
DP is co-NP-complete whereas our problem can be solved in linear time by the
algorithm presented in this chapter. The problems concern two related but in-
herently diﬀerent questions. Problem DP concerns the question whether, given
some conﬁguration, all traces will eventually result in a deadlock conﬁguration,
i.e., whether some conﬁguration is bound to deadlock. Our problem concerns the
question whether there is deadlock conﬁguration reachable from the empty con-
ﬁguration, i.e., whether the empty conﬁguration might result in a deadlock.
n0n1
n2
n3
m0
m2
m1A
Figure 7.9: Example configuration.
We provide an example to stress the diﬀerence. Consider the network in Fig-
ure 7.9. The network contains three messages m0, m1 and m2 destined for n0, n1
and n2. Messages m0 and m2 arrive at intermediate node n1. Both messages need
to be forwarded to channel A. As this channel is empty, the conﬁguration is not
in deadlock yet. Depending on which message is chosen, the conﬁguration results
in a deadlock. If m2 is chosen, it will arrive at its destination and eventually all
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messages will evacuate the network. If m0 is chosen, the cycle will be ﬁlled and
all messages will be permanently blocked.
The deadlock prediction problem concerns the question whether this conﬁgur-
ation is bound to end in a deadlock. In our example this is not the case, as there
is a trace such that all messages evacuate the network. The deadlock prevention
problem addressed in this section concerns the question whether there exists a
reachable deadlock conﬁguration. In our example this is the case. The two prob-
lems are inherently diﬀerent from each other. A decision procedure for one of these
problems cannot be applied to the other. The proofs are completely diﬀerent as
well.
7.8 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no deadlock detection algorithms exist for packet
networks. For wormhole networks, the work of Taktak et al. is the only research
related to automatic detection of deadlocks in a network model similar to our
network model.
Taktak et al. ﬁrst presented an algorithm for proving wormhole networks
deadlock-free [137]. They extended Duato’s condition (see Section 6.7) with de-
pendencies between diﬀerent types of messages. They assume that there exists
an ordering between these message types [68]. Their condition is suﬃcient for
deadlock freedom, but not necessary. An algorithm is presented that checks this
condition automatically.
Taktak et al. continued with a polynomial algorithm checking a necessary and
suﬃcient condition [138]. This condition – presented in Section 6.9 – does not
include message dependencies. Their algorithm ﬁrst breaks down the dependency
graph into strongly connected components. A theorem is proven that it suﬃces
to check for deadlocks in these strongly connected components instead of checking
the dependency graph monolithically. They then search for a strongly connected
component where there exists a channel that cannot be tagged according to their
tagging condition.
As argued in Section 6.9, their condition is only suﬃcient, and not neces-
sary. Their algorithm outputs false deadlocks. Indeed, their algorithm searches
for quasi-deadlocks, just as the algorithm presented in this chapter.
The observable diﬀerences between the algorithms lie in the assumptions and
the computational complexity. In contrast to our algorithm, Taktak et al. require
the network to be livelock- and starvation-free. The computational complexity of
their algorithm is O(|P |4), where P is the set of processing nodes in the network.
Our wormhole algorithm is one degree lower in complexity. Taktak et al. imple-
mented their algorithm in the tool ODI and provide experimental results. In the
next chapter, we present industrial and real-life applications of our algorithms.
Experimental results will be given, and we will compare the performance of our
algorithms with that of Taktak et al.
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7.9 Conclusion
We have presented algorithms to search for deadlocks in communication networks.
For packet networks, we deﬁned an algorithm with a computational complexity
linear in the number of channels in the network. For wormhole networks, we have
shown that a polynomial algorithm does not exist, assuming co-NP does not equal
P. This is due to the fact that worms cannot intersect. We have deﬁned the notion
of quasi-deadlocks, where this fact is disregarded. A polynomial algorithm has
been deﬁned to search for quasi-deadlocks in wormhole networks.
Given a speciﬁcation of the topology and the routing function, our algorithms
are push-button solutions for ﬁnding deadlocks. In case of deadlock, our algorithms
provide detailed feedback. These properties, and their low computational complex-
ity, makes them usable as debugging tools for designers.
At this point, two versions of both algorithms exist: an eﬃcient implementation
in C and a non-executable speciﬁcation in ACL2. Our utmost objective is to make
the ACL2-speciﬁcation eﬃciently runnable. If the ACL2-implementations decide
deadlock freedom, this result can be regarded as a mechanized proof. This way, we
can have formal veriﬁcation play a useful role in the design process of Networks-
on-Chip.
The next chapter will present some applications of these algorithms. An inter-
esting application of our fast algorithms is the veriﬁcation of fault-tolerant network
designs or designs with irregular routing.
In Part II, productivity is broken down into several smaller proof obligations.
The largest and most diﬃcult proof obligation to discharge is deadlock freedom.
The algorithms in this chapter solve this issue. In the next chapter, we present
the tool DCI2, which uses the algorithms presented in this chapter to discharge
all proof obligations required for proving productivity. This yields a push-button
solution for proving productivity of communication networks.
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Applications
The previous chapter presented deadlock detection algorithms. The purpose of
these algorithms is to be of use to a designer of communication networks. In
this chapter, we incorporate the algorithms in the tool DCI2. DCI2 adds various
features to the algorithms that are necessary to make them valuable in practice.
We provide experimental results on some basic benchmarks on six diﬀerent
routing functions in four diﬀerent topologies. We then present two more complex
examples in detail. Both examples are based on the Network-based Processor
Array (NePA) [4, 3, 89]. The ﬁrst example extends the traditional NePA architec-
ture with a routing function that dynamically routes around faults. Even though
this introduces circular dependencies in some faulty conﬁgurations, the network
remains deadlock-free. This routing logic is the result of a collaboration with the
University of California, Irvine (UCI). The second example – taken from Wang et
al. [144] – extends NePA with on-chip wireless communication. Because not all
processing nodes have wireless routers, routing becomes irregular and diﬃcult to
verify manually. DCI2 eﬃciently ﬁnds deadlocks.
8.1 DCI2
A major extension of our deadlock detection algorithms deals with the possibility
to verify fault-tolerant routing functions. The design of a deadlock-free fault-
tolerant routing function is often diﬃcult, as absence of deadlocks must be assessed
for many diﬀerent faulty conﬁgurations. The design might be deadlock-free in
many cases, but a speciﬁc combination of faults may cause a deadlock. DCI2 can
aid in both the design and the veriﬁcation of such routing functions.
DCI2 takes as input a description of the topology and a C++ implementation
of the routing function. Our tool has the following features:
• The tool checks whether the model of the routing function is correct with
respect to the topology. In the hardware it is impossible for a packet to be
routed through channels that do not exist. The model written in C++ code
however can route, e.g., a packet west at the left-most column, or route
diagonally even when a diagonal channel does not exist. The tool detects
such errors and outputs them.
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• The tool takes as input a basic fault model. Common fault models are “as-
sume at most two channels can be faulty” or “assume at most one router is
faulty”. The tool checks the number of available cores in the current machine,
splits up the set of faulty conﬁgurations to check under the fault model, and
executes the algorithm on these conﬁgurations in parallel. It provides 100%
coverage in the cases considered.
• The tool checks whether the routing function is connected. In a fault-tolerant
design, it is possible that in some combination of faults, a packet arriving at
a processing node has no path to its destination. If this is the case, the tool
outputs exactly which packet in which channel with which destination has
no next hops.
• The tool detects livelocks. In fault-tolerant designs, livelock can be hard to
ﬁnd manually. When encountering faults, packets may need to be sent back
to where they came from. During the computation of the dependencies, the
tool checks whether scenarios exist in which one packet gets into a cycle. For
the isolated network model, this is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
livelock. If a livelock has been found, we report the exact trace leading to
this cycle and the cycle itself.
• The tool provides quantitative output. In fault-tolerant designs, one may be
interested to know how many of the faulty conﬁgurations yield a deadlock or
livelock. We have added a command-line option to let the algorithm assemble
quantitative information on how many of the conﬁgurations are correct, how
many contain deadlocks, livelocks, etc. In the next section we will provide
more details on this.
Because DCI2 requires only little user input and it returns results quickly, it
can be used as a debugging tool during the design of interconnects and routing
functions. Our fault-tolerant routing function has been obtained this way: start
with a simple routing function, and then recursively detect erroneous scenarios
and adapt the routing logic until a correct result has been obtained.
8.2 Benchmarks
Figure 8.1 shows results on some standard routing functions. All experiments have
been performed on a 2.93 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo computer, with 2 GB memory.
We present the results on the wormhole algorithm. For the packet algorithm, all
running times are less or equal.
2D Mesh – XY [103]
XY routing is a deterministic routing function for two-dimensional meshes used
in, e.g., the HERMES chip [99]. Messages are routed ﬁrst along the X-axis and
then along the Y-axis. It is deadlock-free, as there are no cyclic dependencies. We
have veriﬁed this for a mesh with 4225 nodes and 16900 channels in 0.31 seconds.
2D Mesh – West-First [61]
West-ﬁrst routing is an adaptive routing function for two-dimensional meshes. Our
algorithm needed 1.49 seconds for a 65 by 65 mesh with 16900 channels.
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2D Mesh – Shortest Path [138]
Shortest path routing is an adaptive routing function, which routes messages along
the shortest path. It is not deadlock-free. Our algorithm ﬁnds a deadlock in 0.87
seconds for a 65 by 65 mesh with 16900 channels.
Double 2D Mesh – Shortest path with XY [138]
There are two virtual channels in each direction between the processing nodes.
One of the channels is used for the adaptive shortest path routing function. The
other channel is used for the deterministic XY routing function. The network is
deadlock-free, even though there are cyclic dependencies. Our algorithm returns
true in 110,07 seconds for a 45 by 45 mesh with 16200 channels.
Spidergon – Shortest path [31, 32]
Spidergon STNoC is an architecture developed by STMicroelectronics. The Spider-
gon topology is a ring where each node has a channel going clockwise, counter-
clockwise, and across. Its shortest path routing function is deterministic. We have
formalized an implementation of the Spidergon without virtual channels. This
implementation has deadlocks, and we checked this for the Spidergon chip with
eight processing nodes, i.e., the Octagon chip [82].
Double ring – AAD
We have designed a new adaptive routing function for Spidergon. There are two
virtual channels in the counter- and clockwise-direction between the processing
nodes on the ring. AAD routing – for Adaptive-Across-Deterministic – routes a
message ﬁrst adaptively in any direction. Once it has taken an across-channel, it
is deterministically routed towards its destination. Our algorithm proves that it is
deadlock-free in 65,12 seconds for a network with 2048 nodes and 12288 channels.
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Figure 8.1: Experimental results
As Figure 8.1 shows, our algorithm performs signiﬁcantly better on XY and
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Figure 8.2: NePA Mesh Network, where the bold arrows denote physical links between
the subnetworks used for fault-tolerant routing.
West-First routing than on "Shortest Path with XY" and AAD routing. This is
due to the fact that the ﬁrst two routing functions are deadlock-free because there
are no cyclic dependencies. In such cases, our algorithm performs exactly like a
regular cycle detection algorithm and terminates in linear time.
8.3 NePA with Fault-tolerant Routing
We shortly introduce the NePA architecture. Both this architecture and the ex-
tensions presented in this chapter are realistic and feasible examples of Networks-
on-Chip, as they have been implemented in synthesizable HDL. For a discussion
on feasibility, performance and scalability, we refer to the original paper of Bahn
et al. [4].
In the NePA NoC system, processing nodes are mapped to a two dimensional
mesh network of routers. The routers are connected through physical links, i.e., the
channels. Horizontally, there is one eastern and one western channel between two
adjacent routers. Vertically, there are two northern and two southern channels.
The NePA NoC design can be viewed as two subnetworks where Subnetwork 1
transports eastbound traﬃc and Subnetwork 2 transports westbound traﬃc. Fig-
ure 8.2 illustrates connections between routers. As the two subnetworks separate
east- and westbound traﬃc, no dependency cycles occur. Consequently there are
no deadlocks. The fault-tolerant extension presented in this section introduces
physical links to add the capability to switch between subnetworks. These new
links introduce dependency cycles.
Figure 8.3 shows the design of a router. Each router has ports for each in-
coming channel. For example, the western in-port contains traﬃc that is going
in the eastern direction. The router is divided into two subrouters, one for each
subnetwork. For example, as the western in-port contains traﬃc heading in the
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Figure 8.3: NePA Router, where the bold arrows denote physical links between the
subnetworks used for fault-tolerant routing [4].
eastern direction, it is connected to the subrouter belonging to Subnetwork 1.
In a subrouter, each in-port is connected to a Header Processing Unit (HPU)
which can receive a header ﬂit, process the destination address and send out a
request to the proper output ports. There is one HPU per incoming channel. The
arbiters of the output ports grant one of the requests from the HPUs and reserve
the output port until a packet transfer is completed. After that, the output port
is released for other packets.
Figure 8.4 shows a detailed block diagram of a subrouter. Highlighted is the
HPU that is connected to the the western in-port. The east-bound traﬃc in this
port is directed to the north, east, or south arbiters of Subnetwork 1. These re-
quests are denoted by W_to_N1_req, W_to_E_req, and W_to_S1_req. Traﬃc
can also be directed to the local arbiter connected to the processing node.
To support fault-tolerant routing, some modiﬁcations of the original design are
needed. Information on faulty links is passed between routers through wires. We
assume that the NoC architecture is equipped with Design For Test technology
[142, 66]. These Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) mechanisms detect faults in links and
switches and update the links’ status information accordingly. Between two sub-
routers, physical links are added to move a packet between the two subnetworks
(see Figure 8.3). A ﬁfth outgoing link W_to_SUB2_req is added to the HPU
depicted in Figure 8.4 to request a switch from Subnetwork 1 to Subnetwork 2.
8.3.1 Routing Logic
The routing logic is contained in the HPU structures. Figure 8.4 shows the HPU
that is connected to the western in-port. We show the details of the routing logic
for this HPU, other HPUs are similar.
The intuition behind our routing logic is the following:
1. If there are no faulty channels, always supply all minimal routes.
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Figure 8.4: Header Processing Unit, where the bold links are used to switch to the other
subnetwork for fault-tolerant routing.
2. If there are faulty channels, take all shortest routes around these faulty
channels that do not cause deadlock or livelock.
Routes are restricted only when they are the cause of deadlock or livelock. Since
many diﬀerent faulty conﬁgurations exist, yielding many exotic corner cases, the
routing logic becomes very intricate and extensive. It has been obtained by con-
tinuously debugging the current routing logic, adding case distinctions where ne-
cessary, and rerunning DCI2.
If there are no faults, the routing logic equals a minimal adaptive shortest
path routing logic. This routing logic can already handle some faults, as there
may be alternative paths to reach a destination. In some cases, the minimal
shortest path routing does not provide more than one path. For example, when
the source and destination are in the same row or column, one fault may cause the
routing function to become disconnected. Two approaches can make the routing
logic fault-tolerant: either more paths must be supplied or the routing logic must
prevent routing towards an area where the destination is no longer reachable.
Starting with the minimal routing logic, we have incremented the logic step-by-
step with case distinctions to handle faults. Each adaptation is designed in such a
way that it takes minimal routes around the set of faults. Figure 8.5 shows routes
supplied by the routing logic in diﬀerent faulty conﬁgurations. With no faults,
all minimal routes are supplied (see Figure 8.5a). In Figure 8.5b there is a faulty
channel between the current position and the destination. When multiple routes
around a fault are possible, all routes that do not cause deadlocks or livelocks will
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be supplied. Figure 8.5c provides an example where there are two faults between
the current position and the destination. In this particular case, the length of the
minimal route increases due to the faults. Figure 8.5d provides an example where
switching between subnetworks is inevitable. Consequently, dependency cycles are
inevitable as well.
c
d
(a) No faults
c d
(b) One horizontal
fault
c
d
(c) Two horizontal
faults
c
d
(d) Two vertical
faults
Figure 8.5: Routes supplied by the routing logic. Processing nodes c and d are the
current node and the destination node respectively. The crossed channels are faulty.
The eastbound routing logic is split up into three parts: the destination is
either south-east of the current processing node, north-east, or east at the current
row. We start with describing the south-east logic (see Algorithm 7).
Signal OK(d) returns 1 if and only if the channel indicated by direction d exists
and is non-faulty. If a second direction is supplied, OK(d1, d2) returns 1 if and
only if the channel reached by ﬁrst performing a step in direction d1 and then in
direction d2 exists and is non-faulty. For example, at router (0, 1) signal OK(N1)
will return 1 if and only if the north channel of Subnetwork 1 from (0, 1) to (0, 0)
is non-faulty. Signal OK(N1, N1) will return 0, as (0, 0) has no northern channels.
A request to an arbiter is performed by setting the corresponding request bit
to 1, i.e., the statement “W_to_S1_req = 1” requests the southern channel of
Subnetwork 1 of the current router.
Without any faults, we can simply supply the eastern and the southern chan-
nels. Line 2 supplies the eastern channel as next hop. The conjunction in Line 1
contains the conditions under which we route east. First of all, the eastern chan-
nel must exist and be non-faulty, i.e., OK(E) must return 1. The second conjunct
prevents routing eastwards in one particular case. Consider Figure 8.6a. The des-
tination is in the column at the end of the eastern channel and the two channels
leading south are both faulty. If we route east, then subsequently we have to route
around the two faulty channels. This rerouting means that either we go east or
west. Going east results in three extra hops and one extra switch from Subnetwork
2 to Subnetwork 1. It also yields a livelock. Going west results in three extra hops
and two switches between subnetworks. We therefore prevent going east, if the
destination is in the next column and the two southern channels are faulty.
A similar restriction is needed for turning south (Line 4). This restriction is
more severe: We never route south, if the channel in eastern direction at the end
of the southern channel is faulty. This is to exclude some livelocks. An example
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Algorithm 7 South-East Routing Logic of West In-Port
1: if OK(E)∧
(dx > cx+ 1 ∨ (dx = cx+ 1 ∧ (OK(E,S1) ∨OK(E,S2)))) then
2: W_to_E_req = 1;
3: end if
4: if OK(S) ∧OK(S,E) ∧ (! OK(E) ∨OK(S2)) then
5: W_to_S1_req = 1;
6: end if
7: if W_to_E_req = 0 ∧W_to_S1_req = 0 then
8: if OK(N1) then
9: W_to_N1_req = 1;
10: else
11: Set intermediate destination to south
12: W_to_SUB2_req = 1;
13: end if
14: end if
(a) (b)
Figure 8.6: Routes prevented by the routing logic. Processing nodes c and d are the
current node and the destination node respectively. The crossed channels are faulty.
occurs if – at the bottom of the mesh – both the eastern channels of the bottom
two rows are faulty (see Figure 8.6b). If we would route south from node c even
though channel E1 is faulty, we end up in a situation where the only possible next
route is a 180 turn back north leading back to node c. As we do not remember the
path taken by the packet, the routing logic will supply the south channel again,
yielding a livelock.
Line 4 enforces a second restriction for going south. A packet is not routed
towards the southern direction if one of the southern channels is faulty, when
the eastern route is available. This restriction prevents some peculiar deadlocks
which occur with some speciﬁc combinations of two faulty channels. Consider
Figure 8.7a, where channels (0, 0, S2) and (1, 1, N1) are faulty. Let pE denote an
eastbound packet occupying channel (0, 0, S1). Without the restriction, packet
pE can be routed towards both the eastern and the southern directions. In this
particular deadlock conﬁguration, it has chosen to go south and occupies (0, 0, S1).
As there is only one available southern channel from (0, 0), all western going traﬃc
uses this channel as well. So an eastbound packet in (0, 0, S1) blocks westbound
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traﬃc. Similarly, all eastbound traﬃc now uses channel (1, 1, N2) since channel
(1, 1, N1) is faulty. So a westbound packet in (1, 1, N1) can block eastbound
traﬃc. We will refer to this packet with pW . This completes a circular wait.
However, for adaptive routing, a circular wait is not suﬃcient for a deadlock. The
minimum deadlock in this particular conﬁguration consists of three intertwined
circular waits.
(0,1)
(1,2)
(1,1)
(1,0) (1,0)
(1,0)
p
E
p
W
(a) Deadlock with two faulty
channels
(0,1)
(1,2)
(1,2)
(1,0)
(0,0)
(b) Channel dependency graph
Figure 8.7: Deadlock occurring with two faults and the dependency graph depicting the
three circular waits that constitute the deadlock.
Due to these restrictions, in some cases no next hops have been supplied at
this point (Line 7). For example, this is the case when both the eastern channel
and the southern channel in Subnetwork 1 are faulty. To minimize the number of
subnetwork switches, we ﬁrst try to route north in the current subnetwork (Line 9).
If this channel is faulty or if we are at the top of the mesh, we switch subnetwork
and route south (Lines 11 and 12).
Algorithm 8 provides the routing logic in case the destination is eastbound on
the current row.
If the eastern channel is not faulty, we simply go east (Line 2 of Algorithm 8).
If this is not possible, then it must be determined whether the packet is routed
north or south around the faulty channel. To prevent livelocks, the next hop is
chosen such that is has at least one non-faulty channel in the current subnetwork
(Lines 4 and 7). As shown in Figure 8.8, if a packet destined for (1, 1) is injected
in (0, 0) it is ﬁrst routed south as the destination is south. At (0, 1), the packet
must be prevented from going back north, as otherwise a livelock occurs. As in
this case both OK(N,E) and OK(N,N1) will yield false, the packet will not be
routed north.
This will always route around a faulty eastern channel, except when the packet
is at either the bottom or the top of the mesh (Lines 11 and 14). Consider the
case at the top of the mesh. Channel S1 is faulty as otherwise Line 7 would have
applied. So a switch between subnetworks is necessary. The routing logic requests
channel S2. Similarly, at the bottom of the mesh, channel N2 is requested.
At this point, the south-east and the east routing logic have been described.
The north-east logic is similar to the south-east logic. Two cases are left: the
destination is north or south in the current column. We describe the southern
case (Algorithm 9).
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Algorithm 8 East Routing Logic of West In-Port
1: if OK(E) then
2: W_to_E_req = 1;
3: else
4: if OK(N1) ∧ (OK(N,E) ∨OK(N,N1)) then
5: W_to_N1_req = 1;
6: end if
7: if OK(S1) ∧ (OK(S,E) ∨OK(S,N1)) then
8: W_to_S1_req = 1;
9: end if
10: if W_to_N1_req = 0 ∧W_to_S1_req = 0 then
11: if cy = DIMY− 1 then
12: Set intermediate destination to north
13: W_to_SUB2_req = 1;
14: else if cy = 0 then
15: Set intermediate destination to south
16: W_to_SUB2_req = 1;
17: end if
18: end if
19: end if
Figure 8.8: Livelock scenario prevented by the routing logic. Processing nodes c and
d are the current node and the destination node respectively. The crossed channels are
faulty.
When the packet has arrived in the correct column, it is routed south towards
its destination without leaving the column. It can use both subnetworks. If it
uses the current subnetwork only, deadlocks will occur. The packet leaves the
column only if both the vertical channels leading towards the destination are faulty
(Lines 7–14 of Algorithm 9).
8.3.2 Results
We have run the tool on meshes of diﬀerent sizes (see Table 8.1). These results
have been obtained on a Sun Fire X4440 machine, with four 2.3GHz Quad-Core
AMD Opteron 8356 processors (16 cores in total) and 128 GB of memory. For
each mesh, the routing function is proven deadlock-free, livelock-free, connected
and correct in all faulty conﬁgurations.
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Algorithm 9 South Routing Logic of West In-Port
1: if OK(S1) then
2: W_to_S1_req = 1;
3: end if
4: if OK(S2) then
5: W_to_SUB2_req = 1;
6: end if
7: if W_to_S1_req = 0 ∧W_to_SUB2_req = 0 then
8: if OK(E) then
9: req_east = 1;
10: else
11: Set intermediate destination to west
12: W_to_SUB2_req = 1;
13: end if
14: end if
Mesh Number of configs Time (hh:mm:ss)
8x8 73,536 00:01:07
10x10 179,700 00:05:35
12x12 372,816 00:22:07
14x14 690,900 00:58:58
16x16 1,178,880 04:30:24
18x18 1,888,596 09:59:16
20x20 2,878,800 22:51:21
Table 8.1: Results with 2 faults
We have also run the algorithm on a 4x3 mesh with more than two faults.
We let the algorithm assemble quantitative information (see Table 8.2). As the
number of faults increases, the number of deadlocks and livelocks increase. Note
that these results hold for a relatively small mesh. In larger meshes, we expect
the percentages to be lower, as there will be more separate faults which do not
interact with each other.
Faults 3 4 5
Conﬁgs 59640 1,028,790 13,991,544
Topology violation 0% 0% 0%
Disconnected routing 0.07% 0.26% 0.64%
Deadlock 0.24% 0.89% 2.04%
Livelock 0.09% 0.31% 0.69%
Table 8.2: Results with more than 2 faults in a 4x3 mesh.
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Figure 8.9: Topology of Wireless NoC [144]
8.4 NePA with Wireless Routers
Wang et al. design and analyze a hybrid NoC system where the standard wired on-
chip communication coexists with on-chip wireless communication technology [144].
This hybrid structure is called Wireless NoC (WNoC).
Wireless communication can improve performance of the chip in terms of
latency, throughput and power consumption. However, a sophisticated routing
logic is required to determine which messages are sent wirelessly and which are
not. We introduce the topology and the routing logic. For a more extensive ex-
planation, and for a detailed analysis of performance and feasibility of wireless
on-chip communication, we refer to the paper of Wang et al. [144].
Wang et al. constructed the WNoC by replacing some of the routers in the
NePA architecture with wireless routers (WRs). The topology is split up into
quadrants (see Figure 8.9). Each quadrant contains one wireless router connected
to the processing node in the middle of the quadrant. Each wireless router can
communicate with all three other wireless routers.
The WNoC contains deadlocks, if no additional measures are taken such as
virtual channels or restrictions on the routing logic to prevent messages from us-
ing WRs under speciﬁc conditions. We have speciﬁed the WNoC without such
additional constructs, and therefore found deadlocks.
8.4.1 Routing Logic
Algorithm 10 contains the routing logic of WNoC as formalized for our tool. Func-
tion NePA_routing formalizes the standard minimal adaptive routing in NePA.
This function takes as parameters a current processing node and the destination
and returns a set of next hops.
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Algorithm 10 Routing Logic of WNoC
Require: Current node c;
Require: Destination d;
1: HW = distance to destination using WRs;
2: HB = distance to destination using wires only;
3: if HW < HB − δ ∧ quadrant(c) 6= quadrant(d) then
4: dWR = WR in current quadrant;
5: if c 6= dWR then
6: return NePA_routing(c, dWR)
7: else
8: Transmit wirelessly;
9: end if
10: else
11: return NePA_routing(c, d)
12: end if
Line 3 decides whether the message will use a WR. In the WNoC, the decision
to transmit messages wirelessly is based on the distance from the current location
to the destination. A WR is used if it takes signiﬁcantly more steps to arrive at the
destination using wires only than using WRs. Signiﬁcance is expressed using some
predeﬁned but constant value δ: the higher δ, the more the WRs will be used.
If the diﬀerence between the number of steps taken wirelessly and the number
of steps taken using wires only is greater than δ, the routing logic will send the
packet towards a WR.
If the message makes use of the WR, it is ﬁrst routed towards it (Line 6). If
it has arrived at the WR, it will be transmitted wirelessly to the quadrant of its
destination (Line 8). From this point on, it will be routed towards its destination
in the regular way (Line 11).
8.4.2 Results
Figure 8.10 gives an example of a deadlock conﬁguration found by DCI2. We have
set δ to 2. Each worm W is destined for processing node dW . Worm A is injected
at (9, 3). The wired distance to its destination is 10 hops. The distance using WRs
(in this case WR (7, 2)) is 8. The wireless distance is less than the wired distance,
but for δ = 2 the diﬀerence is not considered signiﬁcant and the message is routed
without making use of WRs. Worm A is blocked by worm B, which for similar
reasons uses wires only. Worm B, on its turn, is blocked by worm C. Worm D
blocks worm C. It is injected at (4, 0) and destined for (6, 9). The wired distance
is 11, whereas the distance using WR (2, 2) is 8. As 11− 8 = 3, the yield of using
a WR is deemed signiﬁcant. Worm D is ﬁrst routed west to WR (2, 2), routed
wirelessly, and subsequently is routed towards its destination. Finally, worm A
blocks worm D, completing the circular wait.
The circulair wait is not necessarily a deadlock, as routing is adaptive. In this
conﬁguration, all four worms have no escapes. The conﬁguration is therefor a
deadlock.
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Figure 8.10: Deadlock in WNoC. The squares are the WRs.
We have deﬁned the wireless routing logic for a 10x10 mesh. Deadlocks are
found instantaneously. We have experimented with diﬀerent values for δ. Any
δ ≤ 8 yields a deadlock. For δ > 8, the wireless routers are not used at all,
meaning that the routing logic equals a deadlock-free minimal adaptive routing.
8.5 Comparison to Taktak et al.
Taktak et al. present the deadlock checking tool ODI [138] (see Section 7.8 at
Page 129). The algorithmic complexity of their algorithm is O(N4), whereas our
tool checks for deadlock-freedom of wormhole networks in O(N3). Figure 8.11
shows a comparison with our solution for the “Shortest Path with XY” routing
function. This graph shows that the the theoretical improvement in algorithmic
complexity is reﬂected in experimental results as well.
Zhang et al. present the application of ODI to a fault-tolerant routing func-
tion [149]. ODI is used to establish deadlock freedom of their design in all con-
ﬁgurations with one fault in a 10x10 mesh. The total number of conﬁgurations
that needed to be checked is about 800. We analyze our fault tolerant routing
logic in all the conﬁgurations with two faults in a 20x20 mesh. This amounts to
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Figure 8.11: Comparison to Taktak et al.
checking 2,878,800 conﬁgurations. Additionally, DCI2 establishes livelock freedom
and connectedness as well.
8.6 Conclusion
The tool DCI2 has been presented that checks for deadlocks, livelocks, topology
violations and connectedness of the routing logic. Diﬀerent faulty conﬁgurations
are veriﬁed in parallel, so that deadlocks are found quickly. DCI2 can produce
quantitative results on how many conﬁgurations are correct.
Basically, we have applied DCI2 as a debugging tool for programming routing
logic. Initially, we ran the tool on the NePA topology with simple minimal adaptive
routing logic. With two faults, the tool quickly found a conﬁguration in which
the routing function becomes disconnected. For example, when the source and
destination are in the same row and an intermediary horizontal channel is faulty.
After adding a case distinction to the routing logic to handle this situation, we
reran the tool on the new routing logic. The change may cause a deadlock or
livelock. It may route packets away from faults, but towards a situation where
the destination is no longer reachable, eﬀectively causing a disconnected routing
function. Iteratively, we ﬁrst add or remove case distinctions, then rerun the tool
and analyze its output. We have repeated this process, until the routing logic was
completely correct. As an example, the deadlock in Figure 8.7a was found by the
tool. At this point in the design process, the second case distinction in Line 4 of
Algorithm 7 had not been added.
The irregular routing logic of the WNoC is hard to verify manually. DCI2 ﬁnds
deadlocks instantaneously in a 10x10 mesh. Because a result is quickly produced,
we could experiment with diﬀerent values of δ, i.e., with more or less usage of the
wireless routers. Deadlocks have been found for all non-trivial values of δ.
The properties veriﬁed by DCI2 correspond to proof obligations required to
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prove productivity of communication networks (see Chapter 3). Checking for to-
pology violations eﬀectively checks that the routing function is correctly typed,
i.e., it has type P × P 7→ P(C). Proof Obligation 1 states the routing logic must
be connected, which is checked by DCI2. Deadlock freedom (Proof Obligation 7) is
discharged using the formally veriﬁed algorithms presented in the previous chapter.
Checking for absence of livelocks discharges Proof Obligations 11 and 12. DCI2 dis-
charges all proof obligations that concern the routing logic.
In Chapter 4 we presented a full proof of correctness of a communication net-
work with west-ﬁrst routing in a two-dimensional mesh. This proof is done once
and for all, as the size of the mesh is left parametric. The proof eﬀort took approx-
imately one week of ACL2 interaction. In contrast, DCI2 requires 1.49 seconds to
establish deadlock freedom of the same network for a 65 by 65 mesh. DCI2 is a
push-button alternative for discharging Proof Obligation 7, but works for bounded
instances only.
DCI2 provides the possibility to use formal methods during the design process
of a communication network. Assuming starvation freedom and correctness of in-
jection, any packet or wormhole network that passes a check by DCI2 is productive.
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Integrated Network Layer
Deadlock Verification
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Chapter 9
Microarchitectural
Deadlock Verification
The previous part dealt with veriﬁcation of the network layer in isolation. In this
part, we focus on the monolithical veriﬁcation of deadlock freedom. The integrated
network model takes details into account of both the applications running on top
of the network and the transfer protocol. We address two issues. First, we require
a formal language that is suﬃciently expressive to model the behavior of all three
layers. The diﬃculty lies in the fact that the possible behavior is unrestricted,
e.g., cache coherency protocols, master/slave protocols, credit-based ﬂow controls,
broadcasts, etc. A language is required that is on one hand suﬃciently expressive,
but on the other hand restricted and formal enough to allow eﬃcient deadlock
detection. Our solution is to not deﬁne one language, but a family of languages.
This allows deﬁning custom microarchitectural components, resulting in a custom
Microarchitectural Description Language (MaDL). The second problem is how to
detect deadlocks eﬃciently. We deﬁne a deadlock detection algorithm paramet-
erized with the language in which the communication network is deﬁned. An
eﬃcient, optimized and tailored deadlock detection algorithm is obtained for each
language in the family. Using SMT solvers, linear programming solvers, and invari-
ant generation the algorithm can handle message dependencies, counters, virtual
channels, parametric buﬀer sizes, and many other aspects of microarchitectural
models.
Figure 9.1: Work flow enabled in this chapter.
The results in this chapter are part of work in progress. We have not yet
formally proven correctness of the theorems in the ACL2 theorem prover. The
examples are mostly artiﬁcial and academic. We will clearly point to restrictions
and limitations of our approach.
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Figure 9.2: Eight primitives of the xMAS language. Italicized letters indicate paramet-
ers. Gray letters indicate ports.
9.1 MaDLS
This section describes a family of languages. For each language in the family,
we can detect deadlocks eﬃciently. This family is based on the language xMAS
(eXecutable MicroArchitectural Speciﬁcation), developed by Intel [24]. The xMAS
language is a graphical language consisting of eight primitives. It can be used to
model a communication network at the microarchitectural level. We ﬁrst present
xMAS. Then, we provide a formal way of deﬁning custom primitives. This yields
the family of languages. We provide several examples to show the expressivity of
this family.
9.1.1 xMAS: a MaDL for communication fabrics
An xMAS model is a network of primitives connected via channels. A channel
is connected to an initiator and a target. Each channel consists of three signals.
Channel signal x .irdy indicates whether the initiator is ready to write to channel
x. Channel signal x .trdy indicates whether the target is ready to read channel x.
Channel signal x .data contains data that is transferred from the initiator output
to the target input if and only if both signals x .irdy and x .trdy are set to true.
Figure 9.2 shows the eight primitives of the xMAS language. A queue stores
data and is the state holding element. A function primitive manipulates data. Its
parameter is a function that produces an outgoing packet from an incoming packet.
Typically, functions are used to convert message types and represent message
dependencies inside the fabric or in the model of the environment. Messages are
non-deterministically produced and consumed at sources and sinks. A source may
process multiple message types. A fork duplicates an incoming packet to its two
outputs. Such a transfer takes place if and only if the input is ready to send and
the two outputs are both ready to read. A join is the dual of a fork. The function
parameter determines how the two incoming packets are combined. A transfer
takes place if and only if the two inputs are ready to send and the output is ready
to read. A switch uses its function parameter to determine to which output an
incoming packet must be routed. A merge is an arbiter. It grants its output to
one of its inputs.
The execution semantics of an xMAS network consists of a combinatorial and a
sequential part (Figure 9.3). The combinatorial part updates the values of channel
signals. The sequential part is the synchronous update of all queues according to
the values of the channel signals. A simulation cycle consists of a combinatorial
and a sequential update. A sequential update only concerns queues, sinks, and
sources. We denote these primitives as sequential primitives. Other primitives are
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Figure 9.3: Sequential updates regulated by combinatorial primitives
Figure 9.4: Microarchitectural model
denoted as combinatorial.
A configuration represents the current occupation of queues, i.e., the current
state. Conﬁgurations are updated when messages are produced, consumed, or
moved to one or more next queues. Similar to the previous part, we assume that
typing information is known. For each queue q, we assume that τ(q) returns the
set of packets that can be in queue q.
Example 9.1 Consider the xMAS model in Figure 9.4. Assume two request
packets are injected in queue q0 and the other source remains silent. At the fork,
the combinatorial semantics propagates to queues q1 and q2 a positive irdy signal.
As queues q1 and q2 are ready to receive, a positive trdy is propagated back to
q0. In the next sequential update, one request packet is moved to queues q1 and
q2. The remaining packet will be moved in the next simulation cycle. Requests
in q2 are routed to the sink and are eventually consumed. The requests in q1 are
blocked as no response arrives at the join. Indeed, responses injected in q0 are
blocked by the requests in q1 if q1 is full.
Figure 9.4 is a formal description of a communication fabric. For each primit-
ive, the exact semantics are deﬁned by equations on the signals. These equations
assign a value to the irdy signals of the channels going out of the primitive. This
value represents whether the primitive is ready to transmit a value over that outgo-
ing channel. The equations also assign a value to the trdy signal of each incoming
channel. This value represents whether the primitive is ready to receive the data
at the in-channel. Lastly, the primitive semantics assign a value to the data signals
of all outgoing channels.
Running Example 9.1 The semantics of the switch are deﬁned as follows:
o1.irdy ::= i.irdy and s(i.data)
o2.irdy ::= i.irdy and not s(i.data)
i.trdy ::= (o1.irdy and o1.trdy) or (o2.irdy and o2.trdy)
o1.data ::= i.data
o2.data ::= i.data
Output channel om (m ∈ {1, 2}) is ready to transmit if and only if the initiator of
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the input channel is ready to transmit towards om and if the packet at the input
channel is routed towards channel om. Input channel i is ready to receive if and
only if one of the output channels is ready to transmit. Data at the outputs is
copied from the input.
9.1.2 A Family of MaDLs
Intel published the eight primitives in Figure 9.2. Many other useful primitives
can be imagined, such as virtual channels, scoreboards, out-of-order queues, and
adaptive switches. Some of these can be constructed in terms of the eight basic
primitives, but some, e.g., the adaptive switch, cannot. We deﬁne a core language
called xMAS0 that contains only sources, queues and sinks. To obtain a custom
language, xMAS0 is extended with user-deﬁned custom primitives.
To create a custom primitive, the semantics of this primitive are needed. These
semantics can be described in the syntax presented in Figure 9.5. The syntax
allows the use of functions and the Boolean connectives and , or and not . Function
names are left uninterpreted. Quantiﬁers may be used to express semantics of
primitives with a parametric number of inputs and outputs. Input channel signals
i .irdy and i .data and output channel signal o.trdy may be used. Signal i .select
may be used to determine which in-channel gets its turn in case of multiple in-
channels. We use this signal to abstract away from the arbitration policy applied
by the primitives. The semantics is such that at most one channel is selected, i.e.,
if i .select is true for some input channel i, it implies that i ′.select is false for all
other input channels i′. The channel name isel is reserved to refer to the currently
selected channel.
prim_semantics := | prim_semantics signal ::= sign_semantics
sign_semantics := (sign_semantics and sign_semantics)
| (sign_semantics or sign_semantics) |
| forall name sign_semantics | exists name sign_semantics
| not sign_semantics | name(signal) | signal
signal := name.irdy | name.trdy | name.data | name.select
Figure 9.5: Syntax in which primitive semantics can be defined
Primitive semantics will be written in italic font. We let s ∈ S denote that
string s is a line in some semantics S. For example, if S refers to the semantics of
the switch then o2 .data ::= i.data ∈ S.
The core language xMAS0 is deﬁned as the language that contains the source,
sink and queue:
xMAS0
def
= {queue, source, sink}
The original xMAS language can be obtained using our core language and syn-
tax, i.e., one can deﬁne xMAS = xMAS0∪{switch,merge, join, fork , f } using the
semantics given by Chatterjee et al [24].
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9.1.3 Examples
2D Mesh with message dependencies
Section 1.3.1 (see Page 10) presents an example of a communication network with
message dependencies. A set of masters send out requests to slaves. Upon receiving
a request, a slave sends a response back to the master. The masters and slaves
are laid out in a 2D mesh with XY routing. Some layout dictates which nodes are
masters and which are slaves.
Figure 9.6 shows the xMAS model of this network. Channels are modelled with
queues. The processing nodes containing the routing logic are modelled in area N .
Packets arriving at a processing node are routed either into the network according
to the XY routing logic or sent to a local buﬀer storing the arrived packets.
The master/slave protocol is modelled in area P . Each master injects messages
into the local-in queue (see Figure 9.6a). Packets of a master with coordinates
(x, y) are restricted to the form (s, d, t) where s = (x, y), d = (x′, y′) such that
(x′, y′) denotes a slave, (x, y) 6= (x′, y′) and t = req. The source is thus typed
accordingly. If a response arrives at the local-out queue, we assume it can even-
tually be consumed. It is therefore switched to a sink. The slaves do not inject or
consume messages (see Figure 9.6b). If a request arrives, it is not consumed but
altered into a response with as destination the source of the request. It is then
switched into the interconnect according to the routing logic.
(a) Master (b) Slave
Figure 9.6: Processing nodes with XY routing (area N) and master/slave protocol
(area P).
Spidergon with write-invalidate cache coherency
We deﬁne the routing logic of a Spidergon processing node with shortest path
routing (see Figure 9.7). Additionally, a cache coherency protocol is inserted
between process P and processing node N . The protocol is a write-invalidate
protocol with snooping [136]. Processes are either processors or memory modules.
Packets are of type read or write indicating that the process performs a request
to read from or write to a memory module. Broadcasting occurs on a separate
network, which connects all caches in a broadcast ring.
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Figure 9.7: Processing node of Spidergon with shortest path routing
The protocol is deﬁned as follows. Each cache can either be valid or invalid.
If a read arrives at a valid cache, the corresponding cache line is checked. If the
cache did not contain the requested data, the read is forwarded to the intercon-
nection network to be directed to the memory module. If a read arrives at an
invalid cache it is blocked until the cache is valid. If a write arrives at a
valid cache, it changes the state of the cache to invalid and broadcasts the
write to all other caches, invalidating them as well. When all caches are invalid,
the write is performed synchronously after which all caches are set to state valid.
Figure 9.8 shows the xMAS speciﬁcation of the cache model C for some process
P connected to processing node N . A read-packet is routed towards a queue
buﬀering the reads. If the lock is available, a read can proceed. Otherwise it
is blocked until the lock is available. A function primitive models the reading
of the corresponding cache line. In case of a cache hit, the packet is returned
to the process immediately. Otherwise it is routed through the network to the
corresponding memory module.
Figure 9.8: xMAS model of cache coherency protocol
A write packet is routed towards a queue buﬀering the writes. The fork du-
plicates the write: one is sent to the lock of the current cache. The second packet
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is sent to the next cache in the broadcast ring through the acq_lock_out line.
It enters the next cache through the acq_lock_in line. Here it is again duplic-
ated, so that it can again lock the current cache and be forwarded to the next
cache. This duplication proceeds until a write arrives back at the acq_lock_in
line. In this case, the entire ring has received the write and thus all the forks have
duplicated exactly one write for each lock. All caches are locked. The write is
routed from the lock to a second fork. One write is sent to the join, one is sent to
the join of the next cache. The joins ensure that all locks on the broadcast ring
are released synchronously. The actual writing that occurs when a write packet is
sent is represented by a sink.
West-first routing in a 2D mesh
So far, we have used traditional primitives only. In this example we deﬁne a
custom primitive, namely the adaptive switch. This switch has one input and m
outputs (see Figure 9.9a). Figure 9.9b shows its semantics. The adaptive switch
can receive a packet from its input channel i if there exists an outgoing channel om
at which a transfer can occur. Each outgoing channel om is ready to transmit if the
packet at channel i can be routed towards channel om. Data is simply transferred
from the input towards the output.
(a) Primitive
i.trdy ::= exists m · (om.irdy and om.trdy);
om.irdy ::= (i.irdy and sm(om.data));
om.data ::= i.data;
(b) Semantics
Figure 9.9: Adaptive Switch
Using the adaptive switch, we have deﬁned a 2D mesh topology with west-
ﬁrst routing [61]. Figure 9.10 shows a processing node with coordinates (X,Y ).
An incoming packet p is analyzed. We assume its destination coordinates are
(p.X, p.Y ). Packets are only routed westwards, if the packet has just been injected
or if the packet was already heading for the western direction. Packets can always
go east if the destination is east of the current processing node. Similarly, packets
can always go north if the destination is north. However, turns from south to
north are prohibited. Section 4.2 contains more details on west-ﬁrst routing.
We have introduced a family of languages. Each language consists of the three
core primitives source, sink and queue with some additional custom primitives.
For each custom primitive, semantics have to be speciﬁed that determine when
and how the primitive transfers a packet from its inputs to its outputs.
9.2 Deadlock Detection Algorithm
In this section, we deﬁne a deadlock detection algorithm that takes as parameter
not only the communication network in which deadlocks are to be found, but also
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Figure 9.10: Processing node with west first routing
the language in which the network is deﬁned. A deadlock is a situation in which
some channel permanently wants to send a packet, but cannot transmit it. Such a
channel is called a dead channel. The algorithm presented in this chapter searches
for such dead channels. More speciﬁcally, it searches for a reachable conﬁguration
in which a channel is permanently blocked but not permanently idle. The major
purpose of the algorithm is to reduce the search for a reachable conﬁguration
to the search for a solution of a linear integer arithmetic problem (LIAP). This
problem has been well-studied and many diﬀerent eﬃcient tools exist to deal with
them [49, 40, 6]. The reduction makes use of blocking and idle formulas for each
core primitive and each custom primitive. These formulas express necessary and
suﬃcient conditions under which channels are permanently blocked or idle. We
automatically generate these formulas from the semantics of the custom primitives
and use them in our deadlock detection algorithm.
First, we recapitulate the formal deﬁnition of deadlock provided by Gotmanov
et al. [65]. Then we explain by example how the search for a reachable deadlock is
reduced to the search for a solution of a LIAP. Finally, we show how blocking and
idle formulas of custom primitives are used in our deadlock detection algorithm.
9.2.1 Definition of Deadlock
A dead channel c has – ins ome reachable conﬁguration – its c.irdy signal set to
true and its c.trdy signal stuck-at false. Formally, the LTL deﬁnition of a dead
channel is as follows:
Dead(c) = ♦(c.irdy ·¬c.trdy)
Example 9.2 In Example 9.1 above, output channel o of queue q1 is dead.
Consider the execution in which k requests are injected by the ﬁrst source, with
k the size of queue q1 (see Figure 9.11). In this execution, signal o.irdy is set to
true as there is a packet at the head of the queue. Signal o.trdy is stuck-at false
as the join will never receive a response on its second input.
Gotmanov et al. simplify this deﬁnition of deadlock using persistency [65]. A
channel is persistent if its signals – once they are set – are stable until a transfer
156
9.2 Deadlock Detection Algorithm
Figure 9.11: Microarchitectural model
occurs. Gotmanov et al. prove that xMAS networks are persistent. This allows
them to express deadlocks in terms of blocked and idle channels.
Definition 9.1
A channel is permanently blocked, notation Block(c), if and only if eventually its
trdy signal is permanently low.
Block(c)
def
= ♦(¬c.trdy)
A channel is permanently idle, notation Idle(c), if and only if eventually its irdy
signal is permanently low.
Idle(c)
def
= ♦(¬c.irdy)
A channel c is dead, notation Dead(c), if and only if it is blocked and not idle.
Dead(c)
def
= Block(c) ∧ ¬ Idle(c)
9.2.2 Deadlock LIAPs
We formulate LIAPs in which there exists a variable for each queue q and each
packet p that can be in queue q. The LIAPs are constructed in such a way that a
solution assigns to each queue a number of packets in such a way that the resulting
conﬁguration is a deadlock. If no solution exists, there is no deadlock. The value
of variable #q.p represents the number of packets of type p in queue q. The value
of variable #q stores the total number of packets in the queue. We assume that
for each queue q, the size of q can be accessed with the variable q.size.
Example 9.3 Consider again the deadlock in Figure 9.11. In this deadlock
conﬁguration, requests are assigned to queue q1. The number of requests in queue
q1 is represented by variable #q1.req which is equal to q1.size in any deadlock.
Queue q2 does not contain responses. Therefore, #q2.rsp = 0.
For each queue q and for each packet p ∈ τ(q), a LIAP is created. We provide
the LIAP for queue q1 and packet req for the network in Figure 9.11.
If a request is permanently blocked in queue q1, then there must be at least
one request in this queue. The following constraint is added to the LIAP:
#q1.req ≥ 1 (Request in q1)
The join blocks this packet only if no response arrives at its second input. In order
for this to happen, queue q2 may not contain responses.
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#q2.rsp = 0 (No responses in q2)
In order for q2 to permanently be idle for responses, queue q1 must be full. A third
constraint is induced:
#q1 = q1.size (q1 is full)
The LIAP assembled so far has many solutions. The deadlock described above is
one of them, but additional constraints are required to rule out bogus solutions.
For example, a bogus solution might assign three packets to queue q2 even when
the size of the queue is only two. For each queue q, constraints are added to the
LIAP to rule out illegal conﬁgurations.
#q ≤ q.size (Legality constraints)
Queue q0 can contain requests and responses. To enforce that it cannot contain
other packets and to enforce a link between the variables #q.p and #q, constraints
of the following form are added:
#q =
∑
p∈τ(q)
#q.p (Typing constraints)
A solution to the LIAP assembled so far yields a legal deadlock conﬁguration.
However, this conﬁguration is not necessarily reachable from the initial conﬁgura-
tion. For example, a solution might ﬁll queue q1 with responses and leave queue q2
empty, even though the corresponding conﬁguration is not reachable. Invariants
are added to the LIAP to rule out unreachable conﬁgurations. In our example,
the number of responses in q1 is always equal to the number of responses in q2.
#q1.rsp = #q2.rsp (Invariant)
The LIAP obtained this way has multiple solutions. All of these solutions are
legal and reachable deadlocks. The conﬁguration described in Example 9.3 is one
of them.
9.2.3 Algorithm Paraphernalia
The algorithm consists of two parts: function BlockDetect determines whether
a channel c can be permanently blocked, and function IdleDetect determines
whether some channel can be permanently idle. To detect a dead channel, we
execute:
DeadDetect ≡ ¬IdleDetect ∧BlockDetect
Both functions take as parameters a channel c that is to be explored, the current
packet p, the communication network N , and the language L in which network N
is deﬁned. They return a LIAP that is given to an SMT solver.
As shown in the previous example, formulating the LIAP requires the following:
• For a queue q and a packet p, constraints must be computed that reﬂect the
permanent blocking of p in q;
• Legality and typing constraints must be computed to rule out illegal conﬁg-
urations;
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• Invariants must be computed to rule out unreachable conﬁgurations.
The legality and typing constraints can easily be computed. A technique gen-
erating the invariants has been presented by Chatterjee et al. [22, 23]. The issue
to be tackled is to determine eﬃciently which constraints have to be added to
represent that a packet is permanently blocked. Diﬀerent combinatorial primit-
ives induce diﬀerent conditions under which channels are permanently blocked or
idle. Since we allow custom combinatorial primitives, we have to be able to derive
the desired behavior of the algorithm from the user-deﬁned semantics of these
primitives.
For the three basic primitives in xMAS0, the behavior of the algorithm is ﬁxed.
For custom primitives, the behavior of the algorithm is not ﬁxed. We use blocking
and idle formulas as an intermediary between primitive semantics and the behavior
of the algorithm [65]. Blocking and idle formulas represent the exact conditions
that have to be satisﬁed for a channel to be permanently blocked or idle.
Running Example 9.2 For packet p, the blocking formula for the switch is
deﬁned as follows:
Block(i) ≡ if s(p) then Block(o1) else Block(o2)
A packet p is permanently blocked by a switch if and only if the channel to which
the packet is routed is permanently blocked. The idle formulas for the switch are
deﬁned as follows:
Idle(o1, p) ≡ Idle(i, p) or not s(p)
Idle(o2, p) ≡ Idle(i, p) or s(p)
An outgoing channel of a switch is permanently idle for packet p if and only if
either packet p never arrives at the switch or packet p is not routed towards the
channel.
The idle formula of the switch directs the algorithm to recursively compute
whether the input channel can be permanently idle, to compute whether the packet
is routed towards the current channel, and to compute the disjunction of both
results. As another example the blocking formula of a join tells the algorithm
that in order to establish whether a join can be permanently blocked it must
perform both a forward search to establish that the output of the join can be
permanently blocked and a backward search to determine that the other input
can be permanently idle. The essence of blocking and idle formulas is that they
completely determine the desired behavior of our algorithm.
For each custom primitive, the semantics determine the conditions under which
the primitive is permanently blocked or idle. Thus the semantics determine the
blocking and idle formulas and consequently, the semantics determine the behavior
of the algorithm for custom primitives. Figure 9.12 presents an overview.
Figure 9.12: From semantics of primitives to behavior of the algorithm
159
9 Microarchitectural Deadlock Veriﬁcation
We have created an automatic translation from primitive semantics to blocking
and idle formulas. We postpone details on this translation to Section 9.3. The
translation from primitive semantics to blocking formulas is denoted JKp
B
. The
translation to idle formulas is denoted JKp
I
. Our translations satisfy the following
theorems:
notJc.trdyKp
B
⇐⇒ Block(c)
notJc.irdyKp
I
⇐⇒ Idle(c, p)
If one looks up the semantics of the trdy (irdy) signal of some channel and trans-
lates the semantics to a blocking (idle) formula, this formula returns false if and
only if the channel is permanently blocked (idle).
Running Example 9.3 The primitive semantics of the switch are translated to
the following blocking formula:
not(Ji.trdyKp
B
) ≡ (not s(p) orBlock(o1)) and (s(p) orBlock(o2))
The code for the three basic primitives is ﬁxed. The code for custom primitives
is automatically generated from blocking and idle formulas. Given a formula F , the
generated code is denoted by “F ”. Boolean connectives are translated to special C
functions disjunct, conjunct and negate. As we quantify over ﬁnite domains,
quantiﬁers are translated to for-loops of con(dis)junctions. Occurrences of Block
and Idle are translated to recursive calls to BlockDetect and IdleDetect.
Running Example 9.4 Based on the blocking formula yielded by the transla-
tion in Running Example 9.3, the following code is executed by the algorithm to
determine whether a switch x can be permanently blocking.
That is, “notJc.trdyK
B
” denotes the following code:
1: ret0 = disjunct(negate(s(p)),BlockDetect(x.o1, p,N, L)
2: if ret0 then
3: ret1 = disjunct(s(p),BlockDetect(x.o2, p,N, L)
4: else
5: ret1 = false
6: end if
7: return conjunct(ret0, ret1)
The generated code is compiled so that it can be executed by the algorithm.
For sake of presentation, we assume an eval function that takes a piece of C code,
compiles it, and executes it.
9.2.4 Deadlock Detection Algorithm
Algorithm 11 shows the pseudo code of our algorithm for determing whether a
channel can be permanently blocked. Let the target of the current channel be a
queue q. In order to be blocking, queue q must be full. Formula #q = q.size
is the default return value (Line 2). If the current queue has not been visited
yet, it is marked as visited (Line 4). For each packet p′ ∈ τ(q), the algorithm
recursively determines the formulas representing whether the next primitive can
be permanently blocking (Lines 5–7). Queue q is permanently blocking if for one
of the packets p′ the corresponding formula is feasible. The algorithm disjunctively
adds to the return value the conjunct of formula #q.p′ ≥ 1 and the return value of
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Algorithm 11 BlockDetect(c, p,N, L)
1: if c.trgt is a queue named q then
2: ret := #q = q.size
3: if ¬visitedB[q] then
4: visitedB[q] = true
5: for all p′ ∈ τ(q) do
6: ret ∨= #q.p′ ≥ 1 ∧BlockDetect(q.out, p′, N, L)
7: end for
8: visitedB[q] = false
9: end if
10: return ret
11: else if c.trgt is a sink then
12: return false
13: else if c.trgt is a source then
14: \* Will never occur *\
15: else if c.trgt is a custom primitive in L named x then
16: return eval(“notJc.trdyKp
B
”)
17: end if
the recursive call. Subsequently, it marks the current queue as unvisited (Line 8).
A sink is never permanently blocked, as we assume fair sinks (Line 12). If the target
of the channel is some custom primitive x, then the behavior of the algorithm
is determined by the corresponding blocking formula (Line 16). The semantics
of primitive x are translated into a blocking formula. C code that unfolds this
formula is automatically generated and executed.
Algorithm 12 shows the pseudo code of our algorithm for determining whether
a channel can be permanently idle. Let the initiator of the current channel be a
queue q. A queue can be permanently idle for packet p for two reasons: either it
does not contain packet p and its input is permanently idle for packet p (Line 4),
or another packet p′ is permanently blocked at the head of the queue (Line 7). A
source is permanently idle for packet p if and only if packet p is not injected at
the source, as we assume fair sources (Line 15).
Algorithms 11 and 12 provide the main structure of the algorithms. Many
optimizations and features are added:
• Before running the algorithm, the typing information needs to be computed,
i.e., we need to compute τ(q) for all queues q. To obtain this information we
perform exhaustive simulations. For each source and for each possible packet
p injected at the source, we simulate the injection in an empty network until
it is consumed. During this simulation packet p is added to τ(q) for each
visited queue.
Consider the network in Figure 9.13. The network is deadlock-free. To
establish this, it must be established that always eventually a packet “5”
arrives at queue q0. During the simulation of packet “0” in source src0,
queue q0 is visited 6 times. This establishes that τ(q0) = {0, 1, . . . , 5}. Using
this information, our algorithm needs to visit queue q0 just once to establish
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Algorithm 12 IdleDetect(c, p,N, L)
1: if c.init is a queue named q then
2: if ¬visitedI[q][p] then
3: visitedI[q][p] = true
4: ret := #q.p = 0 ∧ IdleDetect(q.in, p,N, L))
5: visitedB[q] = true
6: for all p′ ∈ τ(q) such that p′ 6= p do
7: ret ∨= #q.p′ ≥ 1 ∧BlockDetect(q.out, p′, N, L)
8: end for
9: visitedB[q] = false
10: visitedI[q][p] = false
11: end if
12: return ret
13: else if c.init is a sink then
14: \* Will never occur *\
15: else if c.init is a source named s then
16: return p ∈ τ(s)
17: else if c.init is a custom primitive in L named x then
18: return eval(“notJc.irdyKp
I
”)
19: end if
deadlock freedom of the network.
Figure 9.13: xMAS model
• The forwards exploration in BlockDetect (Line 5) creates a disjunction for
each packet p′ ∈ τ(q). The number of diﬀerent types of packets can be large.
For example, in a 16x16 2D mesh with masters and slaves, packets consist of
17 bits. This would require 217 recursive calls. Many of the packets cause the
exact same routing behavior. The algorithm automatically classiﬁes packets
that cause equal routing behavior into equivalence classes and performs at
most one recursive call per equivalence class. For example, in the 2D mesh,
a packet in a channel can be routed to at most ﬁve diﬀerent other channels
(North, South, West, East and Local). Instead of performing 217 recursive
calls, only 5 are necessary.
• At all times, the algorithm keeps track of the path leading from the initial
queue to the current primitive. This path is always a conjunction of linear
constraints, i.e., a linear program. Each modiﬁcation of the path is checked
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for consistency using the linear programming solver lp_solve. This way,
unnecessary unfolding of primitives is kept to a minimum.
• At each combinatorial primitive, either disjunctions, conjunctions or combin-
ations of both are unfolded. At all times, the algorithm keeps track of the
total number of unfolded conjunctions. If the algorithm encounters a visited
queue, it checks whether this number is equal to zero. If this is the case,
all conjunctions necessary to create a deadlock are unfolded. The current
formula is sent to an SMT solver (we have used Yices [49]). If a solution is
found, a deadlock is returned.
• We support standard optimizations for Boolean connectives, e.g, for a con-
junction the second argument is not evaluated if the ﬁrst argument evaluates
to false. Expensive recursive calls are always the last arguments of disjunc-
tions and conjunctions.
• The algorithm keeps track of which formulas are sent to Yices. If at any time
a formula is subsumed by an earlier call to Yices, then this result is reused
instead of performing a new Yices call.
• The algorithm can deal with the symbolic packet ANY, indicating that the
primitive must be permanently idle for any packet.
9.2.5 Restrictions
Many custom primitives can be described using the syntax in Figure 9.5. However,
some limitations on the syntax are necessary.
1. The network may not contain combinatorial cycles. This ensures termina-
tion.
2. If a primitive has multiple in-channels, we assume that it fairly selects which
of these gets its turn, i.e., we assume that all primitives ensure starvation
freedom. Without this restriction packets that are starving can permanently
block other packets, resulting in new deadlocks.
3. A primitive selects an in-channel only if its initiator is ready.
4. We assume the semantics have been De Morganized as much as possible.
5. The negation cannot be applied to irdy , trdy and select signals. Our blocking
and idle equations can only be expressed in terms of Block and Idle. To
translate, e.g., ¬i.irdy , we need to establish ♦¬i.irdy , for which we must
establish ♦ i.irdy . Thus, we must establish that channel i is at some point
always able to transmit, i.e., it is eager. Checking eﬃciently for eagerness is
still an open question.
6. Functions can take one data signal as input only. To obtain typing inform-
ation, we simulate the injection of packets in isolation, i.e, we simulate the
injection of each packet at each source in an empty network. If functions can
take multiple packets, this way of obtaining typing information is no longer
accurate.
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A consequence of these restrictions is that we cannot express, e.g., a priority merge
in our syntax. Such a merge gives priority to input iH over the other input iL. The
semantics of iL.trdy require the negation of iH .irdy . Another desired primitive that
we cannot handle is the unrestricted join, which takes its two inputs and computes
an output based on both inputs.
The current algorithm heavily relies on invariants to rule out unreachable dead-
locks. The stronger the invariants, the less false deadlocks. We present some
examples of false deadlocks found by our tool.
Asynchronous deadlocks Neither our tool nor the invariant generation takes
into account that packets are moved synchronously throughout the network.
The detected deadlocks are deadlocks under asynchronous semantics, but
not necessarily under synchronous semantics. Consider the network in Fig-
ure 9.14. One packet is duplicated into two cycles. Both tokens move around
in their cycles until at some clock cycle simultaneously the upper token
reaches queue q1 and the lower token reaches q2. If this happens, both tokens
are removed from the cycles and send into a deadlock. Under synchronous
semantics, this never occurs as the tokens move in lock step fashion: they
are either simultaneously in queues q0 and q2 or in queues q1 and q3. Under
asynchronous semantics, the deadlock may occur. Our algorithm returns
this deadlock. To exclude this deadlock, invariants are required dealing with
the synchronizity between queues.
Figure 9.14: False deadlock found by our tool. The sink is dead and the source injects
just one token.
Deadlocks with false ordering of packets Our approach ﬁnds false deadlocks
in networks where deadlock is prevented by a speciﬁc ordering of messages.
Consider the network in Figure 9.15. Blue and red tokens are injected sim-
ultaneously into queues q0 and q1. The contents of these queues are always
equal, including the order in which the tokens are queued. Our algorithm
returns a false deadlock, where queue q0 contains – in this order – a blue
token and a red token, and q1 a red token followed by a blue one. Invariants
dealing with the order of diﬀerent packets in diﬀerent queues are needed to
exclude this false deadlock.
Deadlocks due to rational variables Consider the network in Figure 9.16. One
packet is injected at the source. This packet is randomly send to either
queue q0 or queue q1. As only one packet can reach the join, the join is
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Figure 9.15: False deadlock found by our tool.
dead. Consequently, queues q2, q3, q4 and q5 will always be empty. Our
tool returns this deadlock. However, a false deadlock is returned as well.
During generation of invariants the variables are not considered integers but
rationals, because of eﬃciency reasons. The invariant generator ﬁrst assesses
that #q0 +#q1 ≤ 1. Subsequently, it states that queue q2 can have at most
1/2 packets. As variable #q2 is considered an integer by our algorithm, the
algorithm correctly derives that queue q2 is always empty. However, the
invariant generation duplicates the half packet to queues q3 and q4. Thus
the invariant #q3 + #q4 ≤ 1 is found. The invariant generation proceeds
with adding the invariant that #q5 ≤ 1, as queue q5 is the sum of queues q3
and q4. Based on this invariant, our algorithm ﬁnds a false deadlock where
queue q5 contains a packet. The issue is, intuitively, that (1/2) · 2 is equal
to 1 for rational numbers, but is equal to 0 for integers.
Figure 9.16: False deadlock found by our tool. The crossed sink is dead and the source
injects just one token.
9.3 Correctness Proof
The algorithm presented in the previous section heavily relies on a translation
from semantics to blocking and idle formulas. We present these translations and
prove theorems stating their correctness. Using these theorems, we prove correct-
ness of the algorithm for any language L in the family of languages presented in
Section 9.1.
9.3.1 Automatic Generation of Blocking and Idle Formulas
The blocking and idle formulas of a primitive is expressed using the syntax speciﬁed
in Figure 9.17. Formulas may consist of linear equations, predicates Block and
Idle, auxiliary functions, and the Boolean operators and, or and not. Signal
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i.select can be used to assume that channel i is selected. Formulas will be
written in typewriter font.
form := (form and form) | (form or form) | not form
| forall name · form | exists name · form
| true | false | lin. eq. | Block(name,name) | Idle(name,name)
| i.select =⇒ form
Figure 9.17: Syntax in which blocking and idle formulas can be defined
Given the behaviour of some primitive x speciﬁed in the syntax presented in
Figure 9.5, we automatically generate blocking formulas according to the rules
given in Figure 9.18.
Let S be some primitive semantics. The translation of S is parameterized
with the current packet p. The translation of the primitive semantics S into
blocking formulas for packet p is denoted by JSKp
B
. Intuitively, the translation of
the semantics of a signal yields the conditions under which the signal can always
eventually be set to true. We translate signal in.trdy , which yields the conditions
under which this signal can always eventually be set to true. The negation of these
conditions represent the conditions under which in.trdy can never be set, i.e., the
conditions under which channel in is eventually permanently blocked.
JsignalKp
B
:= JsemanticsKp
B
iﬀ signal ::= semantics ∈ S
Jom.trdyKpB := notBlock(om)
Jin.irdyKpB := true
Jin′ .irdyKpB := not Idle(in′ , ANY(in′))
Jin.dataKpB := p
Jin′ .dataKpB := ANY(in′)
Jf(S)Kp
B
:= f(JSKp
B
)
J(S0 and S1)KpB := (JS0KpB and JS1KpB)
J(S0 or S1)KpB := (JS0KpB or JS1KpB)
Jnot SKp
B
:= notJSKp
B
Jforall SKp
B
:= forallJSKp
B
Jexists SKp
B
:= existsJSKp
B
Ji.selectKp
B
:= forall i′ 6= i · i′.select =⇒ Ji′.trdyKANY(i′)
B
Figure 9.18: Translation rules from primitive semantics to blocking formulas.
Signal om.trdy is eventually set if and only if channel om can never be per-
manently blocked. Signal om.trdy is translated to the negation of the blocking
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formulas of the output channel. For signal in′ .trdy there are two cases. If n′ = n,
trivially the signal is eventually set, as we assume channel in contains a packet
and thus the initiator of this channel is set. Otherwise, the channel is eventually
set if it is not permanently idle for some packet p′. Constant ANY(c) indicates that
the current packet can be any packet that can be in channel c. The translation
of data signal in′ .data of an input channel requires the same case distinction. If
n′ = n, the packet in channel i is simply p, which is a parameter to the trans-
lation. Otherwise, the channel contains any type of data. Finally, signal i.select
is eventually true if and only if any other in-channel i′ can never be permanently
selected. When translating i.select , the translation will remember that channel
i is selected. This is used to translate the reserved channel name isel with the
translation of i. Also, this is required to ensure termination of the translation.
Running Example 9.5 The primitive semantics of the switch are translated as
follows:
Block(i) ≡ not(Ji.trdyKp
B
)
≡ not( (Ji.irdyKp
B
and Js(p)Kp
B
and Jo1.trdyKpB) or
(Ji.irdyKp
B
and notJs(p)Kp
B
and Jo2.trdyKpB))
≡ not( (true and s(p) and notBlock(o1)) or
(true and not s(p) and notBlock(o2)))
≡ (not s(p) orBlock(o1)) and (s(p) orBlock(o2))
We deﬁne the translation of primitive semantics to idle equations (see Fig-
ure 9.19). This translation is dual to the translation to blocking equations. A
notable diﬀerence is the translation of data signals at input channels. Say we want
to establish idle equations for packet p for output channel om. We translate the
data at some input channel in with the set of all packets p′ for which, if signal
o.data is translated under assumption i.data = p′, this translation yields packet p.
9.3.2 Correctness Proofs of Translations
The proofs in this section uses equalities of LTL formulas as they are deﬁned by
Baier and Katoen [5]. In addition, we use the following tautologies:
Name Abbr. Law
Distributivity of  D (a ∧ b) ≡  a ∧ b
Distributivity of ♦ D♦ ♦(a ∨ b) ≡ ♦ a ∨ ♦ b
Partial distributivity of  PD  a ∨ b =⇒ (a ∨ b)
Partial distributivity of ♦ PD♦ ♦(a ∧ b) =⇒ ♦ a ∧ ♦ b
Lemma 9.1 L9.1 (♦(a) ∨ ♦(b)) =⇒ ♦(a) ∨♦(b)
Lemma 9.2 L9.2 ♦(a) ∧ ♦(b) =⇒ ♦(a ∧ b)
We introduce the following adhoc notation: F@t returns true if and only if
LTL-formula F is true at time slot t. E.g., F can be expressed as ∀t · F@t
(similarly for ♦). Lemma 9.1 is a general LTL tautology. Lemma 9.2 does not
hold for LTL formulas in general, but is speciﬁc to xMAS networks. It uses the
fact that xMAS networks are persistent. We ﬁrst prove these lemma’s.
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JsignalKp
I
:= JsemanticsKp
I
iﬀ signal := semantics ∈ S
Jin.irdyKpI := not Idle(in, Jin.dataKpI )
Jom.trdyKpI := true
Jom′ .trdyKpI := notBlock(im′)
Jin.dataKpI := {p′ | Jo.dataKp
′
B
= p}
Jf(S)Kp
I
:= f(JSKp
I
)
J(S0 and S1)KpI := (JS0KpI and JS1KpI )
J(S0 or S1)KpI := (JS0KpI or JS1KpI )
Jnot SKp
I
:= notJSKp
I
Jforall SKp
I
:= forallJSKp
I
Jexists SKp
I
:= existsJSKp
I
Ji.selectKp
I
:= forall i′ 6= i · i′.select =⇒ Ji′.trdyKi′.dataI
Figure 9.19: Translation rules from primitive semantics to idle formulas.
Lemma 9.1
(♦(S0) ∨ ♦(S1)) =⇒ ♦(S0) ∨♦(S1)
Proof.
✘
✘
✘
✘¬♦S0
♦¬S0
∃w
(¬S0)@w
(♦(S0) ∨ ♦(S1))
∀t
(♦S0 ∨ ♦S1)@t
∀t
(♦S0)@t ∨ (♦S1)@t
∀t ≥ w
(♦S1)@t
♦S1
¬♦S0 =⇒ ♦S1
♦S0 ∨♦S1
Lemma 9.2 Assuming that both semantics S0 and S1 must hold for a transfer
to occur, if both semantics hold eventually, then eventually both semantics hold.
♦(S0) ∧ ♦(S1) =⇒ ♦(S0 ∧ S1)
Proof. By assumption we know that there exists n0 and n1 such that S0@n0 and
S1@n1. In [65] the execution semantics of xMAS have been proven persistent over
irdy and trdy signals. This means that these signals do not change from true to
false until a transfer occurs. Assume n0 < n1. By persistency, semantics S0 will
hold at all time slots n such that n0 ≤ n ≤ n1 because until time slot n1 no transfer
occurs. In particular, we know that S0@n1. Similarly we know that S1@n0 for the
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case where n1 < n0. Thus (S0 ∧S1)@max(n0, n1). As we have a witness at which
both S0 and S1 hold, we have established ♦(S0 ∧ S1).
Note that, e.g., ¬i.irdy is not persistent, i.e., even if no transfer occurs, i.irdy
may change from false to true. Restriction 5 ensures that S0 and S1 do not contain
such signals.
We now prove the major lemma’s required for proving correctness of our trans-
lations. Lemma 9.3 states the translation of semantics S to blocking formulas
yields a formula that is true if and only if the semantics always eventually hold.
Lemma 9.4 states the same for the translation to idle formulas. Our ﬁnal theorems
are directly implied by these lemma’s.
Lemma 9.3 The translation of semantics S to blocking formulas yields a formula
which is true if and only if the semantics are always eventually true.
JSKp
B
⇐⇒ ♦S
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of S. We present some of the
interesting cases:
Jom.trdyKpB = ¬Block(om.trdy)
= ¬♦¬om.trdy
⇐⇒ ♦ om.trdy By duality
Ji.selectKp
B
= ∀ i′ 6= i · i′.select =⇒ Ji′.trdyKi′.data
B
⇐⇒ ∀ i′ 6= i · i′.select =⇒ ♦ i.trdy By IH
The target of any channel i′ will become true if it is selected. The initiator is true,
by Restriction 3. So any channel i′ 6= i will eventually be ready to transfer once it
is selected. By Restriction 2 there will be a ﬁnite number of transfers until it gets
its turn. Thus we have established ♦ i.select .JS0andS1KpB = JS0KpB ∧ JS1KpB
⇐⇒ ♦(S0) ∧♦(S1) By IH
⇐⇒ (♦(S0) ∧ ♦(S1)) By D
=⇒ ♦(S0 ∧ S1) By L9.2
Lemma 2 applies here, since by Restriction 4 both S0 and S1 are needed for a
transfer to occur. Since also:
♦(S0∧S1) =⇒ (♦(S0) ∧ ♦(S1)) By PD♦
We have established that:JS0andS1KpB ⇐⇒ ♦(S0 ∧ S1)
JS0 or S1KpB = JS0KpB ∨ JS1KpB
⇐⇒ ♦(S0) ∨♦(S1) By IH
=⇒ (♦(S0) ∨ ♦(S1)) By PD
=⇒ ♦(S0 ∨ S1) By D♦
Since also:
♦(S0∨S1) =⇒ (♦(S0) ∨ ♦(S1)) By D♦
=⇒ ♦(S0) ∨♦(S1) By L9.1
We have established that:
JS0 or S1KpB ⇐⇒ ♦(S0) ∨♦(S1)
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Lemma 9.4 The translation of semantics S to idle formulas yields the conditions
under which the semantics will always eventually be true.
JSKp
B
⇐⇒ ♦(S ∧ om.data = p)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of S. We show here the proof
for the interesting case, the translation of signal in.irdy:Jin.irdyKpI = ¬ Idle(in, Jin.dataKpI )
= ¬ Idle(in, {p
′ | Jom.dataKp′B = p})
By Lemma 9.3 we know that Jom.dataKp′B translates correctly to om.data under as-
sumption that channel in is ﬁlled with packet p′.
⇐⇒ ¬ Idle(in, {p
′ | in.data = p
′ =⇒ om.data = p})
= ∃p′ · (in.data = p′ =⇒ om.data = p) ∧ ¬ Idle(in, p′)
= ∃p′ · (in.data = p
′ =⇒ om.data = p) ∧
∃p′·♦(in.irdy ∧ in.data = p
′)
⇐⇒ ♦(in.irdy ∧ om.data = p)
The correctness of our translation from primitive semantics to blocking formu-
las is expressed by the following theorem. It states that a channel is blocked if
and only if its translation is false.
Theorem 9.1 For any input channel in of a primitive with semantics S, assum-
ing in.data = p, the channel is permanently blocked if and only if the translation
to blocking formulas yields false.
Block(in) ⇐⇒ ¬(Jin.trdyKi.dataB )
Proof.
Block(in) = ♦¬in.trdy
⇐⇒ ¬♦ in.trdy By duality
⇐⇒ ¬(Jin.trdyKpB) By L9.3
A similar theorem is proven for the translation from primitive semantics to idle
formulas.
Theorem 9.2 For any output channel om of a primitive with semantics S the
channel is permanently idle for packet p if and only if the translation to idle for-
mulas yields false.
Idle(om, p) ⇐⇒ ¬(Jom.irdyKpI )
Proof.
Idle(om, p) = ♦(¬om.irdy ∨ om.data 6= p)
⇐⇒ ¬♦(om.irdy ∧ om.data = p) By duality
⇐⇒ ¬(Jom.irdyKpI ) By L9.4
We have presented and proven correct the automatic generation of blocking and
idle formulas. We now use these translations to prove correctness of our algorithm
for any language L.
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9.3.3 Correctness Proof of the Algorithm
The proof of correctness is by induction on the language L. The base case is when
L = xMAS0, i.e., when only queues, sinks and sources can be used to model the
network N . We then prove that adding a custom primitive preserves correctness.
First, we formalize correctness. Let L be a set of xMAS primitives. Let N (L)
denote the set of valid networks that can be expressed using primitives in language
L only. Let Q(N) denote the set of queues in network N .
Definition 9.2 Let L be a set of primitives. A deadlock detection algorithm
BlockDetect is correct for L, notation correct(BlockDetect, L), if and only
if for any network N deﬁned in the language L it returns true if and only if there
exists a deadlock.
correct(BlockDetect, L) ⇐⇒
(∀N ∈ N (L) · ∀q ∈ Q(N) ·
((∃p ∈ τ(q) ·BlockDetect(q.out, p,N, L)) ⇐⇒ Block(q.out))))
A similar deﬁnition of correctness is used for IdleDetect.
Theorem 9.3 The algorithm is correct for xMAS0.
correct(BlockDetect, xMAS0) ∧ correct(IdleDetect, xMAS0)
Proof. We prove that for any channel c and any packet p:
BlockDetect(c, p,N, xMAS0)) ⇐⇒ Block(c)
The proof is by induction over BlockDetect. The base case is when the target
of the channel is a sink. As we assume fair sinks, Block(c) is false. The inductive
case is when the target is a queue q. Two cases arise: either the queue has already
been visited, or not. Consider the ﬁrst case. An invariant of the algorithm is that
for any visited queue, the following constraints have been added to the LIAP that
is returned by BlockDetect:
∨
p′∈τ(q)
#q.p′ ≥ 1 ∧BlockDetect(q.out, p′, N, L)
We will refer to this constraint with ret0. The induction hypothesis states that
ret0 is necessary and suﬃcient for a permanently blocked packet p′ at the head of
queue q. Since channel c can only be permanently blocked if queue q is full and
if there is a permanently blocked packet at the head of the queue, the only extra
condition that is to be met is that queue q is full. Line 2 of Algorithm 11 adds
this constraint to the returned LIAP. The second case, when the queue has not
been visited yet, holds for similar reasons.
We prove that for any channel c:
IdleDetect(c, c.data,N, xMAS0)) ⇐⇒ Idle(c, p)
The proof is by induction over IdleDetect. The base case is when the target of
the channel is a source. As we assume fair sources, Idle(c, p) is true if and only if
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packet p is not injected at the source. The inductive case is when the target is a
queue q. A queue is permanently idle for packet p if and only if it does not contain
p and its incoming channel is idle for p, or if there can be a permanently blocked
packet p′ at the head of the queue. Two cases arise: either the queue has already
been visited, or not. Consider the ﬁrst case. An invariant of the algorithm is that
for any visited queue, the following constraint has been added to the LIAP that
is returned by IdleDetect:
(#q.p = 0 ∧ IdleDetect(q.in, p,N, L))
∨
∨
p′∈τ(q)
p′ 6= p =⇒ #q.p′ ≥ 1 ∧BlockDetect(q.out, p′, N, L)
No new constraints have to be added to the LIAP as this constraint is necessary
and suﬃcient for permanent idleness of queue q for packet p. The second case,
when the queue has not been visited yet, holds for similar reasons.
Theorem 9.4 Let X be a primitive whose semantics are speciﬁed in semantics
S. Let L be a set of primitives. If an algorithm is correct for L, the algorithm is
correct for L ∪{X}.
correct(BlockDetect, L) =⇒ correct(BlockDetect, L ∪ {X})
correct(IdleDetect, L) =⇒ correct(IdleDetect, L ∪ {X})
Proof. First, we prove that BlockDetect terminates. The algorithm keeps track
of visited queues, to ensure termination in case of cycles of queues. Combinatorial
primitives are not marked visited, but as there are no combinatorial cycles between
queues, the algorithm will always eventually reach a queue when unfolding blocking
and idle formulas of combinatorial primitives. The algorithm terminates for all
networks without combinatorial cycles.
Secondly, we prove correctness of BlockDetect by induction. For the induct-
ive case, let i be the in-channel of some primitive x currently under exploration.
By induction hypothesis, we know that the algorithm correctly computes block-
ing equations of the out-channels of primitive x and idle equations for the other
in-channels. If x is a primitive of type X, by Theorem 9.1 the algorithm unfolds
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for blocking of in-channel i of primitive x. If
x is not a primitive of type X, then it is a primitive in xMAS. The algorithm is
correct by assumption correct(BlockDetect, xMAS).
The exact similar reasoning holds for IdleDetect.
Finally, we can formulate our main theorem stating correctness of algorithm
for any language L.
Corollary 9.1 The algorithm is correct for any set of primitives L.
∀L · correct(BlockDetect, xMAS0 ∪ L)
∀L · correct(IdleDetect, xMAS0 ∪ L)
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9.4 Experimental Results
Section 9.1.3 presented several examples of communication fabrics. In this section,
we present experimental results of running our algorithm on these examples and
variations on them.
2D Mesh
We experimented with diﬀerent layouts of masters and slaves. Curve 2D-MS shows
the results where all nodes are both master and slave, i.e., they both inject requests
and send out responses upon receiving a request. Curve 2D-MS-LR has been
obtained with masters on the left part of the mesh and slaves on the right part.
We can prove absence of deadlocks in approximately 1.5 seconds for a 16x16 mesh
consisting of 4864 primitives. Masters on even columns and slaves on odd columns
yields curve 2D-MS-EO. Deadlocks are found within 2 seconds in a 16x16 mesh.
As reference, we have also included results on a 2D mesh without masters and
slaves, i.e., a standard mesh with XY routing (curve 2D-XY).
Finally, we have also run our tool on a 2D mesh with adaptive west-ﬁrst routing.
Curve 2D-WF shows that proving meshes deadlock-free with adaptive routing can
still be done eﬃciently. We have proven a 16x16 mesh deadlock-free within 1
second.
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Figure 9.20: Experimental results
Spidergon
We have experimented with several variations of the Spidergon chip. First, we
have the basic Spidergon with shortest path routing. Our algorithm ﬁnds dead-
locks instantaneously (curve SP). We have added virtual channels to the ring and
modiﬁed the routing logic in such a way that deadlocks are prevented. Our al-
gorithm assesses deadlock freedom of a ring with 100 cores (consisting of 1444
xMAS components) in 0,12 seconds.
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We have added the write-invalidate cache coherency protocol to the basic
Spidergon design, i.e., without virtual channels. This does not increase the run-
ning time signiﬁcantly (curve SP-CCP). Deadlocks are found quickly. We have
experimented with limiting the cores that can inject messages. If only the upper
right quarter of the ring injects read and write messages, the network becomes
deadlock-free. Curve SP-CCP-Q shows the corresponding results: a ring with 32
cores is proven deadlock-free within 30 seconds.
Finally, we have modelled a Spidergon with credit-based ﬂow control (curve
SP-CC). We have added a credit control unit to the basic Spidergon, limiting the
total number of packets in the ring to some constant C. With each injection of
a packet into a local queue, a token is sent to the credit control unit. With each
consumption of a packet, a token is removed from the credit control unit. If C is
too large, deadlocks are found quickly. With C = N · k − 1, where N is the total
number of nodes and k the size of the queues, the network becomes deadlock-free.
We have established deadlock freedom of a credit-based Spidergon with 32 cores
in 193 seconds.
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Figure 9.21: Experimental results
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented an overview of our work on verifying the interconnect
integrally. A family of langauges has been presented, together with a deadlock
detection algorithm for each language in this family. We have implemented an
initial prototype of this algorithm to show the feasibility of our approach.
There is a trade-oﬀ between the expressivity of the languages and the tract-
ability of deadlock detection. For example, we restrict the use of the logical neg-
ation operator in expressing semantics of new components, to exclude networks
where deadlock is dependent on eagerness of channels. Checking eﬃciently for
eagerness is still an open problem. As another example, functions associated to
primitives must be unary to ensure that eﬃcient simulation of packet injections
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is possible. These restrictions limit the use of some primitives that are commonly
used in communication fabrics. Examples are the unrestricted join and the priority
merge. However, we were able to model complex examples with, e.g., credit-based
ﬂow control, message dependencies, or cache chorency protocols. In all examples,
deadlock detection was scalable up to non-trivial sized networks.
The examples presented in this chapter were mostly academic. Applying our
algorithm to realistic and industrial examples is very interesting future work. The
algorithm heavily relies on invariants to rule out unreachable deadlocks. Currently
we have implemented Intels technique for invariant generation. Extending this
technique with more accurate and signiﬁcant invariants would increase the real-
world applicability of our algorithm. We also expect it to increase the scalability
of our algorithm, as more restrictive invariants generally result in a lesser search
space.
In contrast to DCI2, our algorithm requires copious input. It requires a com-
plete microarchitectural model of the application, network and link layer. We
are currently working on a graphical tool linked to both the invariant generator
and our deadlock detection algorithm to facilitate the design of microarchitectural
models. This tool also allows custom primitives, and objects composed of other
primitives or other composite objects. The result would enable an incremental
and compositional approach to deadlock detection in communication fabrics in
the style of D-ﬁnder [9, 102].
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Epilogue
Summary
This thesis deals with formal and mechanical veriﬁcation methods for proving
correctness of the interconnects on microchips. Future microchips are expected to
be built from many cores, which perform computations in parallel. Network-on-
Chip (NoC) is a new paradigm in which a sophisticated infrastructure takes care
of the communication between the cores.
The ubiquity of microchips mandates precise and thorough methods for estab-
lishing their correctness. The contribution of this thesis consists of formal methods
focused on the NoC paradigm which are on one hand easy to use and on the other
hand scalable. Where there previously was no scalable way to establish of some
network that it is always able to successfully complete every pending communica-
tion, this thesis presents algorithms which automatically establish this for a large
family of networks.
In Part II, we start our eﬀort by formalizing the notion of correctness we are
interested in. We coin this notion productivity. A network is productive if and only
if at all times any message can eventually be injected, and any injected message
will always eventually arrive at its destination. Basically, a productive network
behaves like a point-to-point out-of-order network with non-deterministic delay.
Productivity is an emergent property depending on interactions between all
the constituents of the network. We show that in order to prove productivity of
the network as a whole, it suﬃces to prove several smaller isolated properties on
the network constituents. Productivity has been broken down into ﬁve network
properties: functional correctness, deadlock freedom, livelock freedom, starvation
freedom and liveness of injection. Most of these properties have further been
broken down into elementary proof obligations. Many of these proof obligations
are easily discharged. Deadlock freedom, however, is both hard to prove and hard
to split into smaller and more elementary proof obligations. Therefore, the remain-
ing parts of this thesis are devoted to automatically proving absence of deadlocks
for communication interconnects.
It is common practice to reason over networks in diﬀerent layers of abstraction
using the OSI model. This approach has been applied for deadlock freedom as well.
Typically, both the network- and the application layer are proven deadlock-free.
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The drawback of this approach is that even when both layers have been proven
deadlock-free in isolation, cross-layer deadlocks may still occur due to interactions
between layers.
This thesis considers two models of on on-chip communication fabrics. The
isolated network model abstracts away from both the application layer and the
link layer. Eﬀectively, this isolates the network (that is, the routing, injection,
type of switching). Conversely, the integrated network model takes into account
all details of the communication fabric, the applications running on top of it and
the underlying link layer.
Part III presents both the theory and practice of proving deadlock freedom
of communication networks under the isolated network model. We present neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions for deadlock freedom in both packet and wormhole
networks. For packet networks, we present an algorithm that decides deadlock free-
dom in O(|A|), with A the number of routing dependencies in the network. We
show that a similar polynomial algorithm for wormhole networks is not feasible:
deciding deadlock freedom of wormhole networks is shown to be co-NP-complete.
We therefore present an algorithm that is incomplete, but polynomial. If it claims
that the network is deadlock-free, then this result is sound. However, if a deadlock
is found, this deadlock may not actually be legal or reachable from the empty ini-
tial conﬁguration. The algorithm decides deadlock freedom in O(|A||C|), with A
the number of routing dependencies in the network and C the number of channels.
Subsequently, we incorporate eﬃcient C implementations of our algorithms in
the tool DCI2. Besides deadlocks, DCI2 detects livelocks, misrouting and other
routing related issues. We have applied DCI2 to various non-trivial examples.
We prove correctness of a complicated adaptive fault-tolerant routing function in
20x20 mesh up to two faulty channels. This amounts to proving 2,878,800 con-
ﬁgurations deadlock-free. Also, DCI2 conﬁrmed the existence of a deadlock in an
initial design of an NoC with irregular routing due to wireless transmissions in the
WNoC designed at the University of California, Irvine.
Part IV presents both a language and a deadlock detection algorithm for the in-
tegrated network model. The language is based on the xMAS language designed by
Intel. The xMAS language is restricted to a set of eight standard primitives, which
allows relatively eﬃcient formal veriﬁcation. We have generalized this language
to support user-deﬁned primitives. This generalization ensures that the language
is suﬃciently expressive, while preserving the possibility of eﬃcient formal veriﬁc-
ation. Using xMAS with additional user-deﬁned primitives allows the modelling
of application layer behavior such as cache coherency protocols and master/slave
behavior, the modelling of network layer behavior such as adaptive routing and
irregular topologies and the modelling of link layer behavior such as in-network
synchronization and counters.
The deadlock detection algorithm presented in Part IV is able to analyze any
network that consists of the eight standard xMAS primitives and user-deﬁned
primitives. It is therefore able to ﬁnd cross-layer deadlocks caused by, e.g., message
dependencies or wrongly sized counters. The algorithm is not complete. If it
establishes deadlock freedom this result is sound, but if it ﬁnds a deadlock then
this deadlock might not actually be reachable. We have used Intel’s invariant
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generation technique to rule out unreachable deadlocks as much as possible.
Our algorithm has established deadlock freedom of, e.g., a 2D mesh topology
with west-ﬁrst routing, diﬀerent types of messages and master/slave application-
behavior, or the Spidergon ring topology with a cache coherency protocol and on-
chip packet counting.
There is a trade-oﬀ between detecting deadlocks of the network in isolation,
or applying the integrated approach. The advantages of considering the network
layer separately, is that complete – necessary and suﬃcient – conditions can be
deﬁned. For packet networks, such a condition is decidable in polynomial time. For
wormhole networks, a polynomial algorithm can still prove absence of deadlocks
of many networks. In contrast, our deadlock detection algorithm for xMAS is
exponential and uses solvers of NP-complete problems such as satisﬁability and
integer linear programming. We have not been able to formulate a static necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the absence of deadlocks. As a result, any deadlock
found still has to be scrutinized in order to assess that it is actually reachable.
Conversely, the advantages of considering the network monolithically is the
reliability of a positive result. Once a network has been proven deadlock-free –
taken into consideration the applications running on top of it and the link layer
underneath it – this result is sound. If one proves the network layer deadlock-free
in isolation, one is still not assured of the absence of cross-layer deadlocks.
Overall, both approaches have their value. Since our tool DCI2 requires relat-
ively little input and provides copious output, it can be used during the design
phase to debug a network. In contrast, once a stable design has been achieved,
one can take the eﬀort of formalizing this design in its entirety to prove absence
of deadlock once and for all.
The ACL2 theorem prover has been of crucial importance while creating this
thesis. We have extensively made use of typical ACL2 features such as its high
degree of automation and the executability of the ACL2 code. Also, various non-
typical features like the ability to simulate second-order logic or using single-
threaded objects to create eﬃciently executable LISP code have been of great
value. Most importantly, there was a large and apposite library available in GeNoC
to build upon and to extend. A major disadvantage is the fact that there is a gap
between the ACL2 code and its presentation on paper. Due to the fact that the
logic of ACL2 is mostly quantiﬁer-free and ﬁrst-order, the formulation of various
theorems and deﬁnitions diﬀer from their clean mathematical representations in
this thesis.
An example of the added value of proving theorems in ACL2 can be found in
the proofs of correctness of our algorithms in Chapter 7. Both algorithms have
a post-processing step. This step corrects some undesired behavior of the initial
steps. This correction is only required for some speciﬁc networks and for some
speciﬁc traces of the algorithms. We would not have found the necessity of these
post-processing steps without mechanically proving their correctness.
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Future Work
To fully justify the relevance of the contents of this thesis, some additional claims
require further research. In Section 1.1, we argue that analytical methods are
necessary to prove correctness of NoCs, since simulation does not scale to future
communication-centric SoCs. It would be interesting to compare the algorithms
presented in this thesis with state-of-the-art simulation tools. Similarly, we claim
that current model checkers do not scale to future NoCs. We have not yet com-
pared our algorithms with state-of-the-art model checkers. Also, our isolated net-
work model can beneﬁt from more justiﬁcation. To justify assumptions that, e.g.,
all sources fairly send messages to all others sources, we could prove that without
these assumptions, deciding deadlock freedom becomes NP-complete (even for
packet networks).
Even though we have proven co-NP-completeness of deciding deadlock freedom
of wormhole networks, we are still planning to make a complete decision proced-
ure. Such a procedure could be obtained by linking the output of our polynomial
algorithm to an SMT solver to see whether the found deadlock can actually be
ﬁlled by pairwise disjoint worms. Linking the output to an integer programming
solver could have the beneﬁt of ﬁnding minimal deadlocks, which can signiﬁcantly
increase the readability of the output.
DCI2 has been used to prove absence of deadlocks of fault-tolerant routing
functions. It is run in a brute-force – but parallel – fashion on millions of diﬀerent
conﬁgurations where two channels are faulty. For non-trivial networks, we have
not been able to scale to three faulty channels. It is an interesting challenge to deal
with faulty channels in a more symbolical fashion and to prevent this combinatorial
blow-up.
As for our xMAS deadlock detection algorithm, a very interesting direction of
future work is dealing with hierarchies of xMAS networks. To facilitate the creation
of composite objects, to prove them deadlock-free in separation, and subsequently
to reuse this proof in larger xMAS models may signiﬁcantly increase the scalability
of our algorithm. Combined with a graphical xMAS designer tool, this work may
lead to a scalable and user-friendly tool for proving deadlock freedom of a large
class of communication fabrics.
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Datastructures and Notation
A.1 Sets
A set is a – possibly inﬁnite – collection of objects. A set does not contain du-
plicates and the order in which the objects are stored is irrelevant. That is, one
cannot access the ﬁrst object in a set. A set S from objects o0, o1, . . . is denoted
with S = {o0, o1 . . .}. Membership of object x in set S is denoted with x ∈ S. The
empty set is denoted with ∅. The cardinality of set S is denoted with |S|.
Two sets S1 and S2 are equal, notation S1 = S2, if and only if all their objects are
equal.
S1 = S2
def
= (∀x ∈ S1 · x ∈ S2) ∧ (∀x ∈ S2 · x ∈ S1)
Set S1 is a subset of set S2, notation S1 ⊆ S2, if and only if all objects in S1 are
members of S2:
S1 ⊆ S2
def
= ∀x ∈ S1 · x ∈ S2
The powerset of set S, notation P(S), is the set of all subsets of S.
P(S)
def
= P such that S′ ∈ P ⇐⇒ S′ ⊆ S
Given set S and predicate P : S 7→ B, the set comprehension from P , notation
{x ∈ S | P (x)}, is deﬁned as the set with all objects in S that satisfy P :
{x ∈ S | P (x)}
def
= S′ such that ∀x ∈ S′ · x ∈ S ∧ P (x)
The removal of object x from S, notation S − x, is deﬁned as the set S without
object x.
S − x
def
= S′ such that x′ ∈ S′ ⇐⇒ x′ ∈ S ∧ x′ 6= x
Given two sets S1 and S2 the union of S1 and S2, notation S1 ∪S2, is deﬁned as
the set containing exactly all objects of S1 and S2.
S1 ∪S2
def
= U such that x ∈ U ⇐⇒ (x ∈ S1 ∨ x ∈ S2)
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Set {o0, o1, . . .}
Membership x ∈ S
Empty set ∅
Cardinality |S|
Equality S1 = S2
Subset S1 ⊆ S2
Powerset P(S)
Set comprehension S′ = {x ∈ S | P (x)}
Removal S − x
Union S1 ∪S2
Mutual union
⋃
S
Intersection S1 ∩S2
Mutual intersection
⋂
S
Table A.1: Overview of set-related notation.
Given a set of sets S, the mutual union of S, notation
⋃
S is deﬁned as the union
of all objects in S.
⋃
S
def
= U such that x ∈ U ⇐⇒ (∃S′ ∈ S · x ∈ S′)
Given two sets S1 and S2 the intersection of S1 and S2, notation S1 ∩S2, is deﬁned
as the set containing exactly all shared objects of S1 and S2.
S1 ∩S2
def
= I such that x ∈ I ⇐⇒ (x ∈ S1 ∧ x ∈ S2)
Given a set of sets S, the mutual intersection of S, notation
⋂
S is deﬁned as the
intersection of all objects in S.
⋂
S
def
= I such that x ∈ I ⇐⇒ (∀S′ ∈ S · x ∈ S′)
Table A.1 provides an overview.
A.2 Lists
A list is a – ﬁnite – collection of objects. A list may contain duplicates. The order
in which the objects are stored is relevant. A list L from objects o0, o1, . . . , ok
is denoted with L = [o0, o1 . . . , ok]. Membership of object x in list L is denoted
with x ∈ L. The empty list is denoted with []. The number of objects in list L is
denoted with |L|. Given a natural number n < |L|, the nth object of list L can be
accessed by L[n]. The head of the list is deﬁned as the ﬁrst object, i.e., L[0]. The
tail of list L, notation tail(L), is deﬁned as the remainder.
Two lists L1 and L2 are equal, notation L1 = L2, if and only if they have the
same object at each index.
L1 = L2
def
= |L1| = |L2| ∧ ∀0 ≤ n < |L1| · L1[n] = L2[n]
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The removal of object x from list L, notation L − x, is deﬁned as list L without
object x.
L− x
def
=
if |L| = 0 []
if L[0] = x tail(L)− x
otherwise [L[0], tail(L)− x]
The last object in list L, notation last(L), is the object at the end of the list.
last(L)
def
= L[|L| − 1]
The count of object x in list L, notation count(x, L), is the number of occurrences
of x in L.
count(x, L)
def
= count(x, tail(L)) +
if L[0] = x 1
otherwise 0
List L1 is a sublist of list L2, notation L1 ⊑ L2, if and only if each object in L1
has at least as many occurrences in L2.
L1 ⊑ L2
def
= ∀x ∈ L1 · count(x, L1) ≤ count(x, L2)
List L is a subset of set S, notation L ⊆ S, if and only if each object in L is a
member of S.
L ⊆ S
def
= ∀x ∈ L · x ∈ S
The list powerset of set S, notation L(S), is deﬁned as the set containing any list
L that is a subset of set S.
L(S)
def
= S′ such that L ∈ S′ ⇐⇒ L ⊆ S
Given list L and predicate P : L 7→ B, the list comprehension from P , notation
[x ∈ L | P (x)], is deﬁned as the list with all objects in L that satisfy P . In the
list, the order of the elements is preserved:
[x ∈ L | P (x)]
def
=
if |L| = 0 []
if P (L[0]) [L[0]([x ∈ tail(L) | P (x)])]
otherwise [x ∈ tail(L) | P (x)]
List L1 is a permutation of list L2, notation L1 ⋍ L2, if and only if they have the
same objects:
L1 ⋍ L2
def
= L1 ⊑ L2 ∧ L2 ⊑ L1
The union of two lists L1 = [o10, o
1
1, . . . , o
1
k] and L2 = [o
2
0, o
2
1, . . . , o
2
m], notation
L1 ⊔ L2, is the appending of L2 after L1.
L1 ⊔ L2
def
= [o10, o
1
1, . . . , o
1
k, o
2
0, o
2
1, . . . , o
2
m]
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The mutual union of a set of lists S, notation
⊔
S, is the set containing all objects
in all lists in S.
⊔
S
def
= U such that x ∈ U ⇐⇒ (∃L ∈ S · x ∈ L)
The intersection of two lists L1 and L2, notation L1 ⊓L2, is a list with all objects
in lists L1 and L2.
L1 ⊓ L2
def
=
if |L1| = 0 []
if L1[0] ∈ L2 ∧ L1[0] /∈ tail(L1) [L1[0](tail(L1) ⊓ L2)]
otherwise tail(L1) ⊓ L2
The mutual intersection of a set of lists S, notation
d
S, is the set containing all
objects shared by all lists in S.
l
S
def
= U such that x ∈ U ⇐⇒ (∀L ∈ S · x ∈ L)
Set of lists S is pairwise disjoint, notation
d
S = [], if and only if each list in S
shares no objects with the other lists in S:
l
S = ∅
def
= ∀L1, L2 ∈ S · L1 6= L2 =⇒ L1 ⊓ L2 = []
Set of lists P is a partition for list L, notation P ⊕ L, if and only if P is a set of
pairwise disjoint lists that cover L.
P ⊕ L
def
=
l
P = ∅ ∧
⊔
P ⋍ L
Table A.2 provides an overview.
A.3 Tuples
A tuple is a – ﬁnite – collection of objects. Each object can be accessed through a
key. Given a set of keys {k0, k1, . . . , kn}, a tuple type is denoted with 〈k0, k1, . . . , kn〉.
Given a tuple t, the object stored under key k can be accessed through t.k.
A.4 Graphs
A graph G is deﬁned by a set of vertices V and a function A : V 7→ P(V ). All
graphs in this thesis are directed multigraphs. Function A represents the arcs in
the graph and assigns a set of neighbors to each vertex. There is an arc (v0, v1) in
the graph if and only if v1 ∈ A(v0). In all deﬁnitions in this section, we assume a
graph G deﬁned by vertex set V and arc function A : V 7→ P(V ).
The set of parents of vertex v, notation parents(v,G), is the set of vertices of
which v is a neighbor.
parents(v,G)
def
= {p ∈ V | v ∈ A(p)}
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List [o0, o1, . . . , ok]
Membership x ∈ L
Empty list []
Size |L|
nth object L[n]
Head L[0]
Tail tail(L)
Equality L1 = L2
Remove L− x
Last element last(L)
Count count(x, L)
Sublist L1 ⊑ L2
Subset L ⊆ S
List powerset L(L)
List comprehension [x ∈ L | P (x)]
Permution L1 ⋍ L2
Union L1 ⊔ L2
Mutual union
⊔
S
Intersection L1 ⊓ L2
Mutual intersection
d
S
Pairwise disjoint
d
S = ∅
Partition P ⊕ L
Table A.2: Overview of list-related notation.
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A list of vertices π is a path, notation path(π,G), if and only if each vertex in π
is a neighbor of its successor. The head of the path is its ﬁrst object.
path(π,G)
def
= π ∈ L(V ) ∧ |π| > 0 ∧ ∀0 < i < |π| − 1 · π[i] ∈ A(π[i+ 1])
A list of vertices π is a cycle, notation cycle(π,G), if and only if it is a path where
the last object is a neighbor of the head of the path.
cycle(π,G)
def
= path(π,G) ∧ last(π) ∈ A(π[0])
A set of vertices S is a knot, notation knot(S,G), if and only if it is a set of vertices
where each vertex has at least one neighbor and all neighbors are included in S.
knot(S,G)
def
= S 6= ∅ ∧ ∀v ∈ S · v ∈ V ∧ |A(v)| > 0 ∧A(v) ⊆ S
Table A.3 provides an overview.
Graph G = (V,A)
Vertices V
Arc function A : V 7→ P(V )
Parents parents(v,G)
Path path(π,G)
Head of path π[0]
Cycle cycle(π,G)
Knot knot(S,G)
Table A.3: Overview of graph-related notation.
186
Appendix B
List of Terms
Abbreviation Meaning
PS Packet Switching
WHS Wormhole Switching
Iso Isolated Network Layer
Int Integrated Network Layer
ACL2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Conﬁguration (GeNoC). . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Conﬁguration (Int) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Conﬁguration (Iso) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
DCI2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 131
Deadlock (Int) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Deadlock (PS, Iso) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Deadlock (WHS, Iso) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Deadlock avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Deadlock freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Deadlock prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Deadlock-attainable (WHS) . . . . . . 115
Deadlock-immune (PS) . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Deadlock-immune (WHS) . . . . . . . . 115
Deadlock-sensitive (PS) . . . . . . . . . . 104
Deadlock-sensitive (WHS) . . . . . . . . 115
Dependency graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 74
Escape (PS, Iso) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Escape (WHS, Iso) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 43
Flit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Functional correctness . . . . . . . . . 32, 40
Functional instantiation . . . . . . . . . . . 25
GeNoC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
HERMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Idle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Injection (GeNoC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Legal (PS, Iso) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Legal (WHS, Iso). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Livelock freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 45
Liveness of injection . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 44
Local liveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 46
MaDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Message dependency . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 153
Network (Iso) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Next hop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
NoC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Packet switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Persistency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 49
Proof Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Quasi deadlock (WHS) . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Routing function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Routing function (GeNoC) . . . . . . . . 36
Routing function (Iso) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
SoC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Spidergon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 173
Starvation freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 48
Starvation prevention (GeNoC) . . . . 36
Switching (GeNoC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Travel (GeNoC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Typing information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
West-ﬁrst routing . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 155
Wormhole switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
XMAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift gaat over formele veriﬁcatie van communicatie infrastructuren
aanwezig op microchips. Naar verwachting zullen toekomstige microchips vele
verschillende processors bevatten, die parallel berekeningen uitvoeren. Netwerk-
op-Chip (NoC) is een nieuw paradigma waarbij de communicatie tussen de pro-
cessors verzorgd wordt door een geavanceerde infrastructuur.
Het feit dat microchips in ons dagelijks leven overal aanwezig zijn maakt het
noodzakelijk dat we precieze en grondige methodes hebben om hun correctheid
vast te stellen. De bijdrage van dit proefschrift bestaat uit formele methodes toe-
gespitst op het NoC paradigma die enerzijds makkelijk bruikbaar zijn en anderzijds
schaalbaar. Waar er eerder geen schaalbare methode bestond om van een netwerk
op een microchip vast te stellen dat het altijd in staat is om iedere gewenste com-
municatie succesvol uit te voeren, presenteert dit proefschrift algoritmes die dit
automatisch kunnen bepalen voor een uitgebreide familie van communicatie net-
werken.
In Deel II wordt de notie van correctheid geformaliseerd. We noemen deze
eigenschap productiviteit. Een netwerk is productief dan en slechts dan als te
allen tijde iedere processor uiteindelijk in staat is een boodschap te versturen en
als te allen tijde iedere verstuurde boodschap uiteindelijk aankomt bij de correcte
bestemming. In een productief netwerk is iedere boodschap vrij van dodelijke
omarming (deadlock), rusteloosheid (livelock) en uithongering (starvation). Een
verzameling van aannames wordt geformaliseerd die volstaat om een netwerk pro-
ductief te bewijzen. De aanname die het lastigst is om van een gegeven netwerk
te bewijzen, is de afwezigheid van deadlocks.
Delen III en IV presenteren automatische formele methodes om afwezigheid
van deadlocks vast te stellen. Deel III gebruikt een communicatie netwerk mo-
del waarin alleen het netwerk relevant wordt beschouwd en de toepassingen die
ervan gebruik maken weg worden geabstraheerd (het geïsoleerde netwerk model).
Eerst worden twee theorieën gepresenteerd – één voor pakket netwerken en één
voor wormgat netwerken – die noodzakelijke en afdoende condities bevatten voor
afwezigheid van deadlocks. Voor pakket netwerken presenteren we een polynomi-
ale beslissingsprocedure voor de desbetreﬀende noodzakelijke en afdoende conditie.
Voor wormgat netwerken bewijzen we eerst dat een dergelijke beslissingsprocedure
niet bestaat door het probleem co-NP-compleet te bewijzen. Vervolgens wordt een
polynomiale procedure gepresenteerd die een conditie afdoende voor afwezigheid
van deadlocks beslist.
De bruikbaarheid van de algoritmes wordt aangetoond met behulp van uitge-
breide experimentele resultaten. Om deze resultaten te verkrijgen is de applicatie
DCI2 geïmplementeerd (Deadlock Checker In Designs of Communication Intercon-
nects). DCI2 veriﬁeert naast afwezigheid van deadlocks ook andere eigenschappen
geformuleerd in de verzameling van aannames uit Deel II. Het is daarmee een ap-
plicatie die automatisch productiviteit vast kan stellen van netwerken geformuleerd
binnen het geïsoleerde network model. DCI2 wordt gebruikt om productiviteit van
een complexe adaptieve route functie vast te stellen in een 20 bij 20 vlak, waarin
twee willekeurige communicatie kanalen defect kunnen zijn. Dit komt neer op het
vaststellen van afwezigheid van deadlocks in 2,878,800 verschillende conﬁguraties.
Ook heeft DCI2 de aanwezigheid van een deadlock bevestigd in een concept ont-
werp van een netwerk met onregelmatige routes en draadloze transmissies van de
Universiteit van California, Irvine.
Deel IV beschouwt deadlock detectie in het geïntegreerde netwerk model. In
dit model wordt niet alleen het netwerk zelf in acht genomen, maar ook de applica-
ties die er gebruik van maken en de onderliggende implementatie van het netwerk.
De uitdaging ligt hier in een taal die enerzijds voldoende expressief is om al deze
facetten te modelleren en die anderzijds voldoende toegespitst is om eﬃciënt for-
meel veriﬁeerbaar te zijn. De taal xMAS, geïntroduceerd door Intel, bevat een
verzameling van acht primitieven waarmee een communicatie netwerk kan worden
ontworpen. Deel IV breidt deze taal uit met de mogelijkheid om eigen primitieven
toe te voegen. Dit maakt de taal expressief genoeg om allerlei geavanceerde facet-
ten van communicatie netwerken te modelleren zoals protocollen voor het coherent
behouden van het tijdelijke geheugen, adaptieve routes, synchronisaties op de chip
en boodschap tellers. Vervolgens wordt er een algoritme gepresenteerd dat van een
netwerk beschreven in de door de gebruiker gedeﬁnieerde primitieven zoekt naar
deadlocks. Het resultaat van deze aanpak is een algoritme dat in staat is complexe
boodschap afhankelijke deadlocks te vinden. Het algoritme heeft bijvoorbeeld een
twee dimensionale topologie met west-eerst routes, verschillende boodschap types
en meester/slaaf applicaties vrij van deadlocks bewezen. Tevens heeft het de Spi-
dergon topologie met krediet boekhouding correct bewezen.
De ACL2 bewijs assistent is cruciaal geweest bij de totstandkoming van dit
proefschrift. De verzameling van aannames in Deel II is met behulp van de ACL2
bewijsassistent geformaliseerd. Het bewijs dat deze verzameling afdoende is voor
productiviteit is mechanisch tot stand gekomen met behulp van ACL2. Ook cor-
rectheid van zowel de theoriën als de algoritmes in Deel III is geveriﬁeerd met
behulp van de ACL2 bewijs assistent. Er is uitgebreid gebruik gemaakt van ACL2
speciﬁeke mogelijkheden zoals uitvoerbaarheid van de logica, de hoge mate van
automatisering wat betreft het vinden van bewijzen en een uitgebreide bibliotheek
waarop gebouwd kon worden.
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